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Abstract
This thesis explores an array of natural and field experiments to produce causal
estimates of the impact of interventions on four populations: firms, workers, consumers,
and voters, making use of public and private micro-level data. The first chapter
measures the effects on firm performance of a sharp increase in transportation costs
on specific highways. The second chapter investigates the labor market consequences
of an exogenous shock, the unexpected inflow of repatriates following the independence
of former Portuguese African colonies. The third chapter analyzes one of the first
soda taxes implemented worldwide that rises with sugar content to assess its effects on
prices and consumption. The fourth chapter reports on a nationwide field experiment
assessing, for the first time, the capacity of the entire network of a country’s ATM to
“get out the vote”.
Keywords: Evidence-based reforms, difference-in-differences, natural experiments,
field experiments, (shift-share) instrumental variables, highways, repatriates, migration,
consumption taxes, get out the vote, Portugal.
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Introduction
In economics, it is understood that the presence of market failures — like externalities,
public goods, and imperfect competition — creates room for well-designed public
interventions that enhance social welfare. The challenging part is then how to
exactly define what “well-designed” means. Reforms implemented without a deep
understanding of their economic and political consequences, rather than promoting
economic efficiency, can remarkably reduce it (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013).2
Rigorous empirical methods can help determining which sorts of interventions are
effective by providing a counterfactual or, put simply, what would have happened had
the action not been taken.
John Hicks started his 1980 book writing that ”Causality and economics, which
I have joined in my title, are words that are not often found together. Causality,
the relation between cause and effect, is thought to be the business of philosophers;
economists, though they often talk about effects and sometimes (perhaps less
frequently) about causes, are usually content to leave the question of the meanings
of these terms to others” (Hicks, 1980, page 14). The relationship between economists
and causality has, since then, completely changed. Inspired by the early works of
statisticians such as, inter alia, Donald Rubin, Judea Pearl, and James Heckman, and
the “credibility revolution” put forward by labor economists like Joshua Angrist, David
2Joseph Stiglitz argued that sometimes even Pareto improvements are difficult to implement
(Stiglitz, 1998).
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Card, and Alan Krueger, economists have become obsessed with estimating the causal
impact of shocks and reforms (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). Also important in this
pursuit were the experimental contributions of development and behavioral economists
such as Daniel Kahneman, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and John List, as well as
the increased availability of detailed micro-level data in the works of Daron Acemoglu,
Emmanuel Saez, and Raj Chetty.
If all these methodological advances were important for academic reasons, they are
even more central for improving policy prescriptions and reshaping how non-economist
policymakers understand a given issue. Statistics, the “science of the state,” lies at the
heart of policy-making, since every policy measure is constructed to manipulate certain
parameters to achieve a goal. To make an informed, evidence-based decision, policy
makers need to have a priori knowledge about the likely trade-offs of their actions, given
the relevant theoretical framework, the available data, the institutional context, and
the economic question of interest. However, it is also extremely important to revisit and
monitor previous decisions a posteriori and measure their causal impact to fine-tune
current policies and inform on future ones.
Most policymakers know that “correlation does not imply causality”, but sometimes
fail to understand exactly why correlations, particularly in observational data, are
unlikely to display a causal relationship. And this is for the simple reason that economic
agents are not behaving randomly, but instead engaging in (what they perceive as)
optimal behavior. Even more difficult is to gauge a causal relationship when that effect
is not straightforwardly identifiable by simple descriptive statistics.
The causal interpretation of policy shocks and reforms requires meticulous and sound
testing, and attentive consideration of direct and spillover effects. As Scott Cunningham
put it, “The foundations of scientific knowledge are scientific methodologies. True
scientists do not collect evidence in order to prove what they want to be true or what
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others want to believe. That is a form of deception and manipulation called propaganda,
and propaganda is not science. Rather, scientific methodologies are devices for forming
a particular kind of belief. Scientific methodologies allow us to accept unexpected, and
sometimes undesirable, answers. They are process oriented, not outcome oriented.”3
In this thesis, I present four examples that carefully estimate the causal inference of
shocks and reforms using (quasi-) natural (Dunning, 2012) and field experiments (Duflo
and Banerjee, 2017). I take advantage of different “mostly harmless” econometric
methods such as difference-in-differences, (shift-share) instrumental variables, and
randomized control trials to provide credible estimates of the true impacts (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008, Cunningham, 2021, Wooldridge, 2010). I study these impacts on
four key economic agents: firms, workers, consumers, and voters.
There is a growing global awareness that the private sector collects valuable data
for social science research (Chetty et al., 2020). In the first two chapters, I use rich
administrative datasets, while in the final two chapters, I collaborate with two of the
most important Portuguese private firms.
In chapter one, “Transportation Costs and firm performance”, a joint work with
Catarina Branco, Dirk Dohse, and José Tavares, we focus our attention on firms
to analyze how they are effected by the introduction of tolls on previously toll-free
highways. In recent decades, falling transportation costs and rapid technological
progress have precipitated an explosion of trade and changed the spatial economic
pattern of several regions. But what happens when transportation costs suddenly
increase? To answer this question in a causal manner, we rely on a natural experiment,
which resulted from Portuguese central authorities being forced to increase these
transportation costs, in specific highways, during the European sovereign debt crisis
(2010-2011). We use micro-level data encompassing the universe of Portuguese private
3For an interesting discussion on this topic see https://mixtape.scunning.com/introduction.
html.
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firms, for the period 2006-2016, with detailed accounting information to estimate
difference-in-differences and event study with various vectors of firm and regional-year
fixed effects.
Our results show a 10.8% decrease of turnover in firms located in affected
municipalities vis-à-vis firms in the remaining areas. Expenses, in turn, increase,
but by a smaller magnitude, which leads to a reduction of firms’ profits by 3.4%,
on average. Both domestic and international trade (sales and purchases), particularly
with EU countries, was significantly affected. Furthermore, employment fell 2% in
municipalities affected by the increased transportation costs. Importantly, our findings
do not uncover induced inter-regional firm migration, suggesting a substantial net loss
to the Portuguese economy as a whole.
In chapter two, “Cousins From Overseas: The Labor Market Impact of Half a
Million Portuguese Repatriates”, a joint project with Lara Bohnet and Susana Peralta,
we zoom in on the labor market consequences of a large, exogenous, labor market
shock, exploiting the unexpected inflow of repatriates to Portugal, following the end of
the Portuguese Colonial War in 1974. We use detailed census data on all Portuguese
repatriates living in Portugal in 1981, as well as regional level data for the Portuguese
natives in 1960 and in 1981. The labor supply shock entails a composition dimension,
as the repatriates were more than twice as likely to have secondary or higher education.
We take advantage of the fact that most of the repatriates were Portuguese born
to build novel shift-share instrumental variables based on their region of birth. We
explore the impact on regional labor force participation, unemployment, employment
and self-employment, for both male and female natives.
We find substantial gender differences in the effects, with females absorbing the
bulk of the shock. Native workers are driven out of employment as employees, with
a sizeable 22% decrease for males and 50% for females. Men compensate for this
João Pereira dos Santos 4
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loss by transitioning to low quality self-employment, while women move to inactivity.
Our results are robust to changing the instrumental variable, the geographical unit of
analysis, and to various sample restrictions.
In chapter three, “Brown Sugar, how come you taste so good? The impact of a soda
tax on prices and consumption”, a joint work with Judite Gonçalves, we focus on the
impact of a recent tax reform on consumers. Increasing obesity-related problems and
rising healthcare expenditures have led governments in several countries to consider the
introduction of soda taxes. We study such tax, implemented in Portugal in February
2017 - one of the first soda taxes worldwide that increases with sugar content (0.08 euros
per liter for drinks with less than 80 grams of sugar per liter, and 0.16 euros per liter
for drinks with 80 grams or more sugar per liter, plus VAT). We use extremely detailed
panel data at the product level, from one of the two largest retailers in the country,
covering the period between February 2015 and January 2018. We take advantage of
the tax breakdown by sugar levels to examine how soda prices and quantities purchased
reacted to this policy. For identification, we rely on difference-in-differences models with
various vectors of fixed effects, comparing each group of products to bottled water.
For drinks with more than 80 grams of sugar per liter, results indicate close to 100%
full price pass-through to the consumer. For drinks with less than 80 grams of sugar
per liter, price pass-through surpassed 100%. Regarding consumption, our findings
suggest stockpiling behavior in the quarter when the tax was approved and before
it was actually implemented. In the implementation period, there are no significant
changes in quantities purchased for most beverages vis-à-vis water, with the exception
of soda drinks with comparatively low levels of sugar,and thus exempt from the high
tax rate. This suggests that benefits of the soda tax, in terms of reducing sugar intake,
are mainly due to reformulation, as producers dramatically reduced the sugar content
of some drinks to fall below the 80-grams-per-liter threshold.
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In the first three chapters, we rely on observational data, that is, data where policies
were determined in a non-random way (Athey and Imbens, 2017). Finally, in chapter
four, “Can ATMs Get Out the Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Field Experiment,”
jointly with José Tavares and Pedro Vicente, we conduct a randomized control trial
and a post-election survey to study the effect of a heretofore unexploited method of
voter mobilization to study voter turnout. Low and declining levels of voter turnout
constitute a fundamental problem for democracies, raising questions of legitimacy
and representativeness. We report on a large-scale field experiment we designed and
conducted to assess ATMs’ (automatic teller machines) capacity to “get out the vote”.
Our experimental design used the full universe of functioning ATMs in Portugal (more
than 12 000), which benefits from a sophisticated world class system, with wide national
coverage. We randomly selected a set of treatment civil parishes, where a civic message
took over the totality of ad time in ATMs, which we compare with a set of control civil
parishes where advertisements ran as usual. The ATM campaign we follow was active
for almost three days immediately before and during the 2017 October local elections
in Portugal.
We find no statistical significant impact of the treatment per se. However, when
we consider the intensity of treatment, for both the entire campaign period and the
weekend, results show a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of voting.
All three proxies for treatment intensity we employ (number of unique card users,
operations, and withdrawals) deliver consistent positive coefficients. The results are
also robust to several checks. For example, falsification tests using turnout rates in
previous elections do not show significant coefficients, strengthening our interpretation
of the experimental results.
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Chapter 1
Transportation Costs and Firm
Performance1
1.1 Introduction
Transport infrastructure is key for economic development. Not only does it allow
for circulation of people, it is a fundamental piece in the exchange of goods. At
the same time, transport infrastructure is rather expensive. Thus, it is essential to
understand the relationship between transport infrastructure and economic outcomes
in order to adequately design transport policy. Given the importance of this topic,
studies on the effect of transport infrastructure on aggregate economic outcomes are
quite abundant (Redding and Turner, 2015). However, micro level studies on the effect
1This chapter is written in co-authorship with Catarina Branco, Dirk Dohse, and José Tavares.
We are grateful to Samira Barzin, Dave Donovan, Ed Glaeser, Nezih Guner, Adelheid Holl, Gabriel
Kreindler, Xiang Li, Teresa Molina, Susana Peralta, Alfredo M Pereira, Pedro Portugal, Francisco
Queiró, and seminar participants at Nova SBE, the DUP meeting (Harvard University), the 3rd
CompNet ProdTalks (IWH), SAEe 2020, and the 9th PhD Student Workshop on Industrial and Public
Economics (ECO-SOS) for useful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank BPLim –
Banco de Portugal for providing the necessary data for this study.
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of transport infrastructure on firms performance are rather limited (Holl, 2016).2 This
paper contributes to this still-growing literature by studying the impact of an exogenous
increase in transportation costs on a series of financial indicators of firm performance
using micro-level data. We build on earlier work by Audretsch et al. (2020), but we
take advantage of micro firm-level data to gain a better understanding of the exact
firm-level mechanisms at work, and shed light on which indicators of firm performance
are most strongly affected by the introduction of road tolls.
Estimating the causal effect of transport infrastructure on economic outcomes is
not straightforward, as this kind of infrastructure is usually not randomly assigned.
This fact could lead to biased results as it would not be clear if firm-level outcomes are
varying due to a change in response to lower transportation costs provided by this type
of infrastructure or due to other unobserved characteristics. A common solution in the
literature for this endogeneity problem is to use an Instrumental Variable (IV) or the
inconsequential places approach (Redding and Turner, 2015). Although less common,
some papers alternatively rely on a natural experiment.3 The latter is exactly what we
do in this paper.
The SCUT highway system started being built in 1990 and came into completion
in 2008 in Portugal. Portuguese authorities made this network toll free for its users,
hence the name SCUT (“Sem Custo para o Utilizador” or “Without Cost for the
User”). One of the main motivations behind its conception was to create an alternative
network to the old and deteriorated roads. This new and more modern system sought
to make travelling safer and a lot faster. By the end of 2008, SCUTs accounted for
2Some studies explore the effect of transport infrastructure on micro-level outcomes, such as: firms’
exports (Martincus and Blyde, 2013, Martincus et al., 2017, 2012, 2014), inventories (Datta, 2012, Li
and Li, 2013, Shirley and Winston, 2004), and productivity (Gibbons et al., 2019, Graham, 2007a,b,
Holl, 2012, 2016, Lall et al., 2004, Martin-Barroso et al., 2015).
3For some examples of papers which also use a natural experiment as source of exogenous variation
in infrastructure see Martincus et al. (2014) and Martincus and Blyde (2013). Pereira et al. (2021)
and Audretsch et al. (2020) study the same natural experiment that we do in this paper, but rely on
data aggregated at the municipal-level.
João Pereira dos Santos 8
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
almost 1000km which was nearly a third of the Portuguese highway grid at that time
(Statistics Portugal, 2008).
All of this changed in 2010. On the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis, the
Portuguese government was forced to consolidate its financial position, cutting spending
and increasing revenues (Financial Times, 2013). Thus, the national budget could no
longer sustain the provision of a toll free network. Tolls were then introduced in two
waves, first by the end of 2010 and, then, by the end of 2011.
This event provides a unique setting for a natural experiment, which allows one to
study the impact of an exogenous variation of transportation costs on firm related
outcomes.4 This is only possible because tolls were introduced purely out of the
necessity to regulate government budget. In other words, this decision was made
without special consideration for the firms in those regions. Two earlier studies
have used the same natural experiment in their analyzes to assess the impact of the
unexpected introduction of road tolls on other economic outcomes. Pereira et al. (2021)
show that the introduction of tolls resulted in the increase of the number of accidents and
road injuries. Moreover, another study by Audretsch et al. (2020) concludes that this
shock had a significant negative impact on the number of firms and employment for the
affected municipalities. While Audretsch et al. (2020) rely on municipality-level data,
the current paper makes use of a new firm-level dataset, encompassing more than 300
000 firms, which allows us to investigate the impact of tolls on a wide array of firm-level
performance indicators (including turnover, value-added, productivity, imports, and
exports) and also to check whether the tolls have induced inter-regional firm migration.
The paper contributes to the literature in four different ways. First, it provides an
in-depth analysis of the impact of interurban road tolls on a wide array of firm-level
4In Portugal, the transportation of goods is mainly done through road transports. According to
Statistics Portugal (2015), in 2010, 76% of goods were delivered via road transportation. Moreover,
there were no changes in the provision or in the capacity of railroads in this period.
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performance measures. Second, it analyzes how the tolls affect labor productivity and
how firms pass on the burden of the tolls to their employees (employment cuts or wage
cuts). Third, it covers a relatively long time period after the introduction of tolls,
which allows us to disentangle short-run and medium- and longer- run effects. And
fourth, the rich firm-level dataset allows us to analyze whether the firms respond to the
tolls by migration to other (less or non-affected) regions in Portugal. This is extremely
important for the assessment of the overall welfare effects of the tolls, as losses in
the (most) affected municipalities might be compensated by benefits in the remaining
regions.
Using difference-in-differences and event study specifications, our findings show that
the introduction of tolls caused a 0.8% decrease of turnover in firms located in affected
municipalities vis-à-vis firms in the remaining areas. Both labor and non-labor related
expenses are also negatively affected by the shock (around 9%, on average), but to
a lesser extent than turnover. Hence, firm profits fall by 3.4%, on average. Value
added reduces by more than 7% in these areas. Both sales and purchases to/from the
domestic market and abroad (especially to/from partners in the European Union) were
significantly hit.
Focusing on the effects of the tolls on the labor market, we find that paid employment
fell, on average, 2% in the treatment areas. Full-time employees suffer more (in terms
of employment losses) than part-time employees. The majority of effects are long term,
i.e. still persistent six years after the introduction of tolls. Average wages and labor
productivity go down as well, but the effect is not statistically significant.
Finally, we find that inter-regional firm migration has not played a major role in
response to the introduction of tolls. This is a particularly important result as it allows
to conclude that we observe a real deterioration of overall economic activity – and not
just a relocation of firms from treated to non-treated municipalities.
João Pereira dos Santos 10
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature
review. Section 3 details the institutional background, whereas Section 4 presents
the data and discusses the methodology and possible identification threats. Section
5 highlights the results related to firm-level performance and labor-market outcomes.
Section 6 discusses if the previous results represent a relocation of economic activity
from treated to comparison areas or an overall deterioration of the economic conditions.
Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The majority of research on the economic impact of infrastructure provision and pricing
focuses on the macro (country or region) level and looks at macroeconomic variables.
Some of the most prominent papers study the impact of transport infrastructure on:
population growth (Baum-Snow, 2007, Baum-Snow et al., 2017, Garcia-López et al.,
2015, Michaels et al., 2012), aggregate trade (Donaldson, 2018, Duranton et al., 2014,
Storeygard, 2016), and GDP (Banerjee et al., 2012, Faber, 2014).
However, studies carried out at aggregate levels of analysis provide little insights
in the actual mechanisms by which improvements or deterioriations of infrastructure
affect firm performance (Haughwout, 2002) Moreover, these studies ignore mobility of
firms and responses to local price changes caused by modifications in infrastructure
provision and pricing (Holl, 2006). Therefore, researchers have begun to analyze the
effects of transportation infrastructure on firm level performance variables.
Holl (2012) investigates the influence of transportation infrastructure on firm-level
productivity through its effects on market potential in Spain, finding that growth of
market access has a positive impact on firm-level output growth. Holl and Mariotti
(2018) use detailed geo-referenced data to analyze the effects of highway development
João Pereira dos Santos 11
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
on firm level performance in the Spanish logistics sector. They find that highways have
significant implications for logistics’ firm performance, although with important spatial
heterogeneity. While improved highway access increases the productivity performance
of urban logistics firms, the impact on productivity growth for those rural logistics
firms that remained outside of highway corridors are found to be negative. Gibbons
et al. (2019) estimate the impact of new road infrastructure on employment and labor
productivity using firm level longitudinal data for Britain. They measure exposure
to transport improvements through changes in accessibility and find that improved
accessibility increases output per worker, wages, and use of intermediate inputs for
existing establishments. Several (recent) studies suggest that infrastructure provision
positively affects firm performance in a developing country context. Chauvet and
Ferry (2020) investigate the relationship between taxation and firm performance in
developing countries, finding that taxation benefits firm growth in developing countries,
especially in lower-income countries, through the financing of public infrastructure.
Barzin et al. (2018) estimate the effect of roads on firms’ output growth in Colombia,
finding elasticities of output with respect to road infrastructure ranging from 0.13 to
0.15%, which is clearly larger than what is found in comparable work for developed
countries.
While the recent literature has made substantial progress in addressing the
possibility that infrastructure and transportation costs are not assigned to regions
randomly,5 the majority of research is unable to distinguish between growth (or decline)
5The most recurrent strategy found in the literature to solve this problem is the use of an
instrumental variable. According to Redding and Turner (2015) the use of instrumental variables in this
literature can be categorized into three main strategies: planned route IV (Baum-Snow, 2007, Hornung,
2015, Jedwab and Moradi, 2016, Mayer and Trevien, 2017, Michaels, 2008, Michaels et al., 2012, Möller
and Zierer, 2018), historical route IV (Baum-Snow et al., 2017, Duranton et al., 2014, Duranton and
Turner, 2011, 2012, Garcia-López et al., 2015, Hsu and Zhang, 2014, Martincus et al., 2017, Percoco,
2016), and the inconsequential place approach (Ahlfeldt and Feddersen, 2018, Banerjee et al., 2012,
Chandra and Thompson, 2000, Datta, 2012, Faber, 2014, Fretz et al., 2017, Ghani et al., 2016). An
attractive alternative to these standard approaches is the use of natural experiments (Bröcker et al.,
2019).
João Pereira dos Santos 12
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
and reorganization of economic activity. As Gibbons et al. (2019) put it, ”In common
with all empirical work that estimates causal effects from statistical comparisons across
time and place, it is impossible to know for sure whether these employment increases
are additional to the economy as a whole” (Gibbons et al. (2019), p. 45).
However, as is well-known since the seminal paper by Fogel (1964), the assessment
of the economic impact of infrastructure depends critically on whether transport cost
changes the level of economic activity or just leads to a reorganization (or relocation)
of existing activity. Quite obviously, the welfare implications of a new road that creates
new firms and employment are quite different than those that just lead to a re-location
of pre-existing economic activity (Redding and Turner, 2015). The same is true for the
economic effects of road tolls. If the tolls lead to a deterioration of economic activities
(losses in value added, employment etc.) this is – from an overall economic point of
view – quite different from a mere relocation of economic activities to other (less or
non-affected) regions.
We know from the pertinent literature that such relocation effects can be quite
substantial. Duranton et al. (2014), who investigate the effects of within-city motorways
on intercity trade within the US, find that the main effect of within-city highways is to
relocate economic activity, and not to create it. Besides Chandra and Thompson (2000),
who study the effects of access to the US interstate highways system in rural counties,
find that access to these highways increases firm earnings in treated counties mainly
at the expense of their untreated neighbor counties. It is thus important to not only
tackle the endogeneity problem, but also to check whether the observed effect is a real
growth or decline in economic activity or just the consequence of relocation of economic
activity. Our experimental design and our rich firm-level data base that contains
information about movement of firms allows us to do both: the natural experiment
creates quasi-exogeneity of the introduction of tolls and the rich firm level dataset
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allows us to analyze whether the firms respond to the tolls by migration to other (less
or non-affected) regions in Portugal. This is most important for the assessment of the
overall welfare effects of the tolls, as losses in the (most) affected municipalities might
be compensated by benefits in the less or non-affected) regions.
1.3 Institutional Background
Since 1986, Portugal invested substantial resources to close the gap with the core of
Europe in terms of road infrastructure (Fernandes and Viegas, 1999). During the 1990s,
however, these investments became a heavy financial burden. The need to guarantee
the necessary funds without breaching the EU rules on member state budget deficits
spurred the cooperation with private enterprises through public private partnerships
(PPPs) to expand and operate road infrastructures (Fernandes et al., 2005). In 1997,
a new kind of PPP scheme was introduced: a system of modern, toll-free highways,
the so-called SCUTs (acronym for ”Sem Custos para o Utilizador”/without costs for
the users).6 Private investors were ensured, based on the traffic volume and operation
standards, a long-term rent paid by the central government budget (Sarmento, 2010).7
The SCUT highways were constructed between 1998 and 2002 at a cost of about
3 billion Euro, and cover nearly 1000 km, i.e., about one-third of the total Portuguese
highway system. This new PPP scheme allowed for a swift expansion of the highway
system in Portugal at low initial costs for the public sector, and helped cut average
travel time between Lisbon and the Spanish border (as well as between the capital
6According to the Court of Accounts, these projects were financed essentially through loans from
commercial banks (45%), the European Investment Bank (40%), and equity (12%). Fernandes et al.
(2016) compute that the financing costs of SCUT highways are, on average, 370 basis points above the
cost of raising public debt. Moreover, they argue that the transaction costs (which include banking
fees and diligence costs and the impact of all cash distribution traps, such as reserve accounts or
minimum-level of debt ratios) account for around 40% of that financial premium.
7The same rationale can be found, for example, in the UK, Spain, and Australia.
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and some areas) by more than 40%. However, these large investments also generated a
severe pressure for the country’s budget over the next 25-30 years (Santos and Santos,
2012, Sarmento, 2010). Many industrial parks were built in the proximity of these
infrastructures to take advantage of the improved transportation connection.
In the course of the European sovereign debt crisis, the financial strain on the
central budget became so tough that the Portuguese authorities had no choice but to
enforce sizeable tolls on the formerly toll-free SCUT highways. As the Financial Times
wrote, ”To help keep Portugal’s 78bn bailout on track, the government has been forced
to introduce charges on more than 900 km of roads where there was previously none”
(Financial Times of 25 August 2013). When the tolls were established in 2011, the price
was 9 cents/km. In many situations, this implied a shift from SCUT highways to slower
alternative options (e.g., municipal roads), and thus negatively affected businesses’
competitiveness. These toll prices were so high that they also had a substantial adverse
impact on traffic. According to a study by the Institute for Road Infrastructures,
traffic along the SCUT highways decreased substantially between the first quarter of
2011 and the first quarter of 2012. There were no noteworthy congestion cases on
the SCUTs highways when they were introduced (INIR 2011). This shock was driven
by purely financial reasons and did not consider local conditions. The mayors of the
SCUTs regions were against the introduction of tolls (even those who belonged to the
same party as the national government), and there were massive protests from the local
populations.8
With the improvement of the financial conditions, and in reaction to the decrease
in traffic and the widespread criticism in the public, the new Portuguese Socialist
government decided to cut back the tolls on SCUT highways by 15% from 1 August 2016
onwards. This decision was supported by a report from the public entity responsible
8See, for instance, https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/transportes/detalhe/
parlamento-rejeita-fim-das-portagens-na-via-do-infante.
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for managing the road infrastructure that estimated that decreasing the tolls by 15%
would increase public revenues.9
1.4 Data and Empirical Approach
1.4.1 Data
We combine administrative firm with municipality-level data. The firm-level
information comes from the Central Balance Sheet database provided by Banco de
Portugal.10 It consists of economic and financial information on virtually all private
firms (such as financial balance sheet indicators, location, number of employees, size,
among other indicators). This is quite an extensive dataset, which comprises 554,497
firms during the period of 2006-2016, amounting to a total of 3,680,060 observations.11
Note that it is an unbalanced dataset, as not all firms have observations for all the years
in this period. Additionally, only firms in Portugal mainland were considered, hence
firms from Madeira and Azores are not part of the analysis.
This unique dataset allows us to investigate a variety of firm-level performance
variables. These include turnover – the amount of sales of goods and services after any
allowances, discounts, and returns are considered; value added – the value of output
minus the value of intermediate consumption; and a measure of profitability – EBITDA
(earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization). The purchases of
raw and intermediate materials are also contemplated in our data. For both turnover
9See, for instance, https://www.tsf.pt/economia/descer-portagens-nas-antigas-scut-e-bom-negocio.html.
10The data in this database is collected through Simplified Business Information (IES - Informação
Estat́ıstica Simplificada) since 2006. IES is an annual report that must be filled online by firms. This
report is mandatory and non-compliants are penalized. The quality of this data is then monitored by
Statistics Portugal who check with respondents on a regular basis.
11This corresponds to the total number of observations after dropping firms with no municipality
reported, non positive levels of turnover and non positive number of employees. This last drop is meant
to eliminate cases of self-employment from the sample.
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and purchases, we can distinguish between those to/from the domestic market and
exports/imports, from the European Union (EU) and the rest of the world.
Furthermore, we consider the following labor-market outcomes: employment, yearly
average wages, and labor productivity. Regarding employment, the dataset allows us
to divide between paid and non-paid employment, and between full- and part-time paid
employment. Labor productivity is computed as the ratio between turnover and the
number of paid employees.
In addition, this rich dataset allows us to follow the location of firms across time
to compute the variable Moved, a binary indicator that takes the value 1 when a firm
changes municipality and 0 otherwise. Hence, we use this variable to analyze whether
firms have tried to mitigate or circumvent the effects of the treatment by moving to
municipalities less affected by the rapid transport cost increases.12
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics on the firm-level dependent variables
used in the study. Note that most variables were logarithmized with the intention of
bringing skewed data closer to a normal distribution. To prevent the loss of observations
equal to zero and thus avoiding biased estimates, an extra value of one was added when
using the log transformation on these variables.
We complement the firm-level data with administrative municipal information
which allows us to control for time-variant municipal-level covariates. Municipal
socio-demographic characteristics, such as the population density and the age
dependency ratio, were gathered from Statistics Portugal. Moreover, information on per
capita electricity consumption was retrieved from Direção Geral de Energia e Geologia
(DGEG) and data on municipal expenditures was acquired from Direção Geral das
Autarquias Locais (DGAL) to proxy for the wealth of the region. With this data, the
variables age dependency ratio, population density, electricity consumption per capita
12An important limitation of this strategy is that we are not able to observe if entrepreneurs decide
to close a firm in a given municipality and open a different firm in another area.
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and municipal expenditures per capita were created and later added to the model to
control for municipal time-varying characteristics.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Treated 0.244 0.430 0 1
Firm Performance
Turnover 10.212 4.116 0 22.988
Value Added 9.982 2.967 -4.605 21.025
Profits 9.670 1.819 -31.192 22.558
Expenses 11.039 2.894 -3.912 23.000
Wage bill 8.378 4.269 0 19.977
Other non-wage expenses 10.690 2.917 0 22.985
Domestic vs. foreign
Turnover – Domestic 9.985 4.236 -0.051 22.582
Turnover – Exports 1.504 3.817 0 22.029
Turnover – Exports EU 1.226 3.463 0 21.390
Turnover – Exports extra EU 0.644 2.570 0 21.449
Purchases 6.833 5.499 0 22.876
Purchases – Domestic 6.662 5.440 -0.094 22.336
Purchases – Imports 1.543 3.746 0 22.714
Purchases – Imports EU 1.491 3.672 0 22.714
Purchases – Imports extra EU 0.289 1.751 0 22.646
Labor-market outcomes
Total Employment 1.263 0.983 0 10.114
Paid Employment 1.227 1.011 0 10.114
Full-Time Paid Employment 1.315 0.982 0 9.875
Part-Time Paid Employment 0.115 0.385 0 8.935
Moved 0.018 0.134 0 1
Controls
Population density 1717.197 2131.935 4.2 7492.4
Age dependency ratio 0.534 0.095 0.371 1.108
Electricity consumption pc 4.880 3.421 1.527 83.860
Expenses pc 0.507 0.235 0.089 2.630
Notes: All variables are measured in ln. The exceptions are Treated and Moved (dummy variables)
and the vector of controls.
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1.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The validity of this model relies on the fact that the introduction of tolls on SCUT
highways was forced by an exogenous shock (the sovereign debt crisis) upon the
Portuguese political authorities. Being a national matter, municipal authorities played
no role in this decision nor were they able to directly intervene.13 At the same time,
there was no discrimination nor favoritism towards these municipalities.14
We follow the identification strategy proposed and implemented by Audretsch et al.
(2020). They define treatment as the introduction of tolls in the SCUT highways.
As such, municipalities are divided into a treatment group and a comparison group.
All municipalities that have a segment of the SCUT highway network belong to the
treatment group. These amount to 59 municipalities in the treatment group and 219
in the comparison group.15 Note that municipalities in the comparison group do have
other non-SCUT highways. However, it is important to point out that these other
highways were already subject to charges a long time before this crisis and that these
charges remain unchanged by the shock. As far as the treatment period goes, note that
in some treated municipalities, tolls were introduced on the 15th of October 2010 and
in others, this happened on the 8th of December 2011.
The effect of an increase in transportation costs on outcome y is estimated using
the following difference-in-differences specification for unit of analysis firm f , in
municipality m, NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 region n, and year t, during the period 2006-2016:
yfmnt = αf + δm + λnt + γTreatedm × PostPeriodmt +X
′
mtβ1 + εfmnt (1.1)
13Even though, there were huge protests made by SCUT highway users and local mayors, they
had no saying in this decision. (See https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/transportes/
detalhe/municipios_e_utentes_perdem_accoes_contra_portagens)
14Audretsch et al. (2020) show that there was no political attempt to favor municipalities of the
same political party.
15In Table A.1, there’s a list with the municipalities which were affected by this shock and in
Figure B4, there’s a geographical display of these municipalities.
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where αf denotes firm fixed effects, δm municipality fixed effects, and λnt represents
NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 - year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is γ as it gives us the
treatment effect. Treated×PostPeriod represents the interaction between the Treated
dummy and the PostPeriod treatment dummy. Treated variable takes the value one for
municipalities in the treatment group and zero otherwise, while PostPeriod equals one
for the treatment period, and zero otherwise. Note that for firms in municipalities where
the tolls were introduced on the 15th of October 2010, PostPeriod dummy equals one
from 2011 onwards. As for the firms in municipalities where the tolls were introduced
on the 8th of December 2011, the PostPeriod dummy equals one from 2012 onwards.
Additionally, X
′
mt is a vector of municipal-level controls. To control for
socio-demographic characteristics, we include the age dependency ratio and population
density. The model also includes electricity consumption per capita and municipal
expenses per capita to control for municipal income.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level municipality to correct
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, since treatment varies at this level (Bertrand
et al., 2004). However, a few firms change municipality during the period under
study. Therefore, the municipality at the time of the treatment was used to cluster the
standard errors, i.e., the location of the firm in the year 2009 just before the treatment.
Additionally, for firms that do not have an observation for this year (since this is an
unbalanced panel), the location of the firm at the time it first appears in the sample
was used.
Furthermore, we compute a linear probability model to address the growth versus
re-organization issue with the following equation for firm f , in municipality m, and year
t:
Movedfmnt = δm + λnt + γTreatedm × PostPeriodmt +X
′
mtβ + εfmnt (1.2)
where Moved takes the value of one if firm relocates to another municipality, and
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zero otherwise. The remaining variables are defined as before. As can be seen, this
model does not include firm fixed effects. This would have the advantage of capturing
unobservable characteristics of firms that affect the likelihood of exit. However, it would
also imply that the sample used in the estimation of this model could only include firms
that did exit during the time interval covered in our sample (2006-2016). Therefore,
our results would be conditional on the firm dying.16
1.4.3 Identification threats
The internal validity of a difference-in-differences estimation model relies on the parallel
trends assumption (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This assumption states that in absence
of treatment, the average outcome of the treatment group would have changed in a
similar trend as the average outcome of the comparison group. For a careful test on the
validity of the parallel trends assumption, we rely on event study designs for the main
outcome variables. An event study has two main advantages. First, it allows us to
observe whether the strength of the treatment varies with time. Second, it provides a
more rigorous test on whether the common trend assumption holds in the pre-treatment
periods (i.e., 2006-2009 in our sample). The estimating equation for the event study of
firm f , in municipality m, NUTS 2 region n, and year t is:






δtTreatedi ·Y eart+εfmnt (1.3)
Notice that in equation 1.3 the interaction terms for all pre- and post-treatment
years are included, except for 2010. This way, all the coefficients are estimated relative
to this year.
16Results are very similar if we do add firm fixed effects and are available from the authors upon
request.
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An important threat to our identification strategy arises if there are any other
contemporaneous shocks than the treatment occuring during the time period under
analysis. In this study, our time period includes one of the greatest recessions in history,
forcing the Portuguese government to request an international bailout. Given that this
crisis might have affected municipalities differently, region-year fixed effects, either at
the NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 levels, are used to mitigate this problem.17 In addition, we
also include a rich vector of municipal-level yearly controls to take into consideration
the socio-demographic and economic context of these regions.
We also perform a battery of robustness checks and exploit the heterogeneity in our
sample to shed light on the mechanisms driving our results. Regarding the robustness
tests, we show whether our findings hold if we exclude i) firms in the municipalities of
the Lisbon metropolitan area; ii) firms in the 18 district capitals; iii) exclude firms in
all municipalities without a highway.18 In the first exercise, we remove from our sample
firms that are located in the more urban comparison areas, while in the third exercise
we drop firms located in more rural comparison areas. The second exercise is inspired
by the inconsequential place approach, described in Table B1, where we drop from
our sample the most important cities in each area (district capitals), located close to a
major transportation infrastructure, mainly because they happen to be located between
two important local centers. In additional exercise, We also focus on a balanced sample
of firms that persist between 2006 and 2016. Regarding heterogeneity, we divide the
universe of Portuguese private firms between tradable and non-tradable, and between
manufacturing and service sectors.
17Moreover, Tavares and Pereira dos Santos (2018) show that the allocation of European funds is
important for business firms dynamics in Portugal. Since this allocation is done at the NUTS2-level,
using regional-year fixed effects can help accounting for this effect.
18In 2003, the Portuguese municipalities were allowed to organize themselves into intermunicipal
communities and the two metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto. Since then, administrative, financial
and political competencies have been transferred to these entities. Districts in mainland Portugal still
serve as a basis for electoral constituencies.
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1.5 Results
In this section, we analyze the impact of the introduction of tolls in previous toll-free
highways through different specifications. First, we consider the main financial
indicators of firm performance. We then examine labor-market outcomes and zoom
in on the margins of adjustment for sales and purchases on the domestic and foreign
trade. Finally, we show that our results are not driven by inter-regional firm migration.
1.5.1 Firm performance
We estimate Equation (1.3) considering four important indicators of firm performance
(measured in logarithms). Figure 1.1 summarizes the main finding for Turnover (in
panel a), value added (in b), profits (in c), and total expenses (in d). For all outcomes,
our results support the parallel trend assumption, i.e., there are no significant differences
between the treatment and the comparison group in the years 2006-2009 before the
treatment set in. Turnover and expenses suffered an increasing deterioration as time
evolves, whereas profits (proxied by the EBITDA) experienced a small recovery after
2013. Value added decreased but results are only marginally significant.
The event study results are confirmed in the difference-in-differences specifications
computed as in Equation (1.1). In our most demanding specifications with NUTS 3-year
fixed effects, presented in Table 1.2, we find that firms located in treated municipalities
experienced, on average, experienced a decrease of 10.8% in turnover vis-à-vis firms
located in comparison regions. Value added and profits also decreased by 7.6% and
3.4%, respectively.
In addition, we investigate whether firm expenses adjusted in reaction to this
shock in Table 1.3. The difference-in-differences results corroborate that total expenses
decreased by, on average, 9.4%. We also divide firm expenses in two categories: wage
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Figure 1.1: Event Studies – Firm Performance
(a) Turnover (b) Value Added
(c) Profits (d) Expenses
Notes: Outcome variables are measured in logarithms. Graphs were computed with Firm,
Municipality, and NUTS 2 × Year fixed effects. The 90% confidence levels are calculated using
clustered standard errors at the municipal level.
bill (in columns 3 and 4) and other non-wage expenses (in columns 5 and 6). The
wage bill includes wages, social security expenses, and insurance schemes for accidents
at work and occupational diseases. The other non-wage expenses include rents, taxes,
purchases of raw and intermediate materials, and debt service. This distinction is
important to understand how the managers of these firms reacted to the shock. Our
findings suggest the adjustment from the expenditure side impacted labor-related costs
with a similar magnitude (about 10%, on average) as the remaining expenses.
The results for the four main outcomes in this subsection are robust to removing
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Table 1.2: Firm performance deteriorated with the introduction of tolls
Turnover Value Added Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated× Post -0.075* -0.108*** -0.051 -0.076** -0.042*** -0.034*
(0.041) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.015) (0.018)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es No Y es No Y es No
NUTS 3 × Year FE No Y es No Y es No Y es
Controls No Y es No Y es No Y es
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.054 0.055 0.021 0.022
Observations 3,680,060 3,062,711 2,336,798
Number of Firms 554,497 520,444 464,436
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
Table 1.3: Firm expenses adjusted after the introduction of tolls
Total Expenses Wage bill Other non-wage expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated× Post -0.065* -0.094*** -0.058 -0.099*** -0.068** -0.097***
(0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034) (0.028)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es No Y es No Y es No
NUTS 3 × Year FE No Y es No Y es No Y es
Controls No Y es No Y es No Y es
R-squared 0.053 0.054 0.038 0.038 0.055 0.055
Observations 3,680,060 3,678,707 3,678,229
Number of Firms 554,497 554,497 554,488
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
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firms in municipalities in the Lisbon metropolitan area and in district capitals from the
sample, as shown in Table AR.1 in the Appendix. These results also hold if we remove
firms in comparison municipalities with no highway access and in a balanced sample,
as displayed in Table AR.2. Moreover, results seem to be heterogeneous across firms
since the shock affects more tradable than nontradable sectors (see Table AH.1 in the
Appendix) and the manufacturing sector more than the services sector (see Table AH.2
in the Appendix).
1.5.2 Domestic vs. foreign: Turnover by destination and
purchases by origin
We now analyze how the rise in transportation costs affected turnover with respect
to the destination of goods and services: in the Portuguese market or abroad.
Theoretically, it is not clear if sales to domestic buyers should be more or less affected
than sales to foreign buyers by the transportation costs in Portugal. On the one hand,
SCUT highways connect several locations in Portugal. On the other, some of these
highways are the most important roads to Spain. Moreover, it is a well-known stylized
fact that exporting firms usually constitute a small share in their own industry. They
also tend to be larger and more productive than their domestic counterparts (Melitz,
2003). Hence, they may be more robust to adverse shocks.19 This is tested using
Equation (1.3) and the results are presented in Figure 1.2 for domestic turnover (in panel
a) and exports (in panel b). For both outcomes, we find an increasing deterioration in
the treatment period with persistent effects. The reduction in economic activity is less
negative for exports than for the turnover from the domestic market.
19In Portugal, Bastos and Silva (2010) demonstrate that, controlling for distance, exporters in 2005
charged higher prices for goods sold to richer destination markets within narrow product categories.
Moreover, Bastos et al. (2018) show that exporting to richer countries leads Portuguese firms to pay
higher prices for inputs, raising the average quality of goods they produce.
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Figure 1.2: Event Studies – Turnover by destination
(a) Turnover – Domestic (b) Turnover – Exports
Notes: Outcome variables are measured in logarithms. Graph computed with Firm, Municipality,
and NUTS 2 × Year fixed effects. The 90% confidence levels are calculated using clustered standard
errors at the municipal level.
We further decompose these effects computing difference-in-differences regressions
as in Equation (1.1). We report the results on total firm turnover in Table 1.4 as a
reference to columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.2, but we then further distinguish between those
that are destined to the domestic market (in Columns 3 and 4) from Exports (columns
5 and 6). In fact, firms subject to this shock experienced a decrease in turnover from
internal market of more than 7% and in turnover from exports of around 5%. Going
one step further, columns (7) and (8) separately analyze the exports that were going to
the EU market from the ones going to the rest of the world. One can see that exports
to the EU area were significantly affected while no significant effect was found for the
ones directed to the non-EU market. More precisely, exports to the EU decreased
by 6.5% for firms in treated areas. Note that this decrease in exports coincides with
the hypothesis previously made in regards to how the manufacturing sector, as well as
large firms were affected by the shock. If indeed, these two types of firms tend to export
more, then it is only natural that these firms were more vulnerable to this shock, given
that exports were heavily affected. The results obtained for the sales to the EU and
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the internal market can be explained by the dependence of these two markets on road
transportation.
Table 1.4: Sales to domestic and foreign EU consumers were affected
Turnover Domestic Exports EU extra EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated× Post -0.075* -0.108*** -0.073* -0.106*** -0.048* -0.004 -0.065** 0.021
(0.041) (0.034) (0.042) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.017)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es No Y es No Y es No Y es Y es
NUTS 3 × Year FE No Y es No Y es No Y es No No
Controls No Y es No Y es No Y es No No
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005
Observations 3,680,060 3,680,060 3,680,060
Number of Firms 554,497 554,497 554,497
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance levels
of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
Regarding the EU market, it is important to highlight that Spain is one of the main
trading partners of Portugal.20 Spain’s proximity to Portugal makes trade between
these two countries more reliable on road transportation. In addition, Spain’s relevance
for Portuguese exports, makes Portuguese firms more vulnerable to an increase in
transportation costs to this market. This could possibly explain the decrease in exports
to the EU market.
We next investigate whether purchases of raw and intermediate materials were
affected by the transportation shock. The event study graphs are displayed in
Figure 1.3. We divide these inputs between domestic purchases (in panel a), and
imports (in panel b). Our results show that estimates for domestic purchases should be
interpreted with a grain of salt as the parallel trend assumption does not hold in 2006.
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients are very close to zero in the remaining years of
20In 2010, Portugal’s exports to Spain accounted for 32% of the total exports made to the EU area.
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the pre-treatment period.
Figure 1.3: Event Studies – Purchases by origin
(a) Purchases – Domestic (b) Purchases – Imports
Notes: Outcome variables are measured in logarithms. Graphs were computed with Firm,
Municipality, and NUTS 2 × Year fixed effects. The 90% confidence levels are calculated using
clustered standard errors at the municipal level.
We also analyze the effect of an increase in transportation costs on firm’s purchases
using difference-in-differences regressions. The impact on total purchases is presented in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.5. We find that purchases decreased between 7% to 10%
more in firms located in municipalities with a SCUT highway. In addition, we further
separate between purchases from the internal (in columns 3 and 4) or external market (in
columns 5 and 6). We find that both were impacted: purchases from domestic products
were reduced by 6.4% to 10.2% while total imports were reduced by 4.6%. The result is
not statistically significant in our most demanding specification. However, if we divide
imports between imports from the EU in column (7) and Extra EU in column (8), only
imports from the EU seem to be affected (4%) as imports from outside the EU are less
reliant on transportation by road.
The results for both the domestic turnover and purchases are robust to excluding
all firms in the Lisbon metropolitan area, in district capitals, in municipalities without
a highway access, and in a balanced sample. These results can be seen in Table AR.3
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Table 1.5: Purchases from domestic and foreign EU consumers were affected
Purchases Domestic Imports EU extra EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated× Post -0.066* -0.101*** -0.064* -0.102*** -0.046* -0.002 -0.040* -0.013
(0.035) (0.025) (0.035) (0.026) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.009)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es No Y es No Y es No Y es Y es
NUTS 3 × Year FE No Y es No Y es No Y es No No
Controls No Y es No Y es No Y es No No
R-squared 0.049 0.049 0.046 0.046 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001
Observations 3,680,060 3,680,060 3,680,060
Number of Firms 554,497 554,497 554,497
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance levels
of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
and in Table AR.4 in the Appendix. However, trade-related results on exports
and imports are less precisely estimated and are not statistically different from zero
in these specifications. Finally, heterogeneity results highlight that negative effects
are concentrated in the tradable sectors (in Table AH.3 in the Appendix) and in
manufacturing firms (in Table AH.4 in the Appendix).
1.5.3 Employment
We now focus on the labor market impacts of this shock. So far, we found that employee
expenses were dramatically reduced. In this subsection we try to distinguish between
the extensive margin (i.e., if the shock caused a shortfall in employment) and the
intensive margin (i.e., if those who stayed employed experienced a wage cut).
We present the event study results for labor related outcomes in Figure 1.4. One
can observe that the introduction of tolls had a significantly negative effect on (paid)
employment numbers (in panel a). These reductions are not only persistent but they
seem to deteriorate further between 2013 and 2016.
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Figure 1.4: Event Studies – Employment
(a) Paid Employment
Notes: The outcome variable is measured in logarithms. Graphs were computed with Firm,
Municipality, and NUTS 2 × Year fixed effects. The 90% confidence levels are calculated using
clustered standard errors at the municipal level.
Regarding the difference-in-differences results, we find very similar decreases for
total employment (in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.6) and paid employment (in columns
3 and 4). The magnitudes are close to 2%, meaning that employment decreased
2%, on average, for firms in affected municipalities vis-à-vis firms in the comparison
group. Total employment consists of paid and unpaid employment, the latter being
performed by the company owners and their family. These results are consistent with
the findings of Audretsch et al. (2020), who documented a significantly negative impact
on employment at the municipal-level. In addition, our dataset allows us to distinguish
between full-time and part-time employment. Our findings underline that the effects
are concentrated on full-time workers (in column 5) with an estimated impact of 1.3%.
1.5.4 Wages and productivity
What happened to those who managed to keep their job in these firms? To answer
this question we provide the event study specifications in Figure 1.5. We do not
find statistically significant effects on average wages of those who stayed employed (in
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Table 1.6: Employment decreased with the introduction of tolls
Total Employment Paid Employment Full-Time Part-Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated× Post -0.010* -0.019*** -0.011* -0.019*** -0.013** 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es No Y es No Y es Y es
NUTS 3 × Year FE No Y es No Y es No No
Controls No Y es No Y es No No
R2 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.007
Observations 3,680,060 3,667,385 3,345,267 2,215,656
Number of Firms 554,497 554,131 540,269 478,542
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
panel a). This can be explained by the fact that there is a strong downward nominal
labor rigidity in Portugal. Legal restrictions on nominal wage cuts and periods of
close-to-zero inflation leave employers with limited margin to adjust real wages. As a
consequence, in periods of crisis, employment becomes the main margin of adjustment
(Carneiro et al., 2014).21 With respect to the average labor productivity (in panel b),
our findings suggest that this indicator does not seem to be impacted by the increase
in transportation costs, which may possibly be due to the fact that workers with lower
productivity were laid-off first. In any case, results are substantially noisier than in the
pre-treatment years.
Furthermore, we report the difference-in-differences results for the yearly average
wage (in columns 1 and 2) and labor productivity (in columns 3 and 4) of Table 1.7.
These findings confirm the event study results as both variables present a negative,
21The minimum wage was frozen between 2011 and 2014 at 485 euros.
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Figure 1.5: Event Studies – Wages and Labor Productivity
(a) Average Wage (b) Labor Productivity
Notes: Graphs were computed with Firm, Municipality, and NUTS 2 × Year fixed effects. The 90%
confidence levels are calculated using clustered standard errors at the municipal level.
although not significant, impact caused by the introduction of tolls in treated SCUT
highways. However, we would like to point out that the point estimate of the average
yearly decrease is about 40 euros. This constitutes a small effect, even if we consider
that, during this period, the minimum monthly wage was below 550 euros (Alexandre
et al., 2020).
In Section 1.5.1, we find that the wage bill decreased by more than 9%, while in
Section 1.5.3 we argue that employment fell by almost 2% and average wages reduced,
even though this last indicator is not statistically significant. This is consistent with
the fact that the reduction in paid employment comes from full-time workers that are
more likely to be, on average, older, more experienced, and receive higher wages.
The results for the three main outcomes in this and in the previous subsection
are robust to several exercises. First, removing firms in municipalities in the Lisbon
metropolitan area and in district capitals from the sample, as shown in Table A.5
in the Appendix, does not seem to change our baseline results. Second, the same is
true if we remove firms in rural comparison municipalities or if we consider a balanced
sample, as displayed in Table A.6 in the Appendix. In all cases, we estimate that paid
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Table 1.7: Average wages and productivity were less affected with the introduction of
tolls
Average Monthly Wage Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated× Post -38.510 -40.095 -514.679 -577.891
(67.989) (62.325) (1,165.119) (1,818.932)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es No Y es No
NUTS 3 × Year FE No Y es No Y es
Controls No Y es No Y es
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001
Observations 2,884,520 2,884,520
Number of Firms 484,981 484,981
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
employment falls, on average, 1% to 2%. Although negative, we do not find statistical
evidence that average wages were affected. Furthermore, negative impacts seem to
be, once again, concentrated in tradable sectors, as can be seen in Table AH.5 in the
Appendix. Labor-related impact differences between manufacturing and service sectors
are more pronounced as can be seen in Table AH.6 in the Appendix.
1.6 Economic deterioration or just re-location?
As Redding and Turner wrote in their chapter on the Handbook of Urban Economics:
”While much effort has been directed to unraveling the problem of non-random
assignment of infrastructure to places, much less has been directed to distinguishing
between growth and reorganization. This distinction is clearly central to any
understanding of the role of infrastructure and transportation costs in an economy”
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(Redding and Turner, 2015, page 1394).
So far, we documented a strong impact of this transportation shock on firm related
outcomes. In this section, we shed light on a key public policy question: do these results
really indicate a drastic net-reduction of economic activity in Portugal as a whole, or
are they just driven by a re-location of firms from the most affected to the least affected
municipalities in Portugal? While, in the first scenario, this would imply a zero-sum
game for regions, the second case would imply that more profound general equilibrium
effects are present.
In any case, it is important to point out that, if there are non-negligeable negative
effects of the introduction of tolls that spillover to comparison municipalities, results in
the previous sections constitute a lower-bound estimate for the causal impact.
Our unique data and setting allows us to convincingly make this distinction. Our
dependent variable is now an indicator variable that takes value one if a firm decides
to change to another municipality and zero otherwise. Deviating from the analysis so
far, we do not include firm-fixed effects in this subsection due to the nature of the
explanatory variable, which by definition has a very low variability. All remaining
specifications will nevertheless continue to include municipal- and year-fixed effects.22
First, we show the event study results in Figure 1.6. We can observe that all point
estimates are very close to zero. If anything, these zeros are even more precise after the
implementation of tolls in SCUT highways indicating that re-location did not seem to
take place.
Second, we confirm previous results examining the difference-in-differences obtained
from estimating Equation (1.2) for the probability of firms changing municipality. We
22That is, their values vary utmost once from 0 to 1 when a firm changes municipality or exits the
market. As such, these variables have very low individual within variation. Therefore, adding firm
fixed effects might not be appropriate in Equation (1.2) as it would condition the results for firms
where we necessarily observe transition. Nevertheless, the results are very similar if we include firm
fixed-effects.
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Figure 1.6: Event Studies – Move
(a) Moving Municipality
Notes: Graph computed with Municipality, and NUTS 2 × Year fixed effects. The 90% confidence
levels are calculated using clustered standard errors at the municipal level.
find that all estimated coefficients are extremely small and not statistically significant.
These precisely estimated zeros corroborate the idea that displacement effects played
no significant role and that the tolls on SCUT highways led to a severe deterioration
of economic activity in Portugal as a whole. The results are consistent with earlier
findings suggesting that Portuguese entrepreneurs tend to have a strong home-bias in
deciding the municipality where to locate their firms (Figueiredo et al., 2002).
Finally, these results are unchanged when we exclude all firms located in i) the
Lisbon metropolitan area, ii) in the 18 district capitals, and iii) in the comparison
municipalities without a highway access. This is also the case when we rely on a
balanced panel covering the firms that remain in our sample throughout the period
of analysis. All these results can be seen in Table A.7 in the Appendix. Exploring
heteregoneity regarding firms in tradable and non-tradable sectors of activity or
between those in manufacturing industries and services sectors does not change these
conclusions. The results for these exercises are presented in Table AH.7 in the
Appendix.
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Table 1.8: Firms did not change their municipality in reaction to the shock
Prob Change
(1) (2)
Treated× PostPeriod 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
Municipality FE Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es No
NUTS 3 × Year FE Y es Y es
Controls No Y es
R-squared 0,004 0,005
Observations 3,680,060
Number of Firms 554,497
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
1.7 Conclusion
Politicians in several countries argue that new highways are worth large amounts of
public money because they stimulate, among other effects, private business sector
activity and lead to economic development. In fact, however, it is very difficult to
assert the efficacy of these efforts in a causal manner as roads are not assigned to
locations randomly. We deal with this fundamental endogeneity problem examining
the impact of a substantial reduction in transportation costs on the performance of
private firms.
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the first that analyzes the effect
of the introduction of road tolls on a variety of firm-level performance measures, using
a rich administrative micro dataset covering the universe of private firms in a country.
We take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment that happened in Portugal during the
European debt crisis to identify causal parameters.
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Our findings show that the tolls had a significant negative effect on firm turnover
(especially serving the domestic market, but also on exports) and purchases (especially
those from the domestic market, but also, to a lesser extent, on imports). The impact
is more pronounced for turnover than for total expenses, and therefore, firm profits are
negatively hit. Firm value-added and (paid) employment numbers also decrease more
for firms located in affected areas impacted by this shock in transportation costs. In
addition, average wages and labor productivity decline, but the effect is not statistically
significant. Full-time employees suffer more (in terms of employment losses) than
part-time employees. The majority of effects for all these outcomes are medium-term,
i.e., still persistent six years after the introduction of tolls.
Critically, we find that inter-regional firm migration has not played a major role in
response to the introduction of tolls. In other words, we observe a real deterioration
of economic activity and not just a relocation of economic activity. This is extremely
important for the assessment of the overall welfare effects of these tolls, as losses in
the (most) affected municipalities were not compensated by benefits in the less or
non-affected regions. All our results are robust to a plethora of exercises restricting
both the treatment and the comparison group. In this regard, the exercise where
we exclude all firms in the major cities of the country is especially interesting as it
resembles the inconsequential places approach that is also common in the urban and
trade literature.
Our results thus provide compelling evidence that the introduction of tolls on former
SCUT highways – which may have been, in the short-run, inevitable for financial reasons
– inflicted a substantial cost in terms of foregone firm performance and employment in
the medium- to long-run. Future research can further disentangle the impact of this
natural experiment on the financial conditions of firms, depending on their pre-shock
level of debt and their relations with the banking system.
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Chapter 2
Cousins From Overseas: The labor
Market Impact of Half a Million
Portuguese Repatriates1
2.1 Introduction
Following a military coup in 1974, Portugal granted independence to its former colonies,
Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Pŕıncipe. The
civil wars that soon erupted in these territories induced close to half a million ethnic
Portuguese living in Africa to flee to Portugal. In 1976, The New York Times described
the situation in Lisbon as follows: “They are still coming here in droves from what
was once Portuguese Africa, entire families with all their worldly belongings in plastic
bags and tin trunks, and no place to go” and reported that “the absorption of this
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Lara Bohnet and Susana Peralta. We thank
Morgane Delaunay, Elsa Peralta, and Rui Pena Pires for providing us with historical background and
with data to be used in this paper. We are also grateful for comments and suggestions by Cátia Batista,
Ana Rute Cardoso, Anthony Edo, Jules Gazeaud, Yajna Govind, Joël Machado, Sara Signorelli, and
seminar participants at the 2021 IAAEU Workshop on labor Economics (Trier University) and the
Economics of Migration - Junior Seminar.
39
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
mass of colonial refugees is one of the main difficulties facing Western Europe’s poorest
country.”2 Two years later, Der Spiegel states that the hundreds of thousands of refugees
had been integrated faster than expected, describing how local employers were more
prone to employ repatriates than natives because of their more conservative attitudes,
making them less likely to be in labor unions.3 This paper provides quantitative
evidence on the labor market impact of the Portuguese repatriation, which constituted
a large, immigration-induced, one-time supply shock to the labor force.
The case of these so-called Portuguese ”retornados” is a particularly interesting
setting to study for several reasons. First, the inflow was large and concentrated,
with close to half a million people arriving in Portugal within less than three years,
increasing the workforce by about 3.9% on average, and up to more than 15% in
some municipalities.4 Second, the timing of the inflow was largely unpredictable
and hence provides a plausibly exogenous source of variation. Third, there was little
selection among immigrants, as a large majority of the Portuguese living in the former
colonies repatriated to Portugal, independent of social class, education, and other
characteristics. Fourth, most repatriates were born in Portugal, therefore constituting
a case of return migration of substitutes for the native population. This is opposed to
other contexts where natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes due to different
language ability or religious preferences (Manacorda et al., 2012). The final reason is
related with the skill composition of the repatriates. While the majority of existing
literature on the labor market effects of migration has studied inflows of people who
were less skilled than the native population, the repatriates were considerably more
educated than natives (Pires et al., 2020).
2Howe, Marvine. 1976. ”Chased From Africa, Adrift and Jobless in Portugal” The
New York Times, Paragraph 3, March 7. https://www.nytimes.com/1976/03/07/archives/
chased-from-africa-adrift-and-jobless-in-portugal-the-excolonizers.html.
3Der Spiegel. 1978. ”Rechnungen bezahlt” Der Spiegel, July 24. https://www.spiegel.de/
spiegel/print/d-40694112.html.
4In comparison, French repatriation increased the workforce by about 1.6%, on average (Edo, 2020).
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Prior studies by Carrington and De Lima (1996) and Mäkelä (2017) have
investigated the impact of the Portuguese repatriates. They were, however, unable to
distinguish composition effects from effects on native workers. We overcome this issue
by using a rich micro data set on the universe of Portuguese repatriates, which has not
been previously exploited in an econometric analysis of the labor market; in particular,
it allows us to retrieve native outcomes. We further extend their analysis by looking at
a wider range of outcomes, including labor force participation (LFP), unemployment,
employment, and entrepreneurship, and by investigating these outcomes separately for
male and female natives.
To study the effect of the repatriates on these outcomes, we combine the natural
experiment created by the end of the Portuguese Colonial War with a novel instrumental
variable (IV) approach to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns in the location of
repatriates. We use shift-share instruments based on places of birth of repatriates,
thereby exploiting a peculiarity of the Portuguese repatriates: opposed to other
repatriation flows in the literature, such as the French case (Edo, 2020), most Portuguese
repatriates had still been born in Portugal.
For both male and female natives, we find a strong decrease in employment as
employees. This effect is stronger for women (50%) than for men (21%). While
men compensate for this loss by moving into low quality entrepreneurship (i.e.,
self-employment), displaced female natives move mainly to inactivity. This change is
reflected in a decrease in female LFP and overall employment, opposed to no change in
male LFP or overall employment. Our results are robust to changing the instrumental
variable, the geographical unit of analysis, and to various sample restrictions.
We contribute to the literature on the effects of migration on native workers.
Predictions from economic theory depend on the structure of the receiving country
and the skill composition of immigrants relative to the native population (Dustmann
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et al., 2005). In a closed economy with capital and one type of labor, immigrants
reduce the capital-labor ratio and thus lower wages (Friedberg, 2001). If there is more
than one type of labor, the wages of natives decrease when they are gross substitutes
to immigrants in production, and raise them otherwise. If labor supply and demand
are both elastic, native employment will move in the same direction as wages, with a
smaller change in wages than in the case of an inelastic labor supply. In a small open
economy, wages will remain at the world level in the long run. If capital is re-allocated
to labor-intensive sectors with a delay, wages will be lower for some time. If wages are
sticky, there will be a period of unemployment (Hunt, 1992). Recently, the literature
has incorporated externalities of immigration, such as promoting learning, innovation,
or agglomeration externalities (Peri, 2016).
Empirically, a wide range of studies has found modest or absent effects of
immigration on average natives’ wages and employment, while others have found
sizeable impacts of immigration on labor market outcomes for natives. For instance,
Borjas (2003) shows that wages of natives are harmed by immigration, and Ottaviano
and Peri (2012) finds positive wage effects of immigration. In the light of these
conflicting results, there is an ongoing debate about measurement and identification
(Borjas, 2003). Dustmann et al. (2016) argue that different empirical specifications and
assumptions can explain the contradicting findings.
Given the simultaneity between immigrants’ location choice and local labor market
conditions, one strand of literature has focused on large, unexpected increases in
migration as natural experiments. They correspond more closely to exogenous increases
in the supply of immigration to a specific labor market given that their timing is
exogenous to local labor market conditions (Friedberg, 2001). A seminal contribution by
Card (1990), for instance, studies the effect of a large inflow of Cubans into the labor
market of Miami and finds virtually no effect on unemployment or wages of native
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workers.5 We review the literature that uses natural experiments to identify the labor
market consequences for natives in receiving economies in Table B1 in the Appendix.
The impacts of immigration to Portugal have been previously studied by Carrington
and De Lima (1996) and Mäkelä (2017), who both investigate the effect of the
Portuguese repatriation. The former provide ambiguous results: a comparison with
Spain and France indicates no negative effect of the repatriates, while a comparison
between districts within Portugal shows a substantial adverse impact on Portuguese
wages. Mäkelä (2017) employs a synthetic control method and finds significant adverse
effects on productivity and wages in the agricultural and construction industries.6 The
data used in both studies is aggregated at the regional and national levels, and hence
does not allow for distinguishing between composition effects from the inflow and
impacts only on the native population. This study overcomes this issue by taking
advantage of a large micro data set on the Portuguese repatriates. Finally, also related
to this topic is Cardoso and Morin (2018). They study the effect of emigration from
Portugal on native women, showing that the out-migration of men and war drafting in
the 1960s and early 1970s led to a demand-driven increase in female LFP in Portugal.
We investigate the impact of a subsequent increase in the labor force following the
arrival of the repatriates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides historical
background on the Portuguese Colonial War, and the repatriation to Portugal. Section
2.3 describes the data used, presents descriptive statistics, and information on the
5This finding is, however, subject to some debate, with, for instance, Borjas (2017) finding a large
negative impact on wages of native high-school dropouts following the Mariel boatlift. Opposed to
that, Clemens and Hunt (2019) and Peri and Yasenov (2019) agree with Card (1990), concluding that
the boatlift had modest adverse effects on wages.
6Both studies use district-level wage data from Statistics Portugal, recording daily wages in the
agriculture and construction industries. We do not use this data for two reasons. First, it is only
available at the district level, while our main level of analysis are the (smaller) NUTS 3 (Nomenclature
of Territorial Units for Statistics) regions. A more substantial caveat, given that this analysis focuses
on native outcomes, is that it does not allow to distinguish between natives’ and repatriates’ wages.
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spatial distribution of repatriates. Section 2.4 introduces the empirical strategy, before
section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 discusses and reconciles these results with
prior studies. Section 2.7 shows various robustness checks implemented, and section
2.8 concludes.
2.2 Historical Background
2.2.1 A Brief Overview of the Portuguese Colonial War
During the 1960s and early 1970s, unrest caused by independence movements in
Portugal’s largest colonies, Angola and Mozambique, led the authoritarian Portuguese
regime to increase the resources spent on colonial administration. In 1973, military
expenditures made up close to 50% of government expenditures (Carrington and
De Lima, 1996). These high monetary costs, coupled with a rising number of dead and
injured in the Colonial War, and an increasing anti-colonisation sentiment, eventually
culminated in the April 1974 military coup, which put an end to the authoritarian
regime in Portugal (Kalter, 2018). Subsequently, the military withdrew its troops from
the colonies and surrendered to the local independence movements. While initially it
was expected that the white settler populations would be able to remain in Africa, soon
conflicts erupted on the streets of the former colonies (Peralta, 2019). The anticipation
of civil war caused by divisions among the African nationalists and meddling of foreign
powers in Angola and Mozambique led hundreds of thousands of ethnic Portuguese to
flee to Portugal as repatriates (Young and Hall, 1997), especially through a large airlift
organized by Portugal with the assistance of several countries.
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2.2.2 Repatriation to Portugal
The inflow of repatriates to Portugal was large and sudden, which was partly due to the
unexpected timing of the military coup and subsequent independence of the colonies.
The evidence provided by the 1981 census allows us to estimate that close to half a
million repatriates arrived in Portugal between 1974 and 1976, making it the largest
migration exodus resulting from decolonization in relative terms (Peralta, 2019).7 At
the time, the native population accounted for about nine million people. In Figure B1
in the Appendix we display the relative growth of the overall population, with respect
to 1970, for both males and females. Given that many of the repatriates arrived with
few physical resources, the Portuguese government initiated a large-scale settlement
program to assist them in their arrival, carried out by the Instituto de Apoio ao Retorno
de Nacionais (IARN) (Carrington and De Lima, 1996). This state support included
employing repatriates as public servants and giving cheap credits to small businesses
(Peralta, 2019).8 In need for accommodation for the repatriates, the government rented
all available places (sometimes even luxury hotels), in which some of the repatriates
passed their first two years in Portugal. The settlement program accounted for 11%
of total government spending in 1976 (Solsten, 1993) and amounted to roughly 5% of
Portuguese GNP over the 1974-76 period (Carrington and De Lima, 1996). However,
as early as 1981, IARN was dissolved, and the repatriates who remained in need of
assistance were handed over to the social security system (Peralta, 2019).
This fast process may be one of the reasons why the integration of the repatriates is
often remembered as a success that ”may even be considered miraculous” (Peralta
(2019), 6). This happened despite the fact that the post-revolutionary left-wing
7In July 1975, a new Nationality Law was enacted to prevent a mass inflow of Africans determining
that only those who could prove an European lineage up to their grandfathers could apply for a
Portuguese identity card.
8The public sector’s employment share rose from 13.4% in 1973 to 23.7% in 1976 (Carrington and
De Lima, 1996).
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governments implemented income-leveling policies that included a large increase in
the minimum wage for most of the workforce, the nationalization of many industries,
and other restrictions, that made it difficult for firms to fire incumbents and therefore,
indirectly, hire repatriates. However, the arrival of the repatriates was not without
problems.9 Portugal was in the middle of a process of social and political change.10 This,
coupled with a severe economic recession that culminated with the 1978 arrangement
between the Portuguese authorities and the International Monetary Fund, contributed
to repatriates being received with hostility, perceived by the native population as
foreigners, or even invaders (Peralta, 2019). According to Lubkemann (2002), the
media at the time contributed to the negative stereotyping of the ”internal strangers”,
as he called them (p. 76). Press reports of the government assistance program included
claims that repatriates were ”stealing housing and jobs” from the Portuguese (Mäkelä
(2017), 242).
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Data on Repatriates
Data on the repatriates was retrieved by the sociologist Rui Pena Pires from the
Portuguese census of 1981. He defines a repatriate as someone who lived in Portugal
in 1981 and had lived in an African country in December 1973. The data set contains
9A 1978 survey displayed that 68% of the respondents were in favour of the independence of the
colonies, but 59% expressed their disagreement with the way the process had been conducted and
stated that the Portuguese authorities should have defended more “the rights” of the Portuguese
nationals (Oliveira, 2017). Figure B2 in the Appendix, retrieved from Lourenço (2018), we can see the
number of news mentioning the repatriates in two daily newspapers (1974-1979): Primeiro de Janeiro
(from Porto) and Diário de Not́ıcias (from Lisbon). From this graph, two conclusions can be drawn.
First, even though most news were neutral, there were more negative than positive news. Second, the
number of articles was already small in 1979.
10The government changed four times in 1974 and three times in 1975. There was only one change
of government in 1976 and 1977.
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individual-level data on 471,427 repatriates, including demographic information such as
sex and age, place of birth, place of residency in 1979 and 1981, as well as educational
and employment information. In our sample, we consider repatriates who are between
20 and 69 years old in 1981. This range corresponds to an age of around 15 to 64 when
arriving in Portugal, which is considered the most relevant range in inducing a shock
to the labor market. This restriction reduces the sample to 339,868 repatriates. We
furthermore limit the sample to individuals who migrated to Portugal before 1979 and
to those who did not change NUTS 3 region since then. This exclusion leaves us with
a sample size of 317,924 repatriates. The former restriction allows us to consider only
those who moved to Portugal in response to an unanticipated political event, that is,
in response to an exogenous push-factor, which facilitates identification. Restricting
the sample to only those who did not change NUTS 3 region leads to the exclusion of
roughly 20,000 repatriates (approx. 4% of all repatriates). It however aids to capture
the initial shock rather than movements between regions at a later point, which may
have been for economic reasons.11
Moreover, we retrieved data on the white resident population in Angola and
Mozambique from 1940 to 1970 from Statistics Portugal, as displayed in Table B2
in the Appendix. Movements to the colonies were relatively recent, as the number of
white residents in Angola and Mozambique more than tripled between 1950 and 1970.
There were 443,068 white residents in these colonies in 1970. This figure is very close to
the total of repatriates, indicating that almost the entire Portuguese population residing
abroad repatriated to Portugal. We will use this white population in the former colonies
to construct the shift in one of the shift-share instruments.
11As shown later, the results are robust to including those who changed region and to changing the
age range considered.
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2.3.2 Data on Portuguese Natives
To investigate the impact of the repatriates, we are using census data from 1960 as
the pre-shock period, and census data from 1981 as the post-shock period. We use the
1960 census because it is the last census before the massive emigration of Portuguese
residents in the 1960s.12 The 1981 census is the first census after the inflow. Hence,
the post-shock period takes place about six years after the shock, thereby measuring its
impact after some time for adjustment.13 The censuses contain municipality-level data
on demographics and employment. In most of our specifications, we aggregate the data
to the NUTS 3 level, hence containing 30 regions.14 Since the census of 1981 includes
repatriates and is aggregated at the municipality level, a distinction between repatriates
and the native population is not readily available from the data. We define the native
population in each region as the non-repatriate population, calculating them as the
total population listed in the 1981 census minus the number of repatriates that lived
in each region in that year, as taken from the data set on repatriates. We compute
outcomes for the native population likewise: the number of unemployed natives, for
instance, is derived from the total number of unemployed as defined in the census
minus the number of unemployed repatriates. We focus the analysis on the impact of
the repatriates on labor Force Participation, Unemployment Rate and the Employment
Share.15 The census also provides data on different types of employment, among them
the number of employees and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are further divided into
employers (those who have employees) and self-employed individuals (those who do not
12While there was a census in 1970, which is available in non-digital format at Statistics Portugal,
it is considerably smaller than the 1960 and 1981 censuses, covering only 20% of the population and
containing none of the labor market variables used in this analysis.
13In their study of the effect of skewed sex ratios on Portuguese women’s labor market outcomes,
Cardoso and Morin (2018) use an even longer time period between the shock and measured outcomes.
14We use the first definition for NUTS 3 in the country which was established in 2002.
15We do not analyze wages because the linked employer-employee dataset where they are available
started in 1986 (Card and Cardoso, 2012).
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employ others). We investigate these outcomes separately for male natives and female
natives.
To construct a shift-share instrument based on educational levels, we decompose
the native population and the repatriates across four educational groups, namely those
with no education, primary education, secondary education, and higher education.16
2.3.3 Comparison of Repatriates and Natives
Approximately 77.8% of repatriates were born in Portugal, with the majority of
the remaining repatriates born in former Portuguese colonies. This characteristic
distinguishes the repatriates from other decolonization migrants to, for instance, France
and The Netherlands, of whom most had been born in the colonies (Lubkemann, 2002).
In line with this, the large majority of repatriates were Portuguese speaking (Pires et al.,
2020).
What differentiated the Portuguese repatriates from the native population, however,
was the fact that they were more likely to be of working age, as shown in Figure B3
in the Appendix. In Table 2.1, we report further differences. Compared to natives,
repatriates were more likely to be male, more educated, and more likely to be employees
or employers. Overall, the inflow of repatriates not only changed the size, but also the
composition of the Portuguese labor force. The Table displays data on the place of
residence in 1973, indicating that the majority of repatriates came from Angola and
Mozambique.
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for changes in native labor market outcomes
between 1960 and 1981, natives’ and repatriates’ outcomes in 1981, and the difference
16Primary education includes those with Primário elementar or Preparatório. Secondary education
includes those with Secundário unificado, Secundario complementar or Propedêutico ou 12.º ano.
Higher education includes those with Curso de ı́ndole profissional e art́ıstico, Curso médio, enfermagem,
profissional, or Curso superior.
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Table 2.1: Comparison Repatriates and Natives
Natives Repatriates Repatriates
(Sample) (Sample) (Above 15)
N % N % N %
Gender
Male 3,189,679 46.7% 173,382 54.5% 194,617 53.8%
Female 3,634,546 53.3% 144,542 45.5% 167,162 46.2%
Total 6,824,225 100.0% 317,924 100.0% 361,779 100.0%
Education
None 2,612,630 38.3% 39,493 12.4% 45,328 12.5%
Primary 3,341,173 49.0% 185,816 58.4% 210,633 58.2%
Secondary 657,780 9.6% 65,460 20.6% 78,156 21.6%
Higher 212,642 3.1% 27,155 8.5% 27,662 7.6%
Total 6,824,225 100.0% 317,924 100.0% 361,779 100.0%
Profession
Employee 2,808,796 76.8% 174,745 81.4% 181,912 81.7%
Self-employed 602,565 16.5% 25,839 12.0% 26,157 11.8%
Employer 118,985 3.3% 10,338 4.8% 10,441 4.7%
Stay-home parent 97,936 2.7% 1,673 0.8% 1,989 0.9%
Cooperative 16,496 0.5% 540 0.3% 564 0.3%
Other 13,235 0.4% 1,467 0.7% 1,520 0.7%
Total 3,658,013 100.0% 214,602 100.0% 222,583 100.0%
Unemployed/Inactive 3,166,212 100.0% 103,322 100.0% 139,196 100.0%
Residence in 1973
Angola 195,206 61.4% 222,420 61.5%
Mozambique 106,242 33.4% 121,588 33.6%
Other 16,476 5.2% 17,771 4.9%
Total 317,924 100.0% 361,779 100.0%
Notes: The native sample is comprised of all non-repatriates above the age of 15. The
sample of repatriates is comprised of all repatriates between 20 and 69 years old in 1981. For
comparison, statistics of repatriates above 15 are displayed. Shares may not add up to 100%
due to rounding. Source: census of 1981, Statistics Portugal, computations by the author.
between them. In addition, differences are considered separately for both males and
females. We calculate all indicators, with the exception of the unemployment rate,
as shares over the total population of working age, which we define as from 15 to 64
years old. The unemployment rate is the share of the labor force who is unemployed.
The outcomes exhibit an increasing degree of granularity as one moves from the
top to the bottom of the Table. The labor force encompasses all those who are
unemployed and employed. Those employed encompass, among less relevant categories
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not considered, employees, and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs, in turn, are made up of
self-employed individuals (those who do not have employees), which consider low-quality
entrepreneurship, and employers (those who have employees), qhich we consider to be
high-quality entrepreneurship.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Males Females
Natives Repatriates Difference Natives Repatriates Difference
Variable ∆81−60 m81 m81 m81 ∆81−60 m81 m81 m81
LFP -0.100 0.889 0.878 0.011 0.223 0.392 0.483 -0.091∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.026) (0.028) (0.007) (0.052) (0.088) (0.071) (0.021)
Unemployment rate 0.011 0.040 0.073 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.120 0.133 0.224 -0.091∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.026) (0.005) (0.059) (0.060) (0.044) (0.014)
Employment share -0.105 0.854 0.814 0.040∗∗∗ 0.173 0.341 0.375 -0.034
(0.041) (0.030) (0.039) (0.009) (0.050) (0.085) (0.061) (0.019)
Share Employee -0.129 0.587 0.627 -0.040∗ 0.095 0.242 0.320 -0.078∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.078) (0.075) (0.020) (0.045) (0.087) (0.068) (0.020)
Share Entrepreneur -0.014 0.221 0.179 0.042∗∗ 0.065 0.083 0.051 0.033∗∗
(0.056) (0.068) (0.047) (0.015) (0.044) (0.049) (0.021) (0.010)
Share Employer -0.038 0.031 0.046 -0.014∗∗∗ 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.003∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.009) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Share Self-employed 0.023 0.189 0.133 0.056∗∗∗ 0.064 0.079 0.042 0.036∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.072) (0.044) (0.015) (0.045) (0.049) (0.021) (0.010)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. ∆81−60 refer to the change in each outcome between 1960 and 1981.
m81 refers to the mean level in 1981 across the 30 NUTS 3 regions. LFP stands for labor force participation.
The column Difference shows the difference between mean levels of natives and repatriates in 1981. The stars
indicate significance of an unpaired t-test of the differences. All indicators expect for the unemployment rate
are calculated as shares over the total population of working age. I compute the unemployment rate as the
share of the labor force that is unemployed. Source: census of 1981, computations by the author. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The LFP of male natives decreased between 1960 and 1981, while female native
LFP increased. We observe an increase in the male native unemployment rate, and
a large drop in the male employment share. Male natives experienced a decrease in
the share of employers, but an increase in the share of self-employed individuals. For
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female natives, all these outcomes exhibit positive changes, indicating an increasing
integration of women in the labor market.
In 1981, the LFP of both native and repatriate men is significantly higher than
for women. Compared to natives, repatriates of both genders are more likely to be
unemployed, indicating that they were not yet fully integrated into the Portuguese
labor market. However, female repatriates seem to be better integrated than female
natives, as reflected in their higher LFP.17
As already indicated in Table 2.1, both male and female repatriates are less likely
to be self-employed, but more likely than natives to be employers.
2.3.4 Spatial distribution of repatriates
The total sample of repatriates accounts for 4.7%18 of the total natives above 15 in
1981, with considerable spatial variation between municipalities, as shown in Figure B4
in the Appendix. The highest density is observed in the North East of the country and
around Lisbon. In 1981, there seems to be no major clustering of repatriates in certain
regions.
Figure 2.1 shows the relative supply shock by gender and NUTS 3 level. The regional
average supply shock for males is approximately 4.7% of the native population, while
for females it accounts for about 3.3%, with a total average shock of 3.9%. The largest
supply shock was induced in Serra da Estrela, followed by Grande Lisboa.
17Female repatriates exhibit a higher unemployment rate and a higher employment share than do
native women. This means that they are more likely to either be employed or unemployed once they
are of working age and less likely to, for instance, be stay-home parents. This is also reflected in the
higher female LFP. For male repatriates, the LFP is lower than for natives. Once male repatriates
are in the labor force, they are more likely to be unemployed and less likely to be employed than the
native population.
18Calculated as 317,924/6,824,225, see Table 2.1 for the numbers of total natives and repatriates.
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Figure 2.1 Percent supply shock by NUTS 3 regions. The supply shock is calculated as
the number of repatriates in the sample over the number of natives above
15 in 1981. Source: census of 1981, Statistics Portugal, own construction.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Identification
2.4.1 Main Econometric Equation
One of the most common approaches in economic literature to study the effect of
migration on native outcomes is the spatial correlation approach (Glitz, 2012). In this
approach, an outcome in a given area is regressed on the relative quantity of immigrants
in that same area. This area is intended to correspond to a local labor market. We
follow this approach, using as a source of variation the differential relative size of inflows
of repatriates by region. As suggested by Dustmann et al. (2016), we investigate the
effect of the overall (opposed to the group-specific) immigration shock on labor market
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outcomes.19 We estimate the impact of the Portuguese repatriates on several labor
market outcomes using the following specification:
∆Ynr = αn + βmr +X
1960
r + εnr (2.1)
where r stands for NUTS 3 region and n for NUTS 2 region. Figure B5 in the Appendix
shows a map with these regions, Table B3 shows the size of these regions in terms
of population and labor force. The analysis is at the geographical level of NUTS
3 since they are assumed to correspond to local labor markets.20 ∆Yr denotes the
change in the outcome Y from 1960 (the pre-shock period) to 1981 (the post-shock
period) in each region. We investigate labor force participation, the unemployment
rate, overall employment and employment as an employee or entrepreneur. mr is the
ratio of repatriates in the sample in 1981 to the natives above 15 in 1981, in region
r. X1960r is a vector of controls, namely, the shares of unemployed, inactive, young,
highly educated and entrepreneurs in 1960. We further include dummies for the seven
NUTS 2 regions to focus our analysis on differences within these regions. To account
for potential heteroskedasticity of the error term, all regressions use heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors.
19Dustmann et al. (2016) argue that this specification is preferable over specifications using variation
in immigrant inflows both across education groups and across regions for two reasons. First, the latter
unduly rely on the assumption that an immigrant and a native with the same measured education
and experience compete against each other. There is, however, strong evidence that immigrants
”downgrade” upon their arrival. Second, they argue that the overall effect of the total inflow is easier
to interpret and estimates a parameter with direct policy relevance.
20See, for instance, Baptista et al. (2008).
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2.4.2 Identification
Main Identification Issue
The aim of this analysis is to compare the economic outcomes of certain regions
after immigration with the counterfactual outcome that would have been observed
had migration not taken place (Dustmann et al., 2005). In an ideal empirical world,
immigrants would be allocated randomly across labor markets. Any subsequent
variation in economic outcomes would then be purely related to variation in immigrant
densities. However, in the real world, migrants are not allocated randomly, and
immigration densities may be spatially correlated with labor market outcomes because
of common influences, which would bias OLS results.
Our outcome variables are first-differenced to account for omitted time-invariant
characteristics of the regions. Two further endogeneity concerns relate to the
measurement of the supply shock mr, calculated as the ratio of repatriates to the
pre-existing native workforce in 1981.21 This ratio poses two endogeneity concerns:
natives may have moved in response to the inflow of repatriates and repatriates may
locate endogenously.22 If immigration were to increase unemployment in certain areas,
but natives would move to areas with lower migrant density in response, the impact of
immigration would be dispersed through the national economy, leading to downward
biased estimates of the effect of immigration on unemployment. The extent to which
repatriates could actively base their location decision on economic considerations was
limited by the unexpected timing of the end of the Portuguese Colonial War. Even
when controlling for an extensive set of controls in the pre-shock period, we, however,
cannot entirely exclude the possibility that repatriates moved to regions for unobserved
factors that are correlated with changes in outcomes between 1960 and 1981, which
21Hunt (1992), Borjas (2003) and Edo (2020) likewise use this post-shock denominator.
22These concerns are especially warranted in this case since data for the post-shock period comes
from several years after the shock, giving natives sufficient time to adjust their location.
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would again bias OLS estimates.
Shift-Share Instrument
To address the potential endogeneity in the location of repatriates, we use three
variations of a shift-share instrument, which is the most common method applied in
studies of this kind (Jaeger et al., 2018). A shift-share instrument is a weighted average
of some shock, with weights reflecting heterogeneous shock exposure (Borusyak et al.,
2018). That is, the spatial distribution of a certain shock (i.e. the shift) is instrumented
by predicting regional shock exposure from some regional, exogenous characteristic (i.e.
the share). Following the work of Bartel (1989), who showed that arriving migrants are
more likely to settle in areas with higher previous migrant densities, the most common
way to build a shift-share instrument in the migration literature is to use a measure of
historical settlement patterns as share. This assumes network effects between current
and past migrants. Our shift-share instruments resemble that of Edo (2020), who
likewise uses past settlements as shares. We, however, adapt the shares given that we
are dealing with a particular kind of migration, namely repatriation of people who had
mostly still been born in the receiving country. The Portuguese repatriates are unlikely
to have much in common with former migrants, making network effects between these
two groups less plausible. A more suitable parameter to predict settlement patterns is
the place of birth of repatriates since many of them returned to their region of birth.23
Therefore, we use the share of Portuguese-born repatriates born in each region as a
source of variation. We construct three alternative shift-share instruments, all based
on birth places. For the first IV, we decompose the sample of repatriates across four
educational levels to construct the instrument, assuming that network effects with other
23In Figure B6 of the Appendix we show that a large Portuguese-born repatriates return to the
same NUTS 3 where they were born. In our sample, and on average, about 40% of Portuguese-born
repatriates lived in 1981, in the municipality they were born, with 51% residing in the NUTS 3 region
they were born in.
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repatriates are stronger between social classes, for which education serves as a proxy.
We then use the share of Portuguese-born repatriates of a certain education group
born in each region to build the shift-share instrument. The underlying reasoning is
the following: if more repatriates of a particular social class were born in a region, this
region is predicted to attract more repatriates of the same social class. We compute







where i stands for one of four education groups and r stands for one of 30 regions.
To show robustness to the assumption that network effects are stronger within
education groups, we compute a variant of the repatriate prediction by defining i as
origin group rather than education group, with origin referring to the place lived in
before repatriation to Portugal. The three origin groups are Angola, Mozambique and
other colonies. This instrument assumes that network effects are stronger between
repatriates from the same colonies, which might be a more reasonable assumption for
repatriates, who, for instance, migrated together with part of their African-born former
employees.
Lastly, we compute a third prediction of repatriates to construct a more simple
Bartik instrument, as first proposed by Bartik (1991) in the context of predicting
employment growth. We interact the share of total births in each region with another
proxy for the total inflow of repatriates, namely the number of white residents in Angola




×White residents in colonies1970 (2.3)
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This instrument does not rely on network effects between certain education or origin
groups and uses an alternative measure as a shift.
Following Edo (2020), we address the above described potential endogeneity of
natives in 1981 by likewise predicting the number of pre-existing natives, i.e., those







where i again stands for education group and r stands for region.
After predicting the number of repatriates per region from (2.2), or from (2.3), and






The literature on shift-share instruments suggests that such an instrument will be
invalid if conditions which influence the spatial distribution used as share are serially
correlated over time and influence current outcomes (Borjas, 1999). According to
Dustmann et al. (2005), this concern is mitigated by using a sufficient time lag to
predict the regional distribution of migrants. As we are using places of birth of migrants
of different ages, it seems plausible to assume that their places of birth in different
years and subsequent decision to leave their home region in different years have no
systematic impact on changes in outcomes between 1960 and 1981.24 In addition, as
noted by Peralta (2019), the repatriates were a socially diverse population. Some of
them had left Portugal because they resided in impoverished regions and wanted to
24Note that our outcomes use first differences. Therefore, as argued by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al.
(2020), the question is not whether the shares influence levels of outcomes, but rather whether they
influence changes in outcomes.
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escape poverty, others were affluent settler families with affinities to colonial power.
This diversity indicates that there is unlikely to be a systematic relationship between
the places of birth and changes in labor market outcomes between 1960 and 1981.
Nevertheless, we include a set of controls in 1960 to support this assumption. For our
instrument to yield unbiased estimates, we then require the share of births of repatriates
in each region to be exogenous to changes in labor market outcomes between 1960 and
1981, after controlling for several characteristics in the pre-shock period.
2.5 Empirical Results
The fact that the characteristics of female and male natives, as shown in Table 2.2, differ
substantially motivates a separate analysis for male and female outcomes. Moreover,
female labor supply has been found to be more elastic to shocks than male labor supply
(Lloyd and Niemi, 1978). Therefore, it seems relevant to investigate the effect of the
repatriate supply shock on both the male and the female labor markets separately.
Table 2.3 presents the OLS and IV estimated effects of the supply shock induced
by the repatriates on the change in labor force participation, unemployment rate,
employment and entrepreneurship for male natives. Table 2.4 presents the same for
female natives. Specification (1) and (2) are OLS regressions of equation (2.1), without
and with pre-shock controls, respectively. Specification (3) to (5) refer to IV regressions,
with (3) using the IV based on educational network effects, (4) using the IV based
on origin network effects, and (5) using the simple Bartik instrument. All first-stage
coefficients of the instruments are large in magnitude, and the first-stage F-statistics
comfortably pass the bound of 10 suggested by the literature on weak instruments
(Stock et al., 2002). These results indicate that all instruments are relevant predictors
of repatriate density and the IV estimates are unlikely to be subject to weak instrument
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Table 2.3: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - baseline
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP 0.228 0.526 -0.107 -0.111 -0.082
(0.366) (0.458) (0.293) (0.306) (0.296)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.186 -0.044 0.214 0.216 0.210
(0.137) (0.185) (0.119) (0.118) (0.117)
∆ Employment share 0.397 0.527 -0.328 -0.334 -0.300
(0.399) (0.542) (0.319) (0.334) (0.321)
∆ Share Employee -0.490 -1.865 -3.912∗∗∗ -3.902∗∗∗ -3.779∗∗∗
(0.936) (1.085) (0.905) (0.931) (0.886)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.318 1.764∗ 3.079∗∗∗ 3.059∗∗∗ 2.967∗∗∗
(0.573) (0.809) (0.766) (0.774) (0.744)
∆ Share Employer -0.396 -0.624∗∗∗ -0.677∗∗∗ -0.685∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.152) (0.158) (0.159) (0.154)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.714 2.388∗∗ 3.756∗∗∗ 3.744∗∗∗ 3.653∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.854) (0.851) (0.860) (0.826)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.528 0.510 0.375
First-stage F-statistic - - 55.05 50.94 63.64
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample of
repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to changes between
1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship,
Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native working
age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over the
native labor force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain
the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age
population, inactive and population below 15 as share of total population, those with
higher education as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational
network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according to the colony
lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
bias. Notably, the first-stage coefficients for instrument 1 and 2 (i.e. specification (3)
and (4)) are larger than for instrument 3 (i.e. specification (5)), indicating that the
instruments based on network effects between subgroups predict more of the spatial
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Table 2.4: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - baseline
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.512 -1.082 -1.871∗∗ -1.845∗∗ -1.835∗∗
(0.581) (0.892) (0.691) (0.698) (0.690)
∆ Unemployment rate -1.426 -0.655 0.069 0.073 0.084
(0.733) (0.916) (0.519) (0.513) (0.509)
∆ Employment share 0.087 -0.680 -1.587∗ -1.568∗ -1.562∗
(0.596) (0.906) (0.661) (0.663) (0.654)
∆ Share Employee -0.771 -1.059 -1.919∗∗∗ -1.900∗∗ -1.886∗∗∗
(0.558) (0.731) (0.573) (0.586) (0.573)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.604 0.122 0.139 0.136 0.128
(0.500) (0.497) (0.458) (0.459) (0.452)
∆ Share Employer -0.014 -0.050 -0.072∗ -0.071∗ -0.071∗
(0.031) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.618 0.171 0.211 0.207 0.199
(0.514) (0.489) (0.448) (0.449) (0.441)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.528 0.510 0.375
First-stage F-statistic - - 55.05 50.94 63.64
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: See notes in table 2.3. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
variation in repatriates’ location than does the more general Bartik instrument. The
estimated second-stage effects using the three instruments are all very similar both in
terms of magnitude and significance.
OLS indicates a non-significant increase in male LFP, with a slight, non-significant
decrease in unemployment and a non-significant rise in employment. IV reverses the
signs of the estimates, suggesting positive selection: repatriates seem to settle in regions
with better labor market prospects. The IVs mitigate this endogeneity, showing that
a higher supply shock slightly decreases male LFP, decreases male employment, and
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increases male unemployment. None of these effects is however, statistically significant.
The effect on employment hides substantial heterogeneity between different types of
employment. A higher supply shock leads to a substantial and significant decrease in
male employment as employees. A 1 pp increase in the share of repatriates will lead
to roughly a 4 pp reduction in the share of the labor force working as employees, on
average. As the supply shock accounted for a 3.9 pp change in the share of repatriates,
on average, the average decline in employment as employee caused by the shock amounts
to 15.6 pp. This corresponds to an average reduction of about 22% compared to the
pre-shock level of 71.6% in 1960. On the other hand, we observe a substantial increase in
the share of male entrepreneurs. The supply shock increased the share of entrepreneurs
by about 12 pp.25 This corresponds to a rise of about 51.1% compared to the pre-shock
level of 23.5%. An increase in self-employed individuals drives this increase: in the
presence of relatively more repatriates, natives are more likely to be self-employed, but
less likely to work as employers. All these effects are statistically significant at 10%.
For female natives, OLS indicates a non-significant decrease in LFP, unemployment
rate and employment share following a higher shock. The changes in coefficients
between OLS and IV estimates also suggest positive selection in the location of
repatriates. The IV estimates indicate that the shock causes a statistically significant
reduction in female LFP, stemming from a drop in the share of females employed, but
no change in unemployment. On average, the shock introduced a 6.2 pp reduction in
the share employed and a 7.4 pp reduction in the share working as employees. Given
the low pre-shock level of 14.6% of women working as employees, the latter indicates
a larger relative change than for men, corresponding to a decrease of about 50.1%
(compared to 22% for men).26 Contrary to men, women do not compensate for this loss
25Calculated as 3.9*3.1, i.e the average shock multiplied by the coefficient of the variable at hand.
26As all these indicators recorded an increase between 1960 and 1981 (see Table 2.2), these negative
effects imply that in regions with more repatriates, these indicator increased by less than they would
have increased in the absence of the repatriates.
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with an increase in self-employment. While we observe a slight, statistically significant
drop in the share of employers, the overall increase in entrepreneurship is statistically
non-significant. Females seem to move to inactivity, as reflected in the negative effect
on female LFP.
2.6 Discussion of Results
Overall, the results imply that places of birth of repatriates are a strong predictor of
settlement patterns of the Portuguese repatriates. Despite that, it seems that there
is some positive selection, that is, that repatriates to some extent base their location
decisions on economic fundamentals. This finding is in line with makela2017effect
study of the Portuguese repatriates. In addition, while the repatriates caused no overall
increase in unemployment several years after the inflow, there was some displacement of
local workers following the arrival of the repatriates. Both male and female natives seem
to be driven out of employment as employees by the shock, with a larger relative effect
on females. This larger effect is consistent, with the findings of edo2017impact study
of the French repatriation. While male natives manage to adjust and compensate for
this loss by becoming self-employed, overall female employment is impacted negatively
as female natives lose their employment as employees but do not record an increase
in entrepreneurship. Instead, they leave the labor force altogether, with no significant
increase in unemployment. This result is also consistent with Edo (2020).
These findings can be explained by a segmented labor market between male and
female workers. The arrival of a massive number of working age adults is likely to
decrease wages. Indeed, Carrington and De Lima (1996) document a sizeable decrease
in real earnings. They then perform an exploratory regional analysis based on the
construction sector wage (for both natives and repatriates), and suggest that the
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decreases are related to the inflow of repatriates in each of the districts. Aggregated data
from Statistics Portugal confirms that after a period of increases, real wages started
to decrease in 1975, after the arrival of the repatriates (Pereirinha, 1980). Mäkelä
(2017) finds that in 1977, actual average annual wages per worker were about 8% lower
compared to the synthetic counterfactual, with a larger negative effect of -25% in 1970
and -55% in 1985, respectively. Although this is the overall average (i.e., including
male and female, native and repatriate workers) wage, it is reasonable to assume that it
reflects mostly the impact on male wages, given that the bulk of workers were males, on
the one hand, and the supply shock was larger for males, as male repatriates were more
likely to be part of the labor force than females. As of 1960, 71.6% of working age males
worked as employees, compared to 16.4% of females. Given that the population of both
genders was approximately the same, this implies that there were more than four times
as many male employees vis-à-vis female employees. We also know, from de Carvalho
(1980), that the gender wage gap was 64% in 1974, and 75% in 1978, a sharp change
in just four years which can be explained by a decrease in male wages. These spare
pieces of evidence confirm that following the inflow of the Portuguese repatriates, (i)
real wages decreased, (ii) the gender wage gap decreased, driven by a decline in male
wages, and, (iii) the market was segmented by gender, with significantly lower wages
for women than for men.
With the decrease in male wages, some men were likely induced to voluntarily leave
employment as employees to pursue self-employment. If employers in the late 1970s
and early 1980s had a preference for male employees and employed women because they
were relatively cheaper, the decrease in the gender wage gap reduced the relative price
advantage of female labor, leading to female layoffs.27
27Even if both male and female wages decreased, the fact that the relative wage of females increased
drives this effect. Moreover, a stronger displacement effect for women is consistent with the fact that
female labor supply is generally more responsive to wage changes (Lloyd and Niemi, 1978).
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Furthermore, Cardoso and Morin (2018) show that the relative scarcity of men
in the Portuguese economy resulting from military drafting and emigration in the
1960s and early 1970s led to a demand-driven sharp increase in female LFP, making
Portugal one of the European leaders in female LFP. The rise slowed down in the 1980s,
coinciding with the arrival of the repatriates. Therefore, our results imply that after a
demand-driven increase in female LFP, a supply shock leads to a slowdown in this trend.
More specifically, the supply shock changed the relative wage of females, prompting a
demand-driven decrease in female LFP. While Cardoso and Morin (2018) argue that the
early increase in female LFP may have changed social norms in Portugal, our results
question the persistence of the change. Once (predominately male) repatriates arrived,
depressing male wages, women were once again driven out of the labor market, possibly
due to a preference of employers for men. This indicates that there may still have been
strong social norms against female employment.
Interestingly, Mäkelä (2017) finds a small short-run increase in unemployment in
the first years after the repatriates’ arrival, with no effect visible after 1980, and
argues that this may be due to the low unemployment benefits at the time. These
low benefits may have induced displaced females to move to inactivity rather than
unemployment. Conversely, displaced male natives moved to self-employment. The
increase in self-employment and decline in employers fits in with the fact that, while
repatriates are less likely to be self-employed compared to natives, they are more likely
to be employers (see Table 2.2). Therefore, repatriates seem to drive natives out of
occupations in which they are more prevalent. This is what Peri (2016) calls margins of
adjustment: native workers move away from tasks or skills provided by immigrants and
towards talks or skills complemented by them. We do not have sufficient information
on the respective characteristics of self-employment and work as employers to make
any conclusive remarks on their relative quality. Self-employment without having any
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employees may however be an indicator for lower quality entrepreneurship than work as
an employer. Thereby, male natives seem to be driven out of employment as employees
and into, possibly, lower-quality entrepreneurship. This is bound to reflect an overall
decrease in their position in the earnings ranking and may explain part of the negative
sentiment described in Section 2.2.
2.7 Robustness
In this section, we once again take advantage of the fact that we have access to a
individual level data covering the universe of repatriates in 1981 to show that our
baseline results are robust to several checks.
A possible concern relates to the fact that, as we conduct our analysis at the NUTS
3 level, we have a small sample size. In Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 we run the regressions at
the municipality level, with 303 observations, for males and females, respectively.28 This
exercise further allows us to mitigate another concern. If we think that the repatriates
may have caused internal migration among natives, municipal level results should be
less negative than those aggregated at the NUTS 3 regions, as the former would be
contaminated by spatial spillovers due to internal migration. In any case, if anything,
we observe the opposite: our results for the employment effects at the municipality level
are more negative than those at NUTS 3-level.
In Tables 2.7 and 2.8, we display more robustness tests, using the education networks
specification, to account for a number of possible remaining concerns related to our
econometric analysis. More specifically, in column (1), we replace the instrumental
28Braun et al. (2020) point out that the choice of spatial units can have an important impact on
the estimated coefficients. While there were 305 municipalities in Portugal in 1960, the 1960 census
misses data for two municipalities. The number of repatriates in the municipality-level regression is
smaller, as we exclude all repatriates who moved municipalities (rather than NUTS 3 regions) from
the sample.
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Table 2.5: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - municipality
level
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.053 -0.054 -0.395 -0.353 -0.399∗∗
(0.110) (0.109) (0.243) (0.257) (0.154)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.069 0.026 0.132 0.138 0.135∗∗
(0.040) (0.035) (0.069) (0.075) (0.051)
∆ Employment share 0.015 -0.087 -0.518∗ -0.481 -0.526∗∗
(0.114) (0.116) (0.256) (0.268) (0.165)
∆ Share Employee -0.595∗∗ -1.247∗∗∗ -2.829∗∗∗ -2.894∗∗∗ -2.170∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.181) (0.413) (0.442) (0.238)
∆ Share Entrepreneur -0.030 0.477∗∗ 1.702∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.174) (0.362) (0.408) (0.210)
∆ Share Employer -0.188∗∗ -0.135∗ -0.110 -0.076 -0.166∗
(0.060) (0.061) (0.110) (0.119) (0.067)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.159 0.612∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗ 1.896∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.189) (0.372) (0.410) (0.226)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.327 0.309 0.378
First-stage F-statistic - - 49.93 39.96 559.05
Observations 303 303 303 303 303
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample of
repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to changes between
1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship, Share
Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native working age
population. The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over the native
labor force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain
the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working
age population, inactive and population below 15 as share of total population, those
with higher education as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on
educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according
to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. The regressions are run at
the municipality level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.6: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - municipality
level
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.231 -0.499∗ -2.199∗∗∗ -2.414∗∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.198) (0.494) (0.556) (0.262)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.724∗∗∗ -0.098 0.626∗ 0.685∗ 0.299
(0.198) (0.160) (0.263) (0.290) (0.167)
∆ Employment share 0.068 -0.379 -2.085∗∗∗ -2.292∗∗∗ -1.060∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.197) (0.478) (0.534) (0.256)
∆ Share Employee -0.252 -0.575∗∗∗ -2.192∗∗∗ -2.344∗∗∗ -1.247∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.137) (0.442) (0.490) (0.201)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.100 -0.004 0.019 -0.028 0.056
(0.158) (0.160) (0.310) (0.317) (0.238)
∆ Share Employer -0.009 -0.019∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.110 0.015 0.079 0.033 0.100
(0.159) (0.160) (0.310) (0.318) (0.239)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.327 0.309 0.378
First-stage F-statistic - - 49.93 39.96 559.05
Observations 303 303 303 303 303
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample of
repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to changes between
1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship, Share
Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native working age
population. The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over the native labor
force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the following
parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age population,
inactive and population below 15 as share of total population, those with higher education
as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2
is the instrument based on network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the
basic Bartik instrument. The regressions are run at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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variable according to Kronmal (1993). In column (2) and (3), we exclude particular
regions from the sample, while, in columns (4) and (5), we change and remove the
regional fixed effects. Column (6) includes the subsample of repatriates who changed
regions within Portugal before 1981. Lastly, in columns (7) and (8), we consider
gender-specific shocks. We present the main tables with OLS and the three (shift-share)
IV estimates, for all these exercises, in the Appendix.
João Pereira dos Santos 69

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































João Pereira dos Santos 70









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































João Pereira dos Santos 71
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Specification (1) in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 shows that the results are robust to
the specification of Kronmal (see Tables B4 and B5 in the Appendix). As pointed
out by Clemens and Hunt (2019), the fact that the shift-share instrument and the
endogenous variable have a common denominator has the potential to bias second-stage
IV estimates.29 To show that the IV results are not driven by the correlation between
the predicted and actual number of natives, we follow their suggestion to apply the
correction of Kronmal (1993). Consequently, we instrument for the log of repatriates
with the log of the predicted repatriates based on places of birth, including the log of
the native population in 1981 as a control. For males, there are some slight changes in
significance, suggesting slightly more adverse effects. For females, all results are in line
with the main specification.
We then take into consideration possible confounding contemporaneous economic
shocks: the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, the end of the Portuguese Colonial War, which
caused a reduction in military employment of about 200,000 people, the revolution and
democratisation of the country, and the end of emigration to France and West Germany.
These shocks may be a problem if they caused differential regional impacts, hampering
our identification strategy, which is based on the regional distribution of the repatriates.
The return of soldiers from the Colonial War is unlikely to asymmetrically affect
regions within Portugal. As noted by Card and Cardoso (2012), the options for
self-selecting out of drafting for the Colonial War were severely limited, indicating that
returning soldiers likely settled evenly across the country. The fact that the Colonial
War had a relatively low death toll, with 8,290 dead soldiers recorded (Cardoso and
Morin, 2018), adds additional confidence that the impacts of the war do not significantly
bias our results.
On top of including dummy variables for the large NUTS 2 regions in our baseline
29While we are not using the exact same denominator in the endogenous variable as we are using in
the instruments, both denominators have some parts in common.
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specification, the use of (shift-share) IVs should further reduce the concern for bias
by confounding factors. We nevertheless demonstrate that the results are robust to
excluding regions that could be more prone to such factors. As explained by Carrington
and De Lima (1996), Lisbon and Setúbal were the center of the most dramatic political
and economic conflicts following the democratization of Portugal, with communist-led
unions effectively promulgating compulsory unionization in these areas, whereas there
was a large drop in tourism in the Algarve after 1975. Specification (2) in Table 2.7
and Table 2.8 shows that the results are robust to excluding these three regions (see
Tables B6 and B7 in the Appendix).30 In column (3) of Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, we
underline that the results are robust to excluding the NUTS 2 region of Alentejo (see
Tables B8 and B9 in the Appendix). As described by Pires de Almeida (2016), the
Alentejo region was subject to a profound agrarian reform following the military coup
in Portugal, which altered many aspects of the region’s political, economic, and social
reality.
The inclusion of NUTS 2 region dummies, however, may increase the restrictiveness
of the regression and capture part of the impact we want to estimate, as some repatriates
may positively affect the growth of the NUTS 2 region, and can, in turn, influence
native employment. We deal with this by showing that our baseline results remain
unchallenged if we use a smaller set of fixed effects, or if we remove them. Specification
(4) in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 confirms that the results are robust to including a less
demanding set of three regional fixed effects, while, in Specification (5), we remove
the NUTS 2 fixed effects (see Tables B10 and B11 for the first exercise and Tables B12
and B13 for the second).31
30Since we are using different spatial units than these two studies, we exclude the NUTS 3 most
closely corresponding to those excluded districts, namely Algarve, Grande Lisboa and the Peninsula
of Setúbal.
31The three dummy variables are constructed as follows: the first dummy comprises the NUTS
3 regions Center and North; the second dummy comprises Alentejo, Algarve, and Lisbon; the third
dummy comprises the islands of Azores and Madeira.
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We now construct several subsamples of repatriates to show that the results do
not depend on the previously applied sampling criteria. So far, all our specifications
excluded all repatriates who changed NUTS 3 regions between 1979 and 1981.
Specification (6) in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 highlights that including these individuals in
our immigration shock does not change the baseline results. Moreover, Table B14 and
Table B15 in the Appendix show that the findings for males and females, respectively,
hold if we exclude students, adapt the age range of repatriates to 15 to 64 years old
and to 25 to 59 year old in 1981, exclude all inactive repatriates, and if we include only
Portuguese-born repatriates.32 Also related to how we measure the immigration shock,
we show that results are robust to using the preexisting workforce as suggested by (Card
and Peri, 2016), rather than the instrumented post-shock values, as denominator. This
may be important as the native workforce in 1981 may be positively correlated with
native labor force participation due to local demand shocks caused by the influx of
repatriates. The results in column (7) of of Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are more negative than
baseline (see Tables B16 and B17 in the Appendix).
Finally, and given that men and women could be imperfect substitutes in production
(Edo and Toubal, 2017), we replace the ratio of repatriates mr by a gender-specific
repatriate share (i.e.,we compute mr in the sample of males when estimating its impact
on the employment of native men, and compute mr in the sample of females when
estimating its impact on the employment of native women). The results, as shown in
specification (8) of Tables 2.7 and 2.8, are very similar to our baseline (see Tables B18
and B19 in the Appendix).
32For space constraints, we only show the results for IV1. Results for the other IVs are likewise
robust and available upon request from the authors.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper offers new evidence on the effect of a large-scale, one-time supply shock on
native labor market outcomes, exploiting the end of the Portuguese Colonial War and
subsequent repatriation of half a million ethnic Portuguese. As documented by various
scholars, (e.g. Borjas and Monras (2017), Friedberg and Hunt (1995)) such natural
experiments offer an excellent setting to identify causality by combining an exogenous
push factor with the use of an IV strategy to control for the endogenous allocation of
migrants. We use a novel shift-share instrument, exploiting the unique characteristic of
the Portuguese repatriates, namely the fact that they had still been born in Portugal
and that many of them returned to their birthplace. The obtained results are in line
with and extend upon Mäkelä (2017) study of the Portuguese repatriation.
We find robust evidence for adjustment in the labor market following the arrival
of the repatriates, with a larger displacement of females. For both female and male
natives, employment as employees decreases. Men compensate for this by becoming
self-employed entrepreneurs, thereby not experiencing a decrease in overall employment.
Women instead move to inactivity, which is reflected in the significant adverse effect
on overall employment and LFP. A possible mechanism through which the inflow may
have led to these outcomes is through a decrease in wages, which is supported by
Mäkelä (2017) study. Furthermore, the fact that the inflow of the repatriates hampered
the previous sharp increase in female LFP in Portugal may be an illustration of the
persistence of social norms against female employment.
At the same time, we find no evidence for an increase in neither male nor female
unemployment. Notably, we do not show any effects in the very short run, but measure
outcomes several years after the inflow. While there may have been an increase in
native unemployment in the first years after the arrival of the repatriates, we conclude
that about 6 years later, the labor market had accommodated the large inflow, with
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no increased native unemployment detectable. This result is striking given the size of
the inflow and the negative stereotyping of the repatriates at the time. The lack of
a large increase in unemployment may partly be attributable to the policy making by
the Portuguese state to support the integration of the repatriates. The government
rented hotels in different parts of the country to avoid clustering in certain regions,
gave support to small businesses and provided jobs as public servants to repatriates.
Due to the peculiar nature of the repatriates, the findings of this study may not
be applicable to all kinds of migration. The take-away for policymakers is, however,
that lending support to arriving migrants may give the structure of the labor market
sufficient time to adjust and accommodate even substantial inflows of migrants within
just some years. The study further illustrates the importance of viewing female and
male labor market outcomes separately to grasp the whole picture and to be able
to design policy interventions to overcome potential challenges related to large-scale
migration. Future research could explore the importance of the state support provided
to the repatriates in hampering potential adverse effects of the repatriation, or look
into the long-term effect of the repatriates on gender norms in Portugal.
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Chapter 3
Brown Sugar, how come you taste
so good? The impact of a soda tax
on prices and consumption1
3.1 Introduction
A growing number of governments around the world are introducing sugar-sweetened
beverage taxes (SSB or soda taxes for short) to change consumer behavior, generate
revenue, and incentivize manufacturers to reformulate products. In fact, the
World Health Organization’s Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of
Non-Communicable Diseases 2013-2020 added soda taxes to their list of recommended
1This chapter is written in co-authorship with Judite Gonçalves. The authors are grateful for
comments from two anonymous reviewers, Pedro Pita Barros, Judit Vall Castello, Alexander Coutts,
David Cutler, Randall Ellis, Jonathan Gruber, Albert Ma, Martin O’Connell, Jim Poterba, Nigel
Rice, Susana Peralta, José Tavares, and participants at a Nova SBE-ISEG seminar, a Nova Health
Economics and Management KC meeting, the VIII Taller EvaluAES (Universitat de les Illes Balears),
the Workshop on Economics of Taxation Social Expenditure (Universitat de Barcelona), the XXXIX
Jornadas de la Associación de Economı́a de la Salud (Albacete), the 13th Annual Meeting of the PEJ
(Évora), the International Health Economics Association Congress (Basel), the 2019 EuHEA PhD
student-supervisor conference, and the conference of the Portuguese Health Economics Association.
We thank Mafalda Lúıs for excellent technical assistance.
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policies, as there is overwhelming evidence linking SSB consumption to diseases such as
obesity and diabetes (see e.g. Malik et al., 2010a and Malik et al., 2010b for a review
of the evidence).2 As of July 2019, more than 40 countries have implemented or are on
the verge of implementing SSB taxes, including for example Mexico, France, the UK,
Portugal, South Africa, as well as Catalonia in Spain and several cities in the US (e.g.
Berkeley, California, Boulder, Colorado, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; see Global
Food Research Program UNC, 2019).
This study assesses the impacts of the Portuguese soda tax, implemented in February
2017, on soda prices and consumption. We use extremely rich product-store-month-level
sales data from a large retailer with 400+ stores. To estimate the causal impacts of the
tax, we adopt difference-in-differences and event study designs, using bottled water as
the comparison group and controlling for several vectors of fixed effects. We explore
the impacts of the soda tax on four distinct groups of soda products. This distinction
takes into account the structure of the Portuguese soda tax, which taxes more heavily
drinks with higher sugar content and has led manufacturers to alter the recipes of
several drinks. All analyses are performed on both unbalanced and balanced panels;
the latter including only the most popular drinks. Lastly, we study responses to the
tax in different periods: when it was only being discussed in the media, when it was
formally considered and debated in the parliament, and finally when it was enacted.
Our main findings include first, substantial pass-through of the tax to consumer
prices, at almost 100% for high-sugar drinks and above 100% for drinks with less sugar;
second, a substantial drop in consumption of drinks with relatively low sugar content,
but otherwise limited impacts of the tax on consumption; and third, stockpiling in the
quarter before the tax was implemented.
2Macro-level results of a recent study suggest that for each additional teaspoon of added sugar per
person, spending on diabetes per capita rises by as much as 26.8% and the growth rate of total health
care expenditure per capita increases by 1.8 percentage points in the long run (Castro, 2017).
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The economic reasoning underlying SSB taxes is that of making consumers
internalize the costs they impose on themselves (internalities) and on others
(externalities) from consuming too much SSBs. Internalities have to do with individuals
ignoring the effects of consuming SSBs on their health, because they are misinformed
or because they fail to consider health problems that tend to appear far in the future.3
Externalities, in this case, are mainly healthcare costs of treating conditions related with
SSB consumption, that are shared by everyone through public or private insurance.
SSB taxes have different welfare effects if we focus on internalities or externalities.
If poorer individuals tend to consume more SSBs than richer ones, then the internality
benefits of the tax are likely to be progressive, while the externality benefits will be
regressive. In the end, the total regressivity of a SSB tax will also depend on the
allocation of the tax revenues (see e.g. Allcott et al., 2019b for a detailed exposition of
this issue). SSB taxes opponents’ main argument is precisely regressivity; however,
when internality benefits and tax revenue allocation are taken into account, the
evidence suggests that the benefits of SSB taxes are likely to be flat across the income
distribution, or possibly the highest for the lowest-income consumers, at least in the US
(Allcott et al., 2019a; see also Dubois et al., 2018, Etilé and Sharma, 2015, and Etilé
et al., 2018).
Soda taxes can decrease the intake of sugar from SSBs, and consequently lead to
improvements in population health, through three channels. The first channel is by
increasing prices. In principle, consumers respond negatively to higher soda prices.
However, whether soda prices increase or not depends, first, on whether manufacturers
and retailers pass on the tax to the consumer, or alternatively (partly) absorb it. This
in turn depends on manufacturers’ and retailers’ market power as well as the price
3Pigouvian taxation of internalities has also been advocated in the context of unhealthy foods
(Cremer et al., 2016, Haavio and Kotakorpi, 2011, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006), cigarette
consumption (Gruber and Kőszegi, 2004), and energy markets (Allcott et al., 2014).
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elasticity of demand for SSBs. Manufacturers may also reformulate recipes in order to
avoid (higher) taxes. Thus, the first question to be addressed concerns the impact of
soda taxes on consumer prices (i.e. price pass-through). Available evidence on enacted
soda taxes shows significant heterogeneity in price pass-through across countries and
specific drink groups, ranging from less than 40% to more than 100% (Aguilar et al.,
2018; Arteaga et al., 2017; Berardi et al., 2016; Bollinger and Sexton, 2018; Capacci
et al., 2019; Cawley and Frisvold, 2017; Cawley et al., 2018a; Cawley et al., 2018c; Etilé
et al., 2018; Falbe et al., 2015; Grogger, 2017; Rojas and Wang, 2017; Seiler et al.,
2019).
The second channel is precisely the incentive for manufacturers to reformulate
recipes towards formulas with less added sugar. If SSBs contain less sugar, then sugar
intake will be lower, by construction. Nevertheless, if consumers dislike the new recipes,
they may substitute towards comparatively sweeter SSBs or other (unhealthy) products.
The third channel is increased consumer awareness. Regardless of any impact
on price, media coverage and public debate around soda taxes may raise consumer
awareness towards the detrimental effects of sugar intake and SSB consumption for
health, and consequently decrease SSB consumption. Globally, salience is a key
component of a soda tax, as there is robust evidence that consumers underreact to
taxes that are not salient (Chetty et al., 2009). One paper finds that soda consumption
at the University of California campus, in Berkeley, fell immediately after the Berkeley
soda tax was passed, two years before prices increased on-campus (Taylor et al., 2019a).
Other factors to keep in mind are substitution towards untaxed products that also
generate internalities and externalities, e.g. candy or beer, and leakage, namely the
possibility to purchase soda outside of the taxed jurisdiction (Allcott et al., 2019b).
There is suggestive evidence of substitution towards diet soda in countries where it is
untaxed (e.g. Allcott et al., 2019a; Castelló and López-Casasnovas, 2018). For example
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Finkelstein et al. (2013) don’t find evidence of substitution towards sugary foods or
pizza. As for leakage, Bergman and Hansen (2017) find that the tax pass-through for
beer and soda in Denmark is an increasing function of distance to the German border.
Bollinger and Sexton (2018), Cawley and Frisvold (2017), Cawley et al. (2018b), and
Seiler et al. (2019) also find evidence of cross-border shopping as a response to the soda
taxes implemented in Berkeley and Philadelphia.
Most existing studies on consumer responses to soda taxes enacted in Mexico, Chile,
Catalonia, Berkeley, and Philadelphia find that consumption of soda decreased, from
6% in Mexico to more than 20% in Berkeley and Philadelphia (Aguilar et al., 2018;
Arteaga et al., 2017; Castelló and López-Casasnovas, 2018; Cawley et al., 2018b; Falbe
et al., 2016; Mora et al., 2018; Nakamura et al., 2018; Seiler et al., 2019; Taylor et al.,
2019a). Due perhaps to specific data or methodologies, a few studies on the Berkeley
soda tax don’t find significant impacts on consumption (Bollinger and Sexton, 2018;
Rojas and Wang, 2017) and one finds a small positive impact (Debnam, 2017).
The literature so far has mainly relied on survey or home-scan data (e.g. Kantar
World Panel) or hand-collected data on a few products or stores, with only a few studies
having access to retail data (Berardi et al. (2016); Castelló and López-Casasnovas
(2018); Seiler et al., 2019). To try to estimate causal impacts, the vast majority of
studies employ difference-in-differences designs, either comparing taxed products to
untaxed ones (e.g. bottled water), or regions where soda is taxed to regions where it is
not.
The studies cited above estimate the impacts of enacted soda taxes around the
world ex-post. Several other studies provide ex-ante estimates of the impacts of soda
taxes, by estimating demand systems for soda and related products and then simulating
the impact of the introduction of a soda tax. For example, Finkelstein et al. (2013)
and Xiang et al. (2018) estimate that a 20% tax-induced increase in SSB prices would
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decrease per capita energy purchases by 24-29 kcal/day (see also Andalón and Gibson,
2018; Caro et al., 2018; Dubois et al., 2018; Etilé and Sharma, 2015; Gomo and Birg,
2018; Harding and Lovenheim, 2017).
To summarize, most studies on the ex-post impacts of soda taxes implemented in
France, Mexico, Chile, Spain, and the US find increases in SSB prices and drops in
SSB consumption. However, the magnitudes of the effects differ substantially across
countries and studies, reflecting on the one hand the different tax rates and designs
across countries, and on the other the different types of data and methodological
approaches employed.
As for Portugal, non-scientific evidence indicates that between 2016 and 2017 alone,
lemony drinks’ and fruit-flavored soda’s average sugar content decreased by 32.2% and
17.3% respectively (e.g. 7Up, Fanta; dos Santos, 2018). Overall, the change in the
caloric content per 100 mililitres of non-alcoholic beverages was -11% from 2016 to
2017 (-21% from 2013 to 2017; Grupo de Trabalho, 2018). Until December 2017, the
share of products with 80 grams of sugar or more per liter decreased from 61% to
37.9% of the sales volume (Grupo de Trabalho, 2018). Aggregate data also indicate
a 15% reduction in the total amount of sugar intake in 2017, arising from a transfer
of consumption from high-sugar drinks to drinks with less than 80 grams of sugar per
liter (Goiana-da Silva et al., 2018). Of course, this mixes together the effect of recipe
reformulations and any potential substitution effects.
This study adds to the previous literature by assessing for the first time the causal
impacts of the Portuguese soda tax. We start by determining the extent of pass-through
to consumer prices, and then analyze the impacts of the tax on soda consumption.
We make three main contributions. First, soda taxes that vary according to drinks’
sugar content, penalizing more heavily drinks with a lot of sugar, are increasingly
popular. In particular, this tax design led manufacturers in Portugal to change recipes
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in order to pay a lower tax, and we distinguish between the effects of the soda tax
on drinks that remained above the threshold and those that saw their sugar content
reduced. This is an unexplored issue in previous studies.
Second, we have extremely detailed product-store-month-level data from a large
retailer with more than 400 stores distributed across the country and 21% market share.
Our data are nationally representative and allow us to estimate the causal impacts of
the tax through a difference-in-differences design, using bottled water as the comparison
group and controlling for several vectors of fixed effects. Few previous studies are able
to control for potential confounders (e.g. preferences) as rigorously as we are. We also
present event study specifications, providing evidence in favor of the parallel-trends
assumption.
Third, we study the impacts of the soda tax before it was introduced, when it was
only being discussed in the media and debated in the parliament, i.e. before and after
prices changed due to the tax. This allows us to (partly) separate-out price effects
from the other two channels (product reformulations and increased awareness). This
is something that Taylor et al. (2019a) also explore, but our data are more detailed
and representative, covering all soda products and the whole country, as opposed to a
university campus. We also explore stockpilling effects in the quarter prior to the tax
implementation.4
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: the next section presents
the institutional background and sections 3.3 and 3.4 present the data and empirical
strategy. Next, we present the results and finally, section 3.6 discusses the main findings
and concludes.
4There is empirical evidence of stockpiling in the UK before the government levy on sugary drinks
came into effect in 2018 (https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-42565363).
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3.2 Institutional Background
The Portuguese soda tax was implemented nationwide in February 2017 and received
extensive media coverage. It was first mentioned almost one year earlier, in May 5,
2016.5 The tax proposal was included in the government budget proposal for 2017,
submitted to the parliament for discussion in mid-October 2016. The soda tax was
finally approved on December 28, 2016, together with the government budget for 2017
(Decree-law no. 42/2016).
The Portuguese soda tax applies to non-alcoholic drinks with added sugar or
sweeteners, including liquid or powder concentrates.6 Tax-exempt products include
(1) milk-, soy-, or rice-based drinks, (2) fruit-, algae-, or veggie-based juice and nectar,
as well as cereal- and nut-based drinks, and (3) drinks considered essential for special
dietary needs. Similarly to Catalonia, in Portugal there are different brackets defined
based on drinks’ sugar content. The amount of the tax is 0.08e per liter for drinks
with less than 80 grams of sugar per liter, and 0.16e per liter for drinks with 80 grams
or more sugar per liter. The usual 23% VAT adds up to the soda tax.7 So, unlike in
Catalonia, neither drinks with relatively little added sugar nor light drinks are exempt,
and drinks with a lot of sugar pay a comparatively higher tax.
The tax is levied on producers, not retailers. The different tax breaks are a way to
incentivize producers to reduce drinks’ sugar content in order to be subject to a lower
tax (Allcott et al., 2019b; Cremer et al., 2019). In fact, several products that used to
have more than 80 grams of sugar per liter now have 78-79 grams instead, paying a
tax half as large. The UK, which also introduced a graduated soda tax, seems to be
5“Sumos e refrigerantes vão ter imposto extra”, in Expresso
(https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2016-05-28-Sumos-e-refrigerantes-vao-ter-imposto-extra#
gs.ziLEots6)
6Examples are Sunquick and Tang. In this case, the tax is calculated based on the sugar content
of the final diluted mix.
7More precisely, the tax is 8.22 and 16.46 euro cents per liter, plus 23% VAT, which gives 10.11
and 20.25 euro cents per liter.
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experiencing similar effects (Roache and Gostin, 2017). In Portugal, between 2016 and
2017 alone, lemony drinks’ and fruit-flavored soda’s average sugar content decreased
by 32.2% and 17.3% respectively (e.g. 7Up, Fanta; dos Santos, 2018). The drinks that
still have more than 80 grams of sugar per liter include cola-flavored and some energy
drinks. Overall, the change in the caloric content per 100 mililitres of non-alcoholic
beverages was -11% from 2016 to 2017 (-21% from 2013 to 2017; Grupo de Trabalho,
2018). Until December 2017, the share of products with 80 grams of sugar or more per
liter decreased from 61% to 37.9% of the sales volume. Aggregate data also indicate
a 15% reduction in the total amount of sugar intake in 2017, arising from a transfer
of consumption from high-sugar drinks to drinks with less than 80 grams of sugar per
liter (Goiana-da Silva et al., 2018). Of course, this mixes together the effect of recipe
reformulations and any potential substitution effects.
One year after the tax was implemented, news reports suggest that consumer prices
increased by about 25-30% and sales decreased by about 5%.8 Besides affecting recipes
and prices, the soda tax may have changed consumer perception about soda. An
online survey by Nielsen, conducted in the summer of 2017, revealed that 60% of
Portuguese consumers pay attention to drinks’ sugar content; 50% of respondents also
admit that nutritional information may influence their purchasing behavior. In 2017,
the Portuguese soda tax generated almost 70 million euros in revenue, 10 million euros
less than expected.
8“Preços subiram 30% com imposto sobre refrigerantes”, in Diário de Not́ıcias
(https://www.dn.pt/dinheiro/interior/precos-subiram-30-com-imposto-sobre-refrigerantes-9096084.
html)
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3.3 Data
We use data from one of the two largest retailers in Portugal for the period February
2015-January 2018. This retailer has a share of 21% of the Portuguese retailer
market and more than 400 stores that cover the mainland and Madeira territories
comprehensively.9 Unlike in other countries, most retailers operating in Portugal (and
all the main ones) are relatively similar in terms of the products/brands sold and price
ranges.10 This contributes to the national representativeness of our analyses.
The dataset includes monthly information on sales and sales volume at the product
and store levels, from which we can compute unit prices. Prices include VAT and
other taxes; unlike in the US, in Portugal price tags include any applicable taxes. We
can identify products by name/brand, and container size. A product corresponds to a
specific bar code, meaning that a 1-liter bottle and a 33-centiliter can of Coca-Cola are
two distinct products, for instance.
Geographically, we know only if a store is located in the North, Center, South,
or Madeira regions. These regions display both between and within heterogeneity,
e.g. they include both rural and urban areas. In addition, we can identify stores
located in the two main metropolitan areas (Lisbon and Oporto), and stores located
within 30 kilometers from the border with Spain. Unfortunately, we lack more detailed
store locations or client information, preventing us from investigating potentially
heterogeneous responses by local income level or other characteristics.
We define four main treated product groups, directly affected by the tax, based
on the drink’s sugar content. Information on each drink’s sugar content was gathered
from online sources and field visits to the supermarket in mid 2018, and validated,
9“Quota de mercado da Sonae MC aproxima-se dos 22%”, in Jornal Económico
(https://jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/quota-de-mercado-da-sonae-mc-aproxima-se-dos-22-350698)
10“Preços nos supermercados: Jumbo volta a ganhar”
(https://www.deco.proteste.pt/familia-consumo/supermercado/noticias/precos-nos-supermercados-jumbo-volta-a-ganhar)
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for the most part, by the producers or the Portuguese Association of Non-Alcoholic
Beverages (PROBEB) by email.11 The first group includes drinks with more than 80
grams of sugar per liter (High Sugar, HS ); examples are Coca-Cola and Red Bull. The
second group includes drinks with sugar levels just below that threshold (Medium Sugar,
MS ); e.g. Fanta, 7Up. According to the available evidence, these drinks experienced
reductions in their sugar contents; i.e. they contained more than 80 grams of sugar per
liter before the tax was implemented (section 3.2). The third group includes drinks with
lower sugar levels, mostly below 70 grams per liter, unlikely to have dropped from more
than 80 grams per liter pre-tax (Low Sugar, LS ), such as most iced tea and flavored
water drinks. The fourth group includes zero-added sugar/artificially-sweetened drinks
(Zero Sugar, ZS ); e.g. Coca-Cola Zero, Diet 7up. Note that this classification is fixed
over time —products do not move from one group to another. In sum, High Sugar
drinks pay the highest tax (0.16e per liter +VAT), and all other drinks pay the lowest
tax (0.08e per liter +VAT).
Our comparison group is Water. We follow for example Alsukait et al. (2020), Etilé
et al. (2018), and Taylor et al. (2019b), who also consider bottled water as a comparison
product. There are several reasons why we believe that water is a good comparison
group in our setting. First, water is neither taxed nor likely to be indirectly affected
by the tax. Cawley et al. (2019) and Seiler et al. (2019) explore the impacts of the
Philadelphia soda tax on water consumption and find no evidence of substitution of soda
for bottled water. Some other studies from completely different geographies, including
Saudi Arabia or France, also find no evidence of such substitution (Alsukait et al.,
2020; Capacci et al., 2019). Second, with the exception of sugar, the water-bottling
industry uses the same inputs as the soda industry (e.g. machines, electricity, water,
plastic/glass). So, water and soda are likely to share similar cost structures in packaging,
11A few drinks with unknown sugar content that accounted for very few observations or total sales
were excluded. Liquid and powder concentrates were also dropped.
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marketing, and logistics (Etilé et al., 2018). Recent trends against plastic packaging
should also affect both soda and bottled water in a similar manner. Third, soda
brands have very low market shares in the bottled water segment, which mitigates
any strategic manipulation of prices. Coca-Cola Portugal and Sumol-Compal are the
main competitors in the Portuguese soda market, while the bottled water market is
highly fragmented, with more than 30 brands/firms competing. In our data, the two
water brands distributed by Coca-Cola Portugal are not represented, and the one brand
commercialized by Sumol-Compal, Serra da Estrela, represents only 1% of sales volume.
Fourth, most people simply drink water from the tap, making substitution of soda for
bottled water less likely (Instituto Ricardo Jorge, 2016).
We conduct our analyses on the full sample (Unbalanced Panel) that includes all
products, sold in any store in any month over the period February 2015-January 2018.
For comparison, we also estimate our models on a restricted sample (Balanced Panel)
that includes only products available in all stores in every month over the period
February 2015-January 2018, i.e. the most popular drinks in common sizes. Descriptive
statistics for both samples are presented in Table 3.1.
Figures C2 to C5 in the Appendix show the evolution of prices and quantities sold for
each treatment group versus water, in the unbalanced panel (Panel A) and the balanced
one (Panel B). The graphs display similar patterns for water and each of the treatment
groups in the pre-tax period, suggesting that the parallel-trends assumption holds (i.e.
that water is a good comparison group). Overall, the price of water is constant over
the entire period under analysis (left-hand side graphs), at slightly less than 50 euro
cents per liter, on average; quantity of water sold also exhibits a flat trend but with
some seasonality (right-hand side graphs). All product groups show clear increases in
prices when the tax is implemented —especially in the unbalanced panel—, but no clear
changes in quantities sold.
João Pereira dos Santos 88
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Full Before Discuss Approval Implement Full Before Discuss Approval Implement
Price in euros Quantity sold (liters)
A. Unbalanced Panel
Comparison group: Water
Avg 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 1899.53 1863.68 2273.06 1479.55 1872.23
SD 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.33 5344.12 5354.86 6127.92 4232.96 5184.60
Obs 295359 114319 48036 26012 106992 295359 114319 48036 26012 106992
High Sugar (HS)
Avg 1.84 1.72 1.69 1.76 2.06 216.73 237.15 276.45 207.09 170.00
SD 1.61 1.60 1.62 1.56 1.61 1257.36 977.60 1980.30 1471.38 1045.77
Obs 352607 139868 57137 27071 128531 352607 139868 57137 27071 128531
Medium Sugar (MS)
Avg 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.96 1.10 228.25 221.28 251.94 227.33 224.03
SD 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.53 503.33 494.38 522.35 539.00 495.14
Obs 272427 109342 49568 19928 93589 272427 109342 49568 19928 93589
Low Sugar (LS)
Avg 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.90 1.10 188.24 195.77 200.54 177.60 174.31
SD 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.65 420.58 445.79 446.95 374.06 380.54
Obs 812070 339566 145032 66716 260756 812070 339566 145032 66716 260756
Zero Sugar (ZS)
Avg 1.56 1.39 1.43 1.75 1.77 114.88 104.48 138.38 97.52 119.78
SD 1.10 0.98 1.10 1.17 1.18 308.02 248.93 381.67 258.54 339.73
Obs 203740 84955 32262 13436 73087 203740 84955 32262 13436 73087
B. Balanced Panel
Comparison group: Water
Avg 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 2653.14 2622.62 3095.95 2217.50 2578.79
SD 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 6385.42 6411.21 7182.98 5383.30 6144.02
Obs 163881 68268 27318 13659 54636 163881 68268 27318 13659 54636
High Sugar (HS)
Avg 1.85 1.80 1.78 1.77 1.97 179.34 189.78 218.41 181.66 146.17
SD 1.77 1.82 1.81 1.69 1.70 363.29 395.26 485.00 334.04 230.60
Obs 137194 57142 22872 11436 45744 137194 57142 22872 11436 45744
Medium Sugar (MS)
Avg 1.03 1.00 0.95 0.98 1.14 304.21 287.46 354.79 294.26 302.32
SD 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.52 582.63 574.87 609.33 585.92 576.33
Obs 153730 64039 25626 12813 51252 153730 64039 25626 12813 51252
Low Sugar (LS)
Avg 0.74 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.85 334.52 356.07 376.74 313.00 291.88
SD 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.30 574.21 613.89 627.50 503.57 504.43
Obs 346183 144184 57714 28857 115428 346183 144184 57714 28857 115428
Zero Sugar (ZS)
Avg 1.33 1.31 1.27 1.30 1.41 115.43 115.96 134.28 100.74 109.01
SD 1.08 1.11 1.09 0.96 1.05 187.40 209.89 191.91 138.82 163.70
Obs 61079 25442 10182 5091 20364 61079 25442 10182 5091 20364
Notes: Full: February 2015-January 2018; UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November
2016-January 2017; Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Difference-in-Differences Model
We apply difference-in-differences models to compare each treated product group
(PG) to Water, the comparison group (section 3.3). In the following econometric
specification, q denotes the quarter (Feb-Apr 2015 through Nov 2017-Jan 2018), i the
product (e.g. 33-centiliter can of Pepsi, 1.5-liter bottle of Luso water), s the store (each
of 400+ stores), m the month of the year (Jan, Feb, ..., Dec), and r the region (North,
Center, South, or Madeira):
yq,i,s,m,r = β1Under Discussionq × PGi + β2Under Approvalq × PGi + β3Implementationq × PGi
+λq + αi,s + δm,r + εq,i,s,m,r
(3.1)
The dependent variable, y, is either price (in euros per liter) or the natural logarithm
of quantity sold. The natural logarithm accounts for the skewness in the distribution
of sales volume and allows us to interpret consumption responses in percentage.
We compare the pre-treatment period (Feb 2015-Apr 2016) with three distinct
post-treatment periods: 1) UnderDiscussion, the two quarters between May and
October 2016, when the tax was only being discussed in the media, 2) UnderApproval,
the quarter between November 2016 and January 2017, when the tax was formally
proposed and debated in the parliament, and 3) Implementation, from February 2017
onwards, when the tax was actually in place (Figure 3.1). The parameters of interest
are represented by βj.
In the previous section, we motivate the use of bottled water as the comparison
group. We also test the parallel-trends assumption formally (see next section). In
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of Events
addition, the different vectors of fixed effects included in Equation 3.1 control for
potential confounders that may hinder the identification of the causal impact of the
soda tax. Quarter fixed effects (λq) control for aggregate trends related for example
to the business cycle. Product-store fixed effects (αi,s) account for unobserved factors
that may impact specific products or stores, such as preferences, competition, and
other local characteristics. We also include month-region fixed effects (δm,r) to control
for seasonality. In the tables presented in the results section and in the Appendix,
Equation 3.1 corresponds to specification (3). Specification (1) controls only for quarter,
product, and store fixed effects (not product-store fixed effects), and specification (2)
controls only for quarter and product-store fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the brand level to accommodate any serial
correlation across different container sizes of the same product, that may for example
be substitutes (Bertrand et al., 2004).
3.4.2 Event Study Design
We complement the previous strategy with event studies. The econometric specification




(βqQuarterq × PGi) + λq + αi,s + δm,r + εq,i,s,m,r (3.2)
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The omitted quarter is Feb-Apr 2016, before the first news piece on the soda tax.
Again, the parameters of interest are represented by βj and standard errors are clustered
at the brand level.
The event study design presents two key advantages beyond the
difference-in-differences model. First, it is a way of formally testing the parallel-trends
assumption. That is, we may test if prices or consumption of soda and water displayed
similar patterns in the pre-tax period. If so, then it is reasonable to believe that prices
or consumption patterns of bottled water in the post-tax period represent a good
counterfactual for what would be the price or consumption patterns of soda, had there
been no tax. Second, with event study specifications we may look at the dynamics in
more detail, distinguishing between short- and medium-run responses to the tax.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Difference-in-differences Baseline Results
We present the difference-in-differences results for price (in euros) and ln(quantity of
liters sold), based on three alternative specifications.12 Overall, all specifications give
similar results. We focus on the most conservative one, specification (3), which includes
quarter, product-store, and month-region fixed effects, as specified in Equation (3.1).
We present results based on the unbalanced panel (Panel A) and the balanced one
(Panel B).
Starting with High Sugar drinks, we find that when the tax was implemented, and
compared to one year earlier, before the tax was ever mentioned, prices increased by
16 cents on average, vis-à-vis water prices (Panel A of Table 3.2). The price increase
is slightly larger, at 17 cents, when considering only the most popular products (Panel
12Results for ln(price) are presented in Table C1 in the Appendix, for comparison.
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B). This increase is consistent with pass-through to consumer prices below but not too
far from 100%.
Regarding sales, the point estimates suggest a 8% drop in the Under Discussion
period, consistent with an awareness effect, and a 6% drop in the Implementation
period. However, these effects are imprecisely estimated and not statistically different
from zero. In the balanced panel, which includes only the most popular products, we
find a statistically significant 19% increase in sales in the Under Approval period, right
before the tax was implemented. This suggests a stockpiling effect, whereby consumers
may have purchased large quantities of these drinks in anticipation of the price increase
due to the tax in the following quarter.
Moving on to Medium Sugar drinks, which saw their recipes reformulated to fall
below the 80 grams of sugar per liter threshold, we see that the average increase in
prices is less pronounced than in the case of High Sugar drinks, at 15 cents per liter
(Panel A of Table 3.3). In this case, the price increase corresponds to pass-through to
consumer prices well above 100% (the tax amounts to about 10 cents when including
VAT). This may reflect, at least in part, additional costs borne by producers related to
product reformulation, repackaging, and brand repositioning. Regarding sales, the only
estimate worth notice is a 24% increase in the quarter prior to the tax implementation
in the balanced panel (again, a stockpiling effect; Panel B).
Regarding Low Sugar drinks, prices increased by 15-16 cents per liter, on average,
which again corresponds to more than the amount of the tax (Table 3.4). In this
case, we do find significant drops in consumption in both the Under Discussion and
Implementation periods; as much as a 18% drop in the unbalanced panel. One possible
explanation is increased awareness that drinks with added sugar in general are bad
for health, whereas Cola-flavored drinks (in the High Sugar group) have always been
perceived as unhealthy. An alternative explanation is that drinks with comparatively
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Table 3.2: Difference-in-differences Baseline Results: High Sugar (HS)
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.043** -0.040** -0.040** -0.087 -0.084 -0.084
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
UnderApproval ×HS -0.009 -0.015 -0.016 0.019 -0.003 -0.005
(0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.086) (0.093) (0.093)
Implementation×HS 0.156*** 0.159*** 0.160*** -0.071 -0.059 -0.065
(0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.075) (0.080) (0.080)
N 647966 647966 647966 647966 647966 647966
adj. R2 0.974 0.980 0.980 0.846 0.899 0.904
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.028* -0.028* -0.027* -0.034 -0.033 -0.034
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
UnderApproval ×HS -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.189***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Implementation×HS 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** -0.056 -0.056 -0.056
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
N 301075 301075 301075 301075 301075 301075
adj. R2 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.890 0.936 0.940
Quarter FE X X X X X X
Product FE X X
Store FE X X
Product-store FE X X X X
Month-region FE X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1%(***). UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017;
Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
less sugar may be less addictive, which may translate into a more elastic demand
compared to drinks with more sugar. In the balanced panel, once again we find a
surge in sales in the quarter prior to implementation.
Lastly, for Zero Sugar drinks, we find about 100% price pass-through (Table 3.5).
Looking at the balanced panel, we find a statistically significant increase in consumption
in the Under Approval period, in line with our findings for the other drink groups.
In addition, the point estimate for the Implementation interaction term indicates a
12% increase in sales, suggestive of a substitution effect towards artificially-sweetened
beverages, but it is not statistically different from zero due to a large standard error.
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Table 3.3: Difference-in-differences Baseline Results: Medium Sugar (MS)
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.033** -0.032** -0.031** -0.009 -0.022 -0.026
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.110) (0.107) (0.107)
UnderApproval ×MS 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.081 0.042 0.041
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.179) (0.184) (0.184)
Implementation×MS 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.013 0.010 0.003
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.104) (0.112) (0.113)
N 567786 567786 567786 567786 567786 567786
adj. R2 0.950 0.963 0.963 0.785 0.849 0.855
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 0.049 0.049 0.049
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
UnderApproval ×MS -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079)
Implementation×MS 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.037 0.037 0.038
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
N 317611 317611 317611 317611 317611 317611
adj. R2 0.970 0.971 0.971 0.858 0.908 0.913
Quarter FE X X X X X X
Product FE X X
Store FE X X
Product-store FE X X X X
Month-region FE X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1%(***). UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017;
Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
3.5.2 Internal Validity: Event Study and Falsification Tests
We test the internal validity of our results by estimating event study specifications, as
shown in Equation (3.2), and by conducting a placebo test.
Event study results are shown in Figures 3.2 through 3.5, where the top panels
display the results for the unbalanced panel and the bottom panels display the results
for the balanced panel. We present both 90% and 95% confidence intervals. As a
reminder, the omitted quarter is February-April 2016, before the first news piece on the
soda tax.
Overall, we find support for the parallel-trends assumption and the validity of
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Table 3.4: Difference-in-differences Baseline Results: Low Sugar (LS)
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.144** -0.150** -0.150**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.069) (0.065) (0.066)
UnderApproval × LS -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 0.132 0.088 0.085
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.079) (0.089) (0.089)
Implementation× LS 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154*** -0.183** -0.184** -0.185**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077)
N 1107429 1107429 1107429 1107429 1107429 1107429
adj. R2 0.943 0.956 0.957 0.813 0.875 0.879
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.053 -0.053 -0.052
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
UnderApproval × LS -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.238* 0.238* 0.237*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119)
Implementation× LS 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.162*** -0.135* -0.134* -0.134*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
N 510064 510064 510064 510064 510064 510064
adj. R2 0.930 0.931 0.932 0.844 0.904 0.908
Quarter FE X X X X X X
Product FE X X
Store FE X X
Product-store FE X X X X
Month-region FE X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1%(***). UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017;
Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
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Table 3.5: Difference-in-differences Baseline Results: Zero Sugar (ZS)
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041 -0.044 -0.041
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
UnderApproval × ZS -0.019 -0.021 -0.022 -0.003 -0.041 -0.040
(0.061) (0.056) (0.055) (0.132) (0.134) (0.127)
Implementation× ZS 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.020 0.034 0.027
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.086) (0.090) (0.091)
N 499099 499099 499099 499099 499099 499099
adj. R2 0.977 0.984 0.984 0.853 0.902 0.906
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
UnderApproval × ZS -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 0.172** 0.172** 0.171**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Implementation× ZS 0.102** 0.102** 0.102** 0.119 0.119 0.119
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.156) (0.155) (0.155)
N 224960 224960 224960 224960 224960 224960
adj. R2 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.895 0.935 0.939
Quarter FE X X X X X X
Product FE X X
Store FE X X
Product-store FE X X X X
Month-region FE X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1%(***). UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017;
Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
our difference-in-differences results, as confidence intervals for pre-treatment period
interactions include the value zero. In addition, we highlight two main findings,
looking at these plots. First, for any group of drinks, price increases appear mostly
stable along the four quarters of the Implementation period. Second, in the High
Sugar group, we find that consumption did decrease in the first quarter of the
Implementation period, specially in the balanced panel, where we also find evidence of
stockpiling in the pre-implementation quarter. However, consumption quickly returned
to previous levels, resulting overall in the non-significant 6% drop that we find in the
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difference-in-differences results.13
Figure 3.2: Event Study Results: High Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: 90% and 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by brand.
Our placebo test consists in estimating Equation (3.1) only with data for
the pre-treatment period (i.e., February 2015-April 2016). We estimate the
difference-in-differences model pretending the tax is implemented in the quarter before
the first news piece on the soda tax. As expected, results indicate non-significant
impacts of the fake tax introduction (Table C2).
13We also considered quantities sold at the brand level, i.e. aggregating sales volume of all container
sizes of the same drink (and in some cases, different flavors) in the same store and month, to account
for potential substitution between sizes/flavors. Results shown in Figure C6 in the Appendix are very
similar to those presented in this section, but noisier given the smaller sample. We explore further
potential heterogeneous effects by size in Section 3.5.4.
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Figure 3.3: Event Study Results: Medium Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: 90% and 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by brand.
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Figure 3.4: Event Study Results: Low Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: 90% and 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by brand.
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Figure 3.5: Event Study Results: Zero Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: 90% and 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by brand.
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3.5.3 Robustness Checks
Our first robustness check consists in adding sparkling water to the comparison group, as
a means to enlarge sample sizes and eventually obtain more precise estimates. Our go-to
comparison group did not include sparkling water because, contrary to other countries,
in Portugal sparkling water has little expression. Results are virtually unchanged by
this enlargement of the comparison group (Table C3).
Second, we acknowledge that consumers may have different elasticities regarding
popular multinational brands and the retailer’s own brand products. We test the
sensitivity of our findings to the exclusion of the retailer’s own brand products. Third,
we consider potential cross-border shopping as a means to avoid higher tax-induced
prices in Portugal, and exclude from the sample stores close to the border with Spain
(within a 30km distance). Some studies on soda taxes in the US find evidence of
cross-border shopping.14 Neither excluding own brand products nor excluding stores
close to Spain impacts visibly our main findings (Table C4).
Fourth, we distinguish between the impacts of the soda tax in the Lisbon and
Oporto metropolitan areas versus the rest of the country. Excluding observations from
the most urban and densely populated areas in the country also gives very similar
results (Table C5).
3.5.4 Is There Substitution from Large to Small Container
Sizes?
Consumers may react to the introduction of the soda tax by substituting from larger
to smaller container sizes, compensating for the increase in price by reducing quantity
14See also Beatty et al. (2009) on the impacts of differentials in alcohol and tobacco taxes near
an international border, or Hindriks and Serse (2019) on the importance of considering spatial
heterogeneity in tax incidence for homogeneous products due to proximity to borders.
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purchased, in liters. To test this hypothesis, we split the treatment groups into <1
liter and 1+ liters container sizes. The comparison group is unaltered. Results are
reported in Table C6. For all product groups, consumption of larger packages is hit in
a more severe way; the exception is Low Sugar products in the balanced panel, where
point estimates are virtually the same. These findings are in line with the findings
of Castelló and López-Casasnovas (2018). In some cases, the differential impact of
the tax implementation on consumption may partly reflect different price increases
in the two groups. Yet, even in the Under Discussion period, when prices don’t
change substantially in economic terms, we see larger drops in the consumption of
large container sizes. This suggests that heavier soda consumers are the main ones
reducing consumption. For more sugary drinks (HS and MS), consumption tends to
increase in the Under Approval period, especially for larger packages, consistent with
the idea of stockpiling.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
A recent WHO report called for the introduction of taxes on SSBs in developed countries
(WHO, 2017). In particular, WHO recommended that to be effective in reducing
consumption, a soda tax should result in at least 20% increase in retail prices. One of the
arguments to introduce soda taxes is to improve consumer diets through the reduction
of sugar intake from soda. Determining the impact of soda taxes on consumption can
only be done empirically, as in theory there are several mechanisms that may entail both
positive and negative effects. Those mechanisms include the elasticity of consumption
to soda prices, changes in recipes, and amplified consumer awareness of the detrimental
health effects of sugar and soda. Understanding better these mechanisms is also key to
inform the design of more efficient public policies (Cawley and Ruhm, 2011; Cornelsen
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and Smith, 2018).
Portugal introduced a soda tax in February 2017, levied on producers. The amount
of the tax is 0.08e (+VAT) per liter for drinks with less than 80 grams of sugar per
liter, and 0.16e (+VAT) per liter for drinks with more than 80 grams of sugar per liter.
We study the impacts of this tax on prices and consumers’ purchasing behavior. First,
we find substantial pass-through of the tax to consumer prices: almost 100% for drinks
with more than 80 grams of sugar per liter, more than 100% for drinks with less sugar,
and about 100% for artificially-sweetened beverages (average price increases of about
16%, 19%, and 8% respectively, compared to water). One possible reason underlying
price overshooting for drinks with less than 80 grams of sugar per liter is costs associated
with product reformulations. Another explanation may be that producers don’t think
consumers pay attention to the sugar threshold and thus raise the price of all SSBs
equally.
Second, regarding consumption, our results suggest limited impacts of the tax. We
do find a significant and substantial drop in consumption of drinks with comparatively
lower sugar content (-18%). For drinks with very high sugar content, the point estimate
suggests a 6% drop in consumption, but it is not estimated with enough precision to
be statistically significant. Moreover, event study results show an immediate drop in
consumption that quickly rebounds. This suggests that the main benefits of the soda
tax in terms of reducing sugar intake are mainly through product reformulations, as
producers reduced the sugar content of several drinks to fall below the 80 grams per liter
threshold. In fact, the Portuguese government introduced a new soda tax breakdown
in 2019.15 In short, drinks with relatively less sugar, light, and zero products, are
now subject to a lower tax, whereas drinks with high sugar content pay an aggravated
15Drinks with less than 25 grams of sugar per liter now pay a tax of 0.01e per liter, drinks with 25
grams or more and less than 50 grams of sugar per liter pay a tax of 0.06e per liter, drinks with 50
grams or more and less than 80 grams of sugar per liter pay a tax of 0.08e per liter, and drinks with
80 grams or more sugar per liter pay a tax of 0.20e per liter (+VAT).
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tax. This new design is expected to further promote product reformulations towards
lower sugar content. These changes are outside of our period of analysis but are
worth studying in future research. Possibly because in Portugal artificially-sweetened
beverages are also taxed, we find no significant evidence of substitution towards this
type of drinks.
It is worth mentioning that even though it appears that producers are able to
increase prices without significantly impacting demand (i.e., demand for most soda
products appears rather inelastic), they still bother with product reformulations. This
may be to accommodate consumers’ increasing preferences for healthier options, as well
as to come progressively closer to targets negotiated with the government or even in
anticipation of the new tax brackets.16
As far as awareness is concerned, in most cases we find a slight decrease in
consumption when the tax first started to be mentioned in the media, but the estimates
are not precisely estimated and are not significantly different from zero.
Lastly, consumers appear to have engaged in stockpiling of the most widely
consumed products in the quarter prior to the tax implementation. This is not a
surprising finding in the context of Portugal. For example, in 2019 fuel truck drivers
have been striking and when a new strike is announced, consumers run to gas stations.17
The comparison between previous findings and ours is not straightforward, as we
split drinks into different groups. The drop in consumption of low sugar drinks is
somewhere in the middle of the range of prior studies’ estimates. Overall, it is important
to note that although we do not find statistically significant results for most drink
groups, our estimates are more conservative than most, as we include in our main
specification product-store fixed effects, and our standard errors are clustered at the
16In May 2019, the government and several industry representatives signed a compromise to cut
sugar, salt, and fat content in thousands of products until 2022.
17https://sicnoticias.pt/economia/2019-04-16-Corrida-as-bombas-de-gasolina.
João Pereira dos Santos 105
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
brand level.
To conclude, the Portuguese soda tax has two main distinctive features: it
depends on sugar content, taxing more heavily drinks with a lot of sugar, and
artificially-sweetened beverages are also taxed. Due to its structure, the Portuguese
soda tax led producers to reformulate many recipes towards lower sugar content. This
seems to have been the main channel through which the tax reduced sugar intake from
soda (Goiana-da Silva et al., 2018). This finding is in line with recent developments
in soda taxes worldwide, with not only Portugal but also France introducing more tax
brackets in 2019 and 2018 respectively, and for example the UK structuring its 2018
soda tax in a similar manner. We believe that our results are of practical relevance not
only for policymakers planning to implement similar taxes in other countries but also
for countries or regions that have very recently introduced bracketed soda taxes.
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Chapter 4
Can ATMs Get Out the Vote?
Evidence from a Nationwide Field
Experiment1
4.1 Introduction
Low and declining levels of voter turnout constitute a fundamental problem for
democracies, raising questions of legitimacy and representativeness, as well as
challenging the idea of political accountability. Why a rational individual would
spend time and resources to become informed and vote constitutes a classical puzzle,
1This chapter is written in co-authorship with José Tavares and Pedro Vicente. The authors would
like to thank Spectacolor, SIBS, and Comissão Nacional de Eleições for invaluable support, without
which this project would not come to fruition. We are grateful to two anonymous referees, Kai
Barron, Miguel Costa-Gomes, Diogo Geraldes, Donald Green, Horacio Larreguy, Gianmarco León,
Pedro Magalhães, Marco Le Moglie, David Nickerson, Susana Peralta, Vincent Pons, Pedro Robalo,
Carlos Santos, and Francisco Veiga, as well as participants in Nova SBE-ISEG seminar, Advances
with Field Experiments 2018 (B.U.), the Lisbon Meeting on Economics and Political Science 2018,
the 12th NYU-CESS Experimental Political Science Conference, the 77th Annual Midwest Political
Science Association Conference, the Silvaplana Political Economy Workshop 2019, the Society for the
Advancement of Behavioral Economics 2020 Online Conference, and the Economic Science Association
2020 Global Around-the-Clock Virtual Conference for comments and suggestions. Darya Bereziy,
Ernesto Freitas, and Jacob Macdonald provided excellent assistance.
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which has attracted a significant body of work in economics and political science.2
In this context, studies examining which factors influence electoral participation have
gained relevance. Observational studies, as surveyed in Cancela and Geys (2016),
have addressed the question by establishing positive correlations of voter turnout with
campaign expenditures and election closeness. In a more recent generation of studies,
surveyed by Gerber and Green (2017), experimental methods have allowed researchers
to credibly estimate the causal effects of specific interventions. Randomized field
experiments, taking place unobtrusively in real-world settings, are better designed to
address inference identification problems such as self-selection, strategic targeting, or
unobserved confounders. This literature documents large impacts of relatively expensive
personal contact and of interventions activating peer pressure.
This paper contributes to the literature on electoral participation using experimental
methods through an experiment employing the highly granular universe of ATM
(automatic teller machines) terminals in Portugal.3 Our aim is to determine whether
low-cost, impersonal reminders which emphasize the idea of civic duty, when exhibited
in the days leading to local elections, can mobilize voters to vote, and if yes, by
how much. The ATM network in Portugal, Multibanco, is known to be a credible
2Several distinct theories have tried to rationalize the act of voting. According to rational choice
theory, the positive expected utility from participating is associated with the possibility of one’s vote
being decisive or pivotal – typically, a probability close to zero. See Downs (1957), and Dhillon and
Peralta (2002) for a survey. A more general approach contemplates ideological and valence elements
to voter’s preferences, as in FFeddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). The leading alternative to these
instrumental voting models is ethical models, starting with Riker and Ordeshook (1968). This strand
of the literature argues that voters derive utility from the act of turning out to vote (through a general
sense of duty), separate from the consequences of their vote, as discussed, for instance, in Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006). According to Hillman (2010), voting creates positive expressive utility, independent
from the outcome, derived from a conception of civic duty or expressive confirmation of identity. Habit
is also regarded as causing political action (Gerber et al., 2003; Bechtel et al., 2018). There is also
evidence that we vote to tell others (DellaVigna et al., 2016) and we like to hear gratitude for voting
in previous elections (Panagopoulos, 2011).
3The number of ATM machines increased steadily since the 1990s until 2010 (see Figure D1 in the
Appendix to this paper). In per capita terms, ATM machines per 100 thousand inhabitants reached the
record of 135.4 in that year. After that, the number of ATMs slightly decrease to 11570 in 2018 (112.6
per 100 thousand inhabitants). However, ATMs do not seem to be less used over time. Figure D2
displays the amount of withdrawals in ATMs (in e), which depicts an upward trend.
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communication channel, associated with high levels of security, performance and
reliability. Besides account information and withdrawals, the ATM network has
the largest number of functionalities worldwide – 60 innovative operations including
mobile top-ups, the possibility of buying transportation and music festival tickets, as
well as performing instantaneous interpersonal transfers between accounts of different
individuals, and paying for an array of government taxes and licences.4 It is one of
the largest interbank networks within Europe, operating over 11,700 terminals and
processing over 75 million transactions worth e4.8 billion per month.5 To contextualize,
in 2017, there were more than 21,18 million of payment cards (Banco de Portugal, 2019)
for a population of about 10,31 million citizens (Statistics Portugal).
Our ATM treatment was implemented in a randomly selected sample of
municipalities, where a “get out the vote” (GOTV) advertisement reached potential
voters using ATM machines. This message was activated during the two and a half
days leading up to the election, in three different moments: before and after ATM
users introduced their banking card, while they waited to withdraw cash, and while
they waited to perform other operations.
We combine official turnout records for treated and control civil parishes
(freguesias)6 with descriptive information provided by the ATM company on cards,
operations, and withdrawals. We account for potential confounding factors using
detailed socio-economic and political information for a cross-section of more than 1700
civil parishes. One week after the local elections, we conducted a follow-up survey in
neighboring treated and control parishes in Lisbon, interviewing more than 200 ATM
4A proof of the credibility and granularity of the Multibanco system is the 2011 public
discussion of its potential use as a voting network (see https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/economia/
voto-simplex-via-caixas-multibanco-distinguido-no-movimento-milenio_n430575).
5The only competitor of the dominant Multbanco network has 300 terminals,
concentrated in tourist areas and thus directed at non-voters. See https:
//www.publico.pt/2017/01/02/economia/noticia/euronet/a-unica/alternativa/
a-tradicional-rede-multibanco-da-sibs-ja-tem-300-caixas-em-portugal-1756507.
6Civil parishes (freguesias) are the lowest local administrative unit in the country.
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users, in order to gauge whether they recalled the treatment messages. The post-election
survey showed that the treated civil parish had a significantly higher level of recall than
the control civil parish.
We find no statistical significance impact of the treatment per se, but our results on
the intensity of treatment, for either the entire campaign period or the weekend period
(knowing that the election was on a Sunday), show the campaign leads to a statistically
significant increase in the average turnout rate. Our findings are robust to three
alternative measures of user intensity: number of cards used, operations conducted,
and withdrawals. Placebo tests employing turnout rates in previous elections show no
impact whatsoever of the intensity of treatment on turnout rates.
The application of field experiments to the study of electoral participation has its
origins in the early contributions by Gosnell (1927) and Eldersveld (1956). However,
this literature was only re-activated in the late 1990s. In this context, a plethora of
(i) communication modes and (ii) message contents to encourage citizens to go to the
polls were studied using field experiments.
Communication modes tested in the literature range from the highly personal
to the highly impersonal: results suggest that impersonal and passive methods of
contact are less effective at mobilizing voter turnout than personal interactions.
For example, Gerber and Green (2000) find that nonpartisan face-to-face canvassing
increased turnout in an uncontested American election by five to eight percentage
points, compared to less than 1 percentage point for live phone calls and mailings.7
Message contents tested in the literature explored various dimensions like social norms,
explicit peer pressure, and reciprocity. In an influential study of American elections,
7This relative effectiveness has been replicated in local (Gerber et al., 2003) and federal elections
in the U.S. (Nickerson et al., 2006). The findings of Gerber and Green (2000) have been contested by
Imai (2005) who demonstrates that telephone canvassing increased turnout by five percentage points
while employing matching techniques (see Gerber and Green (2005) for an additional discussion). In
Europe, Bhatti et al. (2016) show that the effects of door-to-door canvassing are substantially smaller
than the ones found for the U.S.
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Gerber et al. (2008) highlight that, even in one-way communications, showing citizens
their voting record, or that of their neighbours, which are likely to activate existing
social norms related to peer pressure, can render campaigns more effective.
Several one-way means of GOTV contact were also tested in the literature. Dale and
Strauss (2009) show that text messages on mobile phones reminding recipients about
the election day can succeed in increasing the turnout of registered voters, that is, those
that have signalled their interest in voting. Other modes include radio – Panagopoulos
and Green (2008), newspapers – Gerber et al. (2009), street signs – Panagopoulos
(2009), TV – Gerber et al. (2011), and social media platforms such as facebook or
whatsapp – Arias et al. (2019). Although this literature became most developed for
the US, a number of different geographical contexts have expanded the scope and range
of interventions studied.8 Our experiment has the benefit of estimating the impact
of a low-cost one-way mode of communication – through ATM messaging, on the full
universe of voters in Portugal, while using a message that targets the social norm of
civic duty related to electoral participation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the institutional
background whereas Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and data. Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
8Other examples of randomized voter mobilization applications include studies in the U.K. (John
and Brannan, 2008), Mexico (Arias et al., 2019, Chong et al., 2014), São Tomé and Principe (Vicente,
2014), Nigeria (Collier and Vicente, 2014), Sweden (Nyman, 2017), Mozambique (Aker et al., 2017),
Perú (León, 2017), and France (Pons and Liegey, 2019). Large-scale partisan interventions have also
been analyzed in Benin (Wantchekon, 2003), Italy (Kendall et al., 2015), and France (Pons, 2018).
Recent quasi-experimental studies have also looked at different types of voter mobilization: Barone et
al. (2015) and Ellingsena and Hernæsb (2018) looked at the case of access to digital/cable TV in Italy
and Norway (respectively). Using similar methodologies, Shue and Luttmer (2009) for the U.S., and
Hodler at al. (2015) for Switzerland, analyze the impacts of different voting technologies. Card and
Moretti (2007) test whether electronic voting technology affected electoral outcomes in the 2000 and
2004 US presidential elections and find a positive correlation between use of electronic voting and the
Republican vote share.
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4.2 Institutional background
Local administration elected democratically exists in Portugal since the 1976
Constitution came into force, identifying three administrative divisions (Articles
235-262): civil parishes (freguesias), municipalities (munićıpios), and administrative
regions (regiões administrativas). Civil parishes are the lowest administrative unit,
ruled by an executive body, the civil parish board (junta de freguesia), and a
deliberative body, the civil parish assembly (assembleia de freguesia). Local elections
are exogenously fixed every four years for the civil parish assembly, whose winner is
elected president.9 The lists are closed, and the seats assigned according to the D’Hondt
proportionality method. Unlike in national legislative elections, independent lists can
run. The official campaign period happens during the two weeks before election. The
exception is the day before the election, when the campaign is suspended. Moreover,
debates on TV are organized around one month before the election, only for the races
of the most populous municipalities.
Before 2013, the 308 municipalities were subdivided into 4259 civil parishes.
However, In the aftermath of bailout negotiations during the financial crisis, the
Portuguese government was forced to reduce the number of these units. This way,
the number of parishes was reduced from 4259 to 3091.10
Our field experiment took place in the days leading up to the 2017 municipal
elections, on October 1, 2017. Figure D3 in the Appendix to this paper presents turnout
rates for this election. We exclude from our experimental sample all civil parishes with
no ATM machines in the days before the 2017 local election. The official turnout
rate in 2017 (which includes all civil parishes in Portugal) was 55% while this number
was slightly lower in 2013 (the previous local election), i.e., 52.6% . In our sample,
9Simultaneously, elections are held for Municipal Town Halls (Câmara Municipal), and Municipal
Assemblies.
10Some of these amalgamations, especially in the Lisbon district, implied significant border changes.
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these numbers are very similar: 61% in 2017 vs. 59.5% in 2013. Internationally, these
numbers are comparable to 65.2% (65% ) in the 2019 Spanish local (regional) elections,
and 63.5% at the first round of voting during the 2014 French local elections. Turnout
is substantially lower at the 2018 England local elections (34.6%).
4.3 Experimental design
4.3.1 Treatment
Our treatment consisted on the exhibition, on all ATM machines of treated civil
parishes, of an advert reminding voters that voting is a civic duty, as well as reminding
them of the election day.11 This happened just before and on the election day for a
period of three days, between Friday and Sunday (the election day), until 3 p.m. So,
in succession, the messages pointed “Vote is a Civic Duty – Vote Sunday” presented
Friday, “Vote is a Civic Duty – Vote Tomorrow” presented Saturday, and finally, “Vote
is a Civic Duty – Vote Today” presented on election day.12 The advertisement is
shown in Figure D4 of the Appendix to this paper. We obtained authorization to
use the official layout – images, lettering, and official seal of the National Electoral
Commission. ATMs in control civil parishes displayed publicity for a TV soap-opera
and car commercials. This message was activated in three different moments: before
and after ATM users introduced their banking card (around 3 seconds), while they
waited to withdraw cash (around 6 seconds), and while they waited to perform other
operations (around 6 seconds).
The Electoral Commission spent most of their funds in TV commercials and
11Dale and Strauss (2009) show that, for certain citizens, a noticeable reminder is enough to drive
them to cast a vote.
12Nickerson (2007) presents evidence on timing effects, namely that phone calls made more than one
week before the election are ineffective.
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newspaper ads. Both are targeted to reach potential voters in the entire country and
were broadcasted eight to two weeks before the local elections. In the last two weeks,
the Electoral Commission did not make any efforts to publicize the election. Finally, it
should be highlighted that we assured they did not modify what they typically did in
previous elections to encourage turnout.
4.3.2 Sampling, randomization, and measurement
We restrict our attention to the 1704 civil parishes that have at least one ATM, a
geographical area comprising more than 92% of the population of Portugal according
to the 2011 census. The allocation of treatment and control conditions to the set of civil
parishes followed a standard randomization procedure in two steps: i) we first formed
blocks of civil parishes within each municipality, conditional on observables; ii) we then
randomly assigned the treatment and control conditions to civil parishes within each
block. The referred observables, allowing for a priori balance between treatment and
control, were: voters’ density (i.e., the number of registered voters divided by the civil
parish area), the number of well-functioning ATM devices, the number of commercial
bank agencies, the turnout rate for the previous local elections in 2013, and a term limit
dummy variable taking value one if the civil parish president cannot run for another
term.13 As voter turnout tends to be highly persistent, controlling for pre-treatment
records of the outcome variable is especially important, as pointed in McKenzie (2012).
Figure 4.1 shows the spatial allocation of treatment and control groups.
During the 63 hours of the treatment, our campaign reached more than 1.5 million
unique cards in 682 civil parishes, i.e., 40% of all the civil parishes.
13Veiga and Veiga (2018) study the impact of the 2013 introduction of mayoral term limits on turnout
and show that presence of term-limited incumbents has a positive impact on voter participation. For
more information about the impact of this reform on incumbency advantage see Fonseca (2017).
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Figure 4.1: Treated vs. Control Civil Parishes
2017 Local Elections - Mainland Portugal
4.3.3 Data
Outcome variables, composed from the number of registered and actual voters for the
2017 local elections and for previous elections, are obtained from official turnout records
for civil parishes. These data are combined with treatment assignment and descriptive
information provided by the ATM company on three treatment intensity measures:
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the number of cards, the number of operations, and the number of withdrawals.14
Recall that withdrawals are just one of the possible operations that can be done in the
Portuguese ATM network.15 All these numbers do not include foreign credit or debit
cards. We can distinguish between number of operations during the three days of the
campaign and during the weekend of the elections. We also collected data on a series
of potential socio-demographic, political, and economic controls. Table 4.1 presents the
descriptive statistics of our sample.
Besides the variables considered as part of the randomization procedure, we add
a vector of socio-demographic covariates to our analysis. Education is one of the
strongest predictors of voter turnout, so we include the shares of the population with
no primary education and with tertiary education. We use the unemployment rate and
the mean value withdrawn in ATMs on September 2016 as proxies for the economic
environment.16 Both the education measures and the unemployment rate were obtained
from the 2011 census operation of the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE ).
Our analysis also considers a vector of institutional variables. Political competition
has been shown to positively affect turnout, as in Gerber and Green (2017) and others.17
We take two variables proxying for local competitiveness: the percentage difference in
the vote on the two largest parties in the 2013 local elections, i.e., the winning margin
in those elections, and the number of candidates in the 2017 municipal election. We
14Unique cards as well as the other intensity measures are counted per civil parish in the three days
before the 2017 local election. We do not know the origin of viewers (they could even be from civil
parishes in areas without ATMs). Therefore, this may be overstating the actual number of reached
potential voters if someone used the same card in different civil parishes or if there are some clients of
the ATM machines with less than 18 years old, the minimum required age to vote.
15In 2017, withdrawals accounted for less than 30% of the operations in Multibanco (Banco de
Portugal, 2017).
16Martins and Veiga (2012), using panel datasets covering all mainland municipalities, from 1979 to
2005, and cross-sections of civil parishes for 2011 show that turnout in legislative and local elections
react to the state of the economy.
17This is consistent with evidence from lab experiments. Levine and Pelfrey (2007), Duffy and Tavits
(2008), Agranov et al. (2017) find that a higher chance of being pivotal, as in smaller elections or when
elections are closely contested, leads to higher voter turnout.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable (%)
Turnout Rate 2017 61.222 9.266 34.61 89.154
Turnout Rate EU 2014 33.833 7.278 0 64.63
Turnout Rate Legislative 2015 56.17 7.591 22.423 80.335
Turnout Rate Presidential 2016 48.957 8.025 17.09 74.36
Experimental Variables
Treatment 0.4 0.49 0 1
Intensity Measures: Total
Number of Cards (/100) 22.573 49.317 0 532.59
Number of Operations (/100) 38.522 84.409 0 869.99
Number of Withdrawals (/100) 19.305 41.691 0 467.8
Intensity Measures: Weekend
Number of Cards (/100) 12.525 26.317 0 259.34
Number of Operations (/100) 19.123 40.695 0 399.11
Number of Withdrawals (/100) 10.042 20.884 0 224.09
Stratification Controls
Voters Density 512.904 1292.266 1.729 14081.45
Number of ATM Devices 7.006 14.334 1 162
Number of Commercial Banks 1.19 3.225 0 36
Turnout 2013 (%) 59.509 9.913 5.869 100
Term Limit Dummy 2017 0.086 0.28 0 1
Other Controls
Socio-demographic and Economic
Population Below 15 Share 2011 (%) 24.658 4.973 5.941 47.09
Population Above 70 Share 2011 (%) 16.532 7.335 3.564 54.525
New Citizens Share 2011 (%) 2.143 1.258 0 12.209
Until Primary Education Share 2011 (%) 39.4 8.03 17.087 78.96
Tertiary Education Share 2011 (%) 7.763 5.172 0.301 41.829
Mean Value September 2016 40162.93 82599.15 0 825553.8
Unemployment Rate 2011 (%) 12.395 3.920 0.990 31.299
Service Workers Share 2011 (%) 61.828 14.019 23.696 91.474
Fiscal and Political
Transfer to Civil Parishes per capita 0.031 0.028 0 0.246
Winning Margin 2013 (%) 21.71 18.523 0.045 100
Number of Candidates 2017 3.585 1.303 1 10
Independent Mayor Dummy 0.098 0.297 0 1
Leftist Share 2013 (%) 48.924 22.586 0 98.587
Central Government Alignment Dummy 0.447 0.497 0 1
Notes N= 1703.
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also include whether the incumbent mayor has independently run for office and the
share of leftist mandates in the Municipal Assembly as defined in the 2013 elections.
These variables are provided by Direção Geral Autarquias Locais (DGAL).
Balance tests on the variables described in this subsection are presented in Table D1
of the Appendix to this paper: they show that randomization was successful in creating
comparable treatment and control groups.
4.3.4 Econometric specifications
We estimate the intent-to-treat (average treatment effects) impact of the campaign
using the following specification:
Turnout Rateim = αm + γ Treatmenti + βXi + εi (1)
where the outcome variable is the Turnout Rate for the 2017 local elections,
determining who will become president of the civil parish board. i denotes a Civil
Parish. αm includes binary variables for each of the 308 Portuguese municipalities
(denoted by m ). Treatment is a binary indicator that takes value one if the civil
parish was treated. γ is our coefficient of interest, capturing the effect of being assigned
to the treatment group. It captures both the direct impact of the campaign on voters
who saw it and indirect spillover effects stemming from interactions between voters
who have seen the campaign. X is a vector of covariates including the stratification
controls, as well as the socio-demographic and institutional variables specified above.
εi accounts for robust standard errors given that the unit of observation and the unit
of randomization are the same.
As it is the case in several GOTV efforts, our campaign does not reach everyone
assigned to the treatment group and may reach people in the control group as a spillover
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effect. This happens because some of the voters in the treated civil parish may not use
the ATM machines, nor interact with people who use them. In fact, it could happen
that some of these voters are users of ATM machines in control locations (e.g., where
they work, study, or shop). At the same time, voters in non-treated civil parishes,
may have used ATM machines in treated civil parishes. As pointed out by Arceneaux
and Nickerson (2009), “the failure to treat problem does not bias the estimates of
the empirical model (. . . ), because random assignment ensures that (within sampling
variability) the treatment and control group have an equal proportion of contactable
individuals.” Nevertheless, while the intent-to-treat effect allows us to evaluate the
effects of a program, it is not suitable to estimate the behavioral response of individuals
to the actual program intervention. Both these possibilities, if real in our experiment,
contribute to bias treatment effects towards zero. Some of the robustness tests we show
below attempt to minimize the extent that these biases are at work.
We also estimate the following equation considering three measures of campaign
intensity:
Turnout Rateim = αm+γ1 Treatmenti+γ2 Intensityi+γ3 Treatmenti Intensityi+
βXi + εi (2)
where we consider three different measures of Intensity provided by the ATM
company: the number of cards, the number of operations, and the number of
withdrawals. γ3 is our coefficient of interest, which tests whether more intensely treated
civil parishes are associated with significantly higher turnout rates. Control variables
are particularly important in this setting. This is the reason we selected a set of control
variables that features prominently in non-experimental turnout studies.
Finally, we run a specification to examine whether ATM user j recalled seeing the
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campaign in two similar civil parishes, but just one of them treated, as follows:
Recallj = α + γ Treatmentj + β Xj + εj (3)
Here, Recall is a binary indicator taking value one if the subject recognizes the
image of the campaign. γ is our coefficient of interest. X is a vector of control variables
such as gender, age, self-reported education level, and self-reported interest in politics.
We present the summary statistics for these variables in Table D2 of the Appendix to
this paper.
4.3.5 Treatment adherence: the post-treatment recall survey
We conducted a post-treatment survey in eight ATMs in two contiguous civil parishes
in Lisbon on Sunday October 8, 2017, one week after the local elections, between 10
a.m. and 1 p.m. One of the civil parishes belonged to the treatment group and the
other to the control, respectively Campo de Ourique and Estrela. Figure 4.2 presents a
map of the exact location of the eight ATMs that were targeted by surveyors, four in
the treated (in blue) and four in the control (in red) civil parishes.
All individuals who used these ATMs in the referred period were approached by the
enumeration team, leading to slightly less than 200 valid interviews. All enumerators
received detailed training and advice on how to start and lead the questionnaire.
Moreover, enumerators were not told about whether they were in a treated or control
area. The goal of this exercise was to assess whether there were significant differences
in recall for treated and control groups. Enumerators confronted ATM clients with
a visual copy of our campaign (see Figure D4), asked whether they recalled seeing
the image, and further collected information on socio-demographic characteristics of
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Figure 4.2: Recall: Treated and Control ATMs
the interviewees such as age, gender, self-reported education level, and self-reported
interest in politics.18 As a placebo, and before confronting ATM clients with the image
of our campaign, we asked if they recalled seeing any particular ad in the ATM.
Table 4.2 presents the results using a linear probability model for the likelihood
of recall using equation (3).19 The results show a large and statistically significant
difference in recall between the treatment and the control civil parishes. Moreover,
with respect to recalling past ATM campaigns, there are no reported differences as
displayed in column (4).
18Table D2 of the Appendix to this paper presents the summary statistics for these control variables.
19We examined results using a Probit specification and obtained very similar findings.
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Table 4.2: Self-Reported Recall Results of the post-treatment recall survey
Recall GOTV Campaign Recall Any Campaign
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.113** 0.118** 0.092* 0.016
(0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.078)
Gender 0.078 0.063 -0.158**
(0.058) (0.061) (0.077)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Primary Education -0.145 -0.093
(0.152) (0.222)
Secundary Education -0.024 0.104
(0.158) (0.208)
Tertiary Education 0.022 0.142
(0.154) (0.202)
Low Interest in Politics -0.035 0.034
(0.072) (0.095)
Medium Interest in Politics -0.020 -0.063
(0.105) (0.123)
cons 0.111*** -0.029 0.012 0.257
(0.037) (0.108) (0.171) (0.238)
Mean of Control Group 0.111 0.113 0.113 0.486
N 188 176 175 175
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.025 0.017 0.011
Notes The main dependent variable, Recall GOTV Campaign, is a binary indicator that takes value one if the ATM
user reported to recall seeing our treatment message. Recall Any Campaign is a binary indicator that takes value one if
the ATM user reported to recall seeing any advertising campaign in the ATM. Treatment is a binary indicator that
takes value one if the ATM user was asked in one of the four ATMs in Campo de Ourique. The omitted categories in
the control variables are No Primary Education and High Interest in Politics. Robust standard errors are depicted in
parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Average treatment effects
In Table 4.3 we present the results for the intent-to-treat estimates from equation (1).
Across specifications, our findings suggest that treatment causes an increase in turnout,
although it never reaches standard levels of statistical significance. It is reassuring to
see that the magnitude of the effect is stable as controls are added across specifications,
while the precision of the treatment effect increases.20
Table 4.3: Treatment effects
Turnout Rate 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.119 0.109 0.101 0.091
(0.458) (0.322) (0.178) (0.175)
Municipal dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Stratification Controls No No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No No Yes
Number of observations 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703
Mean of Control Group 61.173 61.173 61.173 61.173
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.574 0.870 0.876
Notes : The dependent variable, Turnout Rate 2017, is measured in percentage terms. Treatment is a binary indicator
that takes value one if all ATMs in the civil parish displayed the voting campaign. There are 308 municipal dummies.
The vector of Stratification Controls includes registered voters’ density, the number of ATM devices, the number of
commercial banks in 2016, and turnout in 2013 municipal elections. The vector of Other Controls includes the share
population below 15 years old in 2011, the share of population above 70 years old in 2011, the share of new citizens in
2011 (since 2007), the share of citizens with primary education and below in 2011, the share of citizens with tertiary
education in 2011, the mean value withdrawn in ATMs in September 2016, the unemployment rate in 2011, transfers to
civil parishes per capita, the winning margin share in 2013 Local Elections, the number of candidates in the 2017 local
election, an independent mayor dummy for 2017, the share leftist votes in the 2013 local election, a central government
alignment dummy. Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
20Assuming for a moment the point estimate from column (3) as a treatment effect size, considering
the mean turnout for the control group is 61.17% , , and taking the average number of voters per
municipality, our treatment would increase turnout by 2.77 (=0.101/61.173 ∗ 1677.65) voters, on
average, per civil parish). Since our treatment was implemented in 682 civil parishes, our campaign
would have a causal impact of 1889 more voters in the 2017 local elections.
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4.4.2 Heterogeneous effects and Robustness
We now focus on estimating how the intensity of treatment affects voter turnout,
making use of information provided by the ATM company, including the number of
cards, operations, and withdrawals by civil parish. In addition to the binary treatment
variable, we now include, successively, these three different indicators of intensity of
ATM usage during the campaign, as well as the interaction term between intensity
and treatment. Table 4.4 presents estimates for equation (2) using information on the
intensity of treatment for the entire campaign period. Odd columns show results with
fixed effects for the 308 municipalities, whereas even columns show similar results after
adding the vector of stratification and additional controls.
Our results in Table 4.4 suggest that the wide use of ATMs can be a powerful tool for
rallying voters. Considering the average ATM usage for the sample of civil parishes and
the point estimate in Column (2), our results translate into an increase in the average
turnout rate by 0.14 percentage points (22.573∗ 0.006), thus indicating that people who
live in areas with high ATM usage are mobilized by our treatment. These results are
statistically significant and stable across the three proxies of intensity of ATM usage.21
In face of our concern that there could be a downward bias in treatment effects due to
a mismatch between voting and treatment locations for a share of the voters, we restrict
our attention to the intensity derived from ATM usage during the weekend, when voters
21In Figure D5 of the Appendix to this paper we provide a graph of the estimated treatment effects
in Table 4.3. As expected, we see no differences for areas with limited ATM usage while we observe
sizable effects in the areas with many ATM users. We also relax the functional form by separating
our sample by each tercile of parishes in terms of ATM usage (measured by the number of unique
cards). The results are presented in Table D3 of the Appendix to this paper and show that the tercile
with highest ATM usage seem to be most responsive to our treatment. In addition, we also test the
robustness of our findings with a difference-in-differences exercise using the turnout for the 2017 and
the 2013 local elections. The results in Table D4 of the Appendix to this paper are very similar to our
baseline results.
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Table 4.4: Intensity Effects: Entire Campaign
Turnout Rate 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.244 -0.035 -0.232 -0.034 -0.254 -0.039
(0.350) (0.196) (0.349) (0.195) (0.351) (0.195)
Treatment * Number of Cards (*100) 0.016** 0.006**
(0.007) (0.003)
Number of Cards (*100) -0.058*** -0.012
(0.006) (0.010)
Treatment * Number of Operations (*100) 0.009** 0.003**
(0.004) (0.002)
Number of Operations (*100) -0.034*** -0.009
(0.003) (0.006)
Treatment * Number of Withdrawals (*100) 0.020** 0.007**
(0.009) (0.003)
Number of Withdrawals (*100) -0.069*** -0.020
(0.007) (0.013)
Municipal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratification Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.876 0.618 0.876 0.619 0.876
The dependent variable, Turnout Rate 20117, is measured in percentage terms. Treatment is a binary indicator that
takes value one if all ATMs in the civil parish displayed the voting campaign. There are 308 municipal dummies. The
vector of Stratification Controls includes registered voters’ density, the number of ATM devices, the number of
commercial banks in 2016, and turnout in 2013 municipal elections. The vector of Other Controls includes the share
population below 15 years old in 2011, the share of population above 70 years old in 2011, the share of new citizens in
2011 (since 2007), the share of citizens with primary education and below in 2011, the share of citizens with tertiary
education in 2011, the mean value withdrawn in ATMs in September 2016, the unemployment rate in 2011, transfers to
civil parishes per capita, the winning margin share in 2013 Local Elections, the number of candidates in the 2017 local
election, an independent mayor dummy for 2017, the share leftist votes in the 2013 local election, a central government
alignment dummy. Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
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moving across parishes for employment reasons is likely to be smaller. Table D5 of
the Appendix to this paper presents results using weekend intensity measures, which
confirm our previous findings.
For an easier interpretation of results, we compare the magnitudes for the mean
and the median values of the three intensity measures. Figure 4.3 presents the results.
We can see that point estimates for the total campaign period and weekend yield very
similar results.
Figure 4.3: Interpretation of intensity effects: mean and median
In addition, we also run a battery of robustness exercises. First, we exclude the
large urban areas of Lisbon and Oporto (in Table D6 of the Appendix to this paper),
as well as the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira (in Table D7 of the Appendix
to this paper). These specifications aim to disregard possible concerns with the results
being driven by more urban areas or insular regions. The results remain unchallenged.
Finally, we run a horse race to test if our main result is affected by differences in
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important control variables in the treatment and control areas. For that we modify
equation (2) by adding an interaction term between the treatment status dummy and
the top 5 most highly correlated control variables with ATM usage.22 These results
(reported in Table D8 of the Appendix to this paper) confirm our main conclusions.
4.4.3 Falsification tests
In Table D9 of the Appendix to this paper we present again estimates considering the
intensity of treatment for the entire campaign period, but employ instead the turnout
rates for (i) the 2014 European elections, (ii) the 2015 legislative elections, and (iii) the
2016 presidential elections as the dependent variable. This constitutes a placebo test
for our parameters of interest. We find no statistically significant effect of the campaign
on turnout using the alternative placebo dependent variables, further strengthening our
interpretation of the results as causal, associated with the specific timing and scope of
the nationwide field experiment.
4.4.4 Cost-effictiveness discussion
So far, we have analyzed the potential benefits of using ATMs to get out the vote. But
how much does it cost to make someone vote instead of abstaining? Is it cost-effective?
These are precisely the questions that we tackle in this subsection.
The cost of our campaign, in terms of revenue that was not received from selling the
ad space to other clients of the ATM system was estimated, by the partner organization,
at around 35,000e (2017 current prices). In addition, since we used the official layout
22For space considerations, we present the results for the number of cards as our intensity measure.
Results for the other intensity measures are available from the authors upon request.
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– images, lettering, and official seal of the National Electoral Commission, no further
costs on creating the visual aspects of the campaign should be imputed. Taking this into
consideration we can reach two conclusions with back-of-the-envelope computations: 1)
the cost of reaching an additional potential voter was below 3 cents (35,000e/1.547,197
unique card users in the treated area); and 2) the cost effectiveness of our campaign,
considering the numbers presented in Section IV. 1, was 18.53e (35,000e/1,889 new
voters) or $ 20.81 (at September 2017 exchange rates).
We compare these numbers with the benchmark on other modes of communication
provided by Green and Gerber (2019). For ease of comparison, we present their
conclusions Table D10 of the Appendix to this paper, adapted from Green and Gerber
(2019). Two caveats should be mentioned. First, they only report cost-effectiveness
estimates of tactics whose average impact has been demonstrated, in their survey of
the literature, to be significantly greater than zero. Second, dollars-per-vote exclude
start-up and management costs (which are included in our assessment). Regarding
other modes of communication, costs range between $ 31(for door-to-door) and $ 91
(for nonpartisan direct mail).
Hence, costs of converting get-out-the-vote efforts into voting, for the other means
of communication reviewed by Green and Gerber (2019), seem to be substantially
higher than the cost-benefit of our treatment. So, despite the relative modest effects
of the treatment, it probably helps that the ATM campaign involved reaching people
frequently in moments where they are, naturally, paying attention to a screen before
withdrawing their own money or using the other wide-ranging services of the Portuguese
ATMs.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
We conducted a field experiment that encompassed the entire universe of ATM machines
in a country to assess whether treating a subset of civil parishes with a get-out-the-vote
message based on activating the social norm of civic duty delivers higher turnout.
Portugal is an appropriate testing ground as there is an ATM system that is both
virtually universal, and particularly credible – it is the base for a wide array of sensitive
financial and tax operations in the country. ATMs are so far an unexploited mode of
communication for voter mobilization. All ATM users in treated civil parishes were
subject to a message encouraging turnout based for three consecutive days leading
to the day of the local elections in 2017. In the treated civil parishes, ATM users
were exposed to no other message in ATMs, while in non-treated civil parishes voters
were exposed to the usual advertisement messages. Considering the number of unique
cards who saw our treatment in the 63 hours of the campaign, the cost of reaching an
additional potential voter was below 3 cents.
While the estimated impact of treatment on turnout, despite the stability of the
estimates, is not significant, results that consider the intensity of treatment measured
by the number of ATM users, the number of operations and the number of withdrawals
show a statistically significant effect on turnout. This is true for the whole treatment
period, as well as for the weekend, when contamination between treatment and control
is less likely. A placebo test using turnout for the previous election and a plethora of
robustness checks further strengthen our causal interpretation.
The short time frame for which the experiment was run, and the low-cost and
wide dissemination of the communication tool suggest a great potential of ATMs
for channelling get-out-the-vote campaigns. The fact that voters were approached
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electronically at a moment when they are likely to be paying attention to the means
of communication provides an indication of what can be done through the internet
employing ads that are strategically placed. Based on our findings, it is likely that
ads linked to the financial movements of voters are effective at increasing electoral
participation. These results can also potentially be generalizable to the use of
automated kiosks that are being more and more used for transactions worldwide. Less
closely related to ATMs, the (cost-)efficacy of ads in Youtube, Spotify, and other related
digital platforms in get-out-the-vote efforts can also constitute an interesting avenue for
future research.
Moreover, as voting moves to electronic platforms in many countries, and ATMs
represent a highly secure network with unique capillarity, one can envision that electoral
communication and procedures can increasingly be taken to these networks.
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Garcia-López, M.-À., Holl, A., and Viladecans-Marsal, E. (2015). Suburbanization and
highways in Spain when the Romans and the Bourbons still shape its cities. Journal
of Urban Economics, 85:52–67.
Gerber, A. S., Gimpel, J. G., Green, D. P., and Shaw, D. R. (2011). How large and
long-lasting are the persuasive effects of televised campaign ads? results from a
randomized field experiment. American Political Science Review, 105(1):135–150.
Gerber, A. S. and Green, D. P. (2000). The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and
direct mail on voter turnout: A field experiment. American Political Science Review,
94(3):653–663.
João Pereira dos Santos 143
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Gerber, A. S. and Green, D. P. (2005). Correction to gerber and green (2000), replication
of disputed findings, and reply to imai (2005). American Political Science Review,
99(2):301–313.
Gerber, A. S. and Green, D. P. (2017). Field experiments on voter mobilization: An
overview of a burgeoning literature. In Handbook of Economic Field Experiments,
volume 1, pages 395–438. Elsevier.
Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., and Larimer, C. W. (2008). Social pressure and voter
turnout: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. American Political Science
Review, 102(1):33–48.
Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., and Shachar, R. (2003). Voting may be habit-forming:
evidence from a randomized field experiment. American Journal of Political Science,
47(3):540–550.
Gerber, A. S., Karlan, D., and Bergan, D. (2009). Does the media matter? a field
experiment measuring the effect of newspapers on voting behavior and political
opinions. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(2):35–52.
Ghani, E., Goswami, A. G., and Kerr, W. R. (2016). Highway to success: the
impact of the golden quadrilateral project for the location and performance of Indian
manufacturing. The Economic Journal, 126(591):317–357.
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da rede pública ou água acondicionada.
Jaeger, D. A., Ruist, J., and Stuhler, J. (2018). Shift-share instruments and the impact
of immigration. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Jedwab, R. and Moradi, A. (2016). The permanent effects of transportation revolutions
in poor countries: evidence from Africa. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
98(2):268–284.
John, P. and Brannan, T. (2008). How different are telephoning and canvassing? results
from a get out the vote field experiment in the british 2005 general election. British
Journal of Political Science, 38(3):565–574.
Kalter, C. (2018). ”Rückkehr oder Flucht? Dekolonisierung, Zwangsmigration und
Portugals retornados”. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 44(2):250–284.
João Pereira dos Santos 147
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., and Trebbi, F. (2015). How do voters respond to
information? Evidence from a randomized campaign. American Economic Review,
105(1):322–53.
Kronmal, R. A. (1993). ”Spurious correlation and the fallacy of the ratio standard
revisited”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society),
156(3):379–392.
Labanca, C. (2020). The effects of a temporary migration shock: Evidence from the
Arab Spring migration through Italy. Labour Economics, 67:101903.
Lall, S. V., Shalizi, Z., and Deichmann, U. (2004). Agglomeration economies and
productivity in Indian industry. Journal of Development Economics, 73(2):643 –
673.
León, G. (2017). Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence
from Peru. Journal of Development Economics, 127:56–71.
Li, H. and Li, Z. (2013). Road investments and inventory reduction: firm level evidence
from China. Journal of Urban Economics, 76:43–52.
Lloyd, C. B. and Niemi, B. (1978). ”Sex differences in labor supply elasticity:
The implications of sectoral shifts in demand”. The American Economic Review,
68(2):78–83.
Lourenço, I. (2018). Retornados: Representações Sociais na Integração (1974–79). PhD
thesis, PhD thesis, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, Porto.
Lubkemann, S. C. (2002). ”Race, class, and kin in the negotiation of ‘internal
strangerhood’among Portuguese retornados, 1975-2000”. Europe’s Invisible Migrants,
pages 75–93.
João Pereira dos Santos 148
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
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Figures
Figure A.1: Geographical Distribution of Affected Municipalities
Note: Darkened regions represent treated municipalities whereas light regions depict municipalities in
the comparison group.
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Tables
Table A.1: Municipalities Affected by the Introduction of Tolls in the SCUT Highways
SCUT Highway Municipalities Affected
Tolls introduced on the 15th October 2010
SCUT Grande Porto - 79 Km
A4: AE Transmontana Matosinhos, Maia.
A41: CREP - Circular Regional Exterior do Porto Matosinhos, Valongo, Santa Maria da Feira, Espinho.
A42: AE Douro Litoral Valongo, Paços de Ferreira, Paredes, Lousada.
SCUT Litoral Norte -113 Km
A28 Matosinhos, Vila do Conde, Póvoa de Varzim,
Esposende, Viana do Castelo, Caminha.
SCUT Costa da Prata – 110 Km
A29 Estarreja, Ovar, Espinho, Vila Nova de Gaia.
Tolls introduced on the 8th December 2011
SCUT Algarve – 133 Km
A22 Lagos, Monchique, Portimão, Lagoa, Silves, Albufeira,
Loulé, Faro, Olhão, Tavira, Castro Marim, Vila Real de
Sto. António.
SCUT Beira Interior – 217 Km
A23 Torres Novas, Entroncamento, Constancia, Abrantes,
Marvão, Gavião, Vila Velha de Rodão, Vila Nova da
Barquinha,Castelo Branco, Fundão, Belmonte, Covilha,
Guarda.
SCUT Interior Norte – 162 Km
A24 Viseu, Castro Daire, Lamego, Peso da Régua, Vila Real,
Vila Pouca de Aguiar, Chaves.
SCUT Beiras Litoral e Alta – 173 Km
A25 Íhavo, Aveiro, Albergaria-a-Velha, Sever do Vouga,
Oliveira de Frades, Vouzela, Viseu, Mangualde, Fornos
de Algodres, Celorico da Beira, Guarda, Pinhel, Almeida.
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Table A.5: Labor Robustness: excluding i) the Lisbon metropolitan area and ii) district
capitals
Paid Employment Average Wage Labor Productivity
Exclude no Lisbon no Capitals no Lisbon no Capitals no Lisbon no Capitals
Treated× Post -0.020*** -0.018*** -57.490 -96.577 -730.971 1,854.510
(0.005) (0.006) (57.815) (68.583) (1,996.758) (2,240.964)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 3 × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Controls × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
R-squared 0.025 0.029 0.010 0.008 0.000 0.001
Observations 2,453,617 2,583,610 1,969,938 2,069,516 1,969,938 2,069,516
Number of Firms 370,992 402,744 329,512 355,804 329,512 355,804
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of
socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
Table A.6: Labor Robustness: excluding i) municipalities without highways in the
comparison group and ii) balanced sample
Paid Employment Average Wage Labor Productivity
no Highways Balanced no Highways Balanced no Highways Balanced
Treated× Post -0.013** -0.019*** 4.358 -70.668 38.339 -295.368
(0.006) (0.007) (68.447) (71.816) (2,225.762) (2,715.546)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 3 × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Controls × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
R-squared 0.027 0.051 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.000
Observations 3,345,013 1,667,255 2,624,574 1,484,934 2,624,574 1,484,934
Number of Firms 510,766 151,679 445,748 148,360 445,748 148,360
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of
socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
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Table A.7: Moved Robustness: i) excluding the Lisbon metropolitan area, ii) excluding
district capitals, iii) municipalities without Highways in the comparison group, and iv)
balanced sample
Moved
no Lisbon no Capitals no Highways Balanced
Treated× Post 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 3 × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Controls × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 2,461,358 2,592,200 3,356,784 1,668,469
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of
socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Asterisks indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
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Table AH.5: Labor Heterogeneity: Tradables vs non-tradables
Paid Employment Average Wage Labor Productivity
T NT T NT T NT
Treated× Post -0.019*** -0.003 -18.980 -44.687 -1,907.124 -386.813
(0.007) (0.006) (94.855) (61.769) (3,075.788) (254.791)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
R-squared 0.017 0.039 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.001
Observations 1,626,134 2,041,251 1,318,925 1,565,595 1,190,473 1,377,044
Number of Firms 250,660 313,744 223,720 269,179 210,802 249,917
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. Asterisks indicate
significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
Table AH.6: Labor Heterogeneity: Manufacturing vs Services
Paid Employment Average Wage Labor Productivity
M S M S M S
Treated× Post -0.029* -0.010* -117.152 0.408 -3,739.623 -368.516
(0.015) (0.005) (80.965) (70.031) (7,374.162) (678.758)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
R-squared 0.043 0.017 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.001
Observations 438,265 2,672,654 383,527 2,071,259 361,750 1,829,826
Number of Firms 63,676 413,636 59,820 356,512 57,939 329,408
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. Asterisks indicate
significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
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Table AH.7: Moved Heterogeneity: Tradables vs non-tradables and Manufacturing vs
Services
Moved
T NT M S
Treated× Post 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Firm FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Municipality FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
NUTS 2 × Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 1,631,134 2,048,926 887,783 2,682,601
R-squared 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. Asterisks indicate
significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***), respectively.
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Figures
Figure B1 Relative Population.
Notes: Female population in 1970: 4,546 millions. Male population in 1970:
4,078 millions.
Source: Statistics Portugal, own construction.
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Figure B2 Number of references to repatriates in two Portuguese daily newspapers.
Notes: This figure is retrieved from Lourenço (2018). News are collected
from two newspapers: Primeiro de Janeiro (from Porto) and Diário de
Not́ıcias (from Lisbon).
Figure B3 Age pyramid natives vs repatriates in 1981.
Notes: The age range below five is not displayed as the data set on
repatriates only contains repatriates above the age of seven.
Source: census of 1981, Statistics Portugal, own construction.
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Figure B4 Repatriate settlement across municipalities in 1981.
Source: census of 1981, Statistics Portugal, own construction.
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Figure B5 NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 regions according to the 2002 definition.
Notes: Different colors indicate different NUTS 3 regions, while the black
outlines show NUTS 2 regions.
Source: Statistics Portugal.
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Figure B6 Are repatriates returning to their place of birth?
Notes: The share of Portuguese born is measured, for each NUTS 3 region,
from those that migrated to Africa and are in Portugal in 1981. The most
prominent outlier is Grande Lisboa.
Source: census of 1981, Statistics Portugal.
João Pereira dos Santos 178
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Tables
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Table B2: White resident population in Angola and
Mozambique, 1940 - 1970
White resident population
Year Angola Mozambique Total
1940 44,083 27,438 71,521
1950 78,826 48,213 127,039
1960 172,529 97,245 269,774
1970 280,101 162,967 443,068
Notes: Source: Statistics Portugal, Recenseamentos Gerais da
População de Angola e Moçambique.
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Table B3: Population and Labor Force in 1981 by NUTS 3 and NUTS 2
regions
Region Native Population above 15 Native Labor Force




Alto Trás-os-Montes 181,544 80,195
Minho-Lima 179,634 87,503
Douro 172,304 81,556
Entre Douro e Vouga 161,565 101,354
Região do Norte 2,299,103 1,319,914
Grande Lisboa 1,299,030 798,476
Peńınsula de Setúbal 394,596 230,053
Região de Lisboa 1,693,626 1,028,529
Baixo Mondego 235,406 126,627
Baixa Vouga 229,908 133,111
Oeste 226,672 118,855
Dão-Lafões 199,922 104,982
Médio Tejo 164,753 80,345
Pinhal Litoral 150,897 83,332
Pinhal Interior Norte 110,555 49,663
Beira Interior Norte 93,514 42,640
Cova da Beira 74,185 37,953
Beira Interior Sul 66,234 28,063
Pinhal Interior Sul 45,798 19,751
Serra da Estrela 39,473 19,688
Região do Centro 1,637,317 845,010
Leźıria do Tejo 173,980 95,960
Alentejo Central 138,687 76,565
Baixo Alentejo 122,216 58,792
Alto Alentejo 111,167 54,377




Região Autónoma da Madeira 170,975 93,907
Região Autónoma da Madeira 170,975 93,907
Região Autónoma dos Açores 155,220 71,728
Região Autónoma dos Açores 155,220 71,728
Portugal 6,824,225 3,810,271
Notes: The regions in bold are NUTS 2 regions. The Labor Force is defined as all those
who are employed (i.e. in paid employment) and unemployed. Source: census of 1981,
computations by the author.
João Pereira dos Santos 182
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Table B4: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - Kronmal
specification
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.002 0.018 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.008 -0.005 0.014∗ 0.014∗ 0.014∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ Employment share 0.006 0.021 -0.026∗ -0.026∗ -0.024∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
∆ Share Employee -0.028 -0.058 -0.186∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.014 0.056 0.141∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
∆ Share Employer -0.017∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.030 0.078∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.507 0.505 0.519
First-stage F-statistic - - 19.75 20.12 23.56
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the
log of repatriates. All outcomes refer to changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP,
Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and
Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native working age population.
The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over the native labor force.
All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the following
parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age population,
inactive and population below 15 as share of total population, those with higher
education as share of those above 15 and the native population above 15 in 1981. IV1
is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on
network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B5: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - Kronmal
specification
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.0139 -0.0382 -0.119∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.033) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.057 -0.036 0.043 0.042 0.040
(0.029) (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
∆ Employment share 0.010 -0.019 -0.114∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.035) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
∆ Share Employee -0.029 -0.039 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.031 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
∆ Share Employer -0.001 -0.002 -0.004∗ -0.004∗ -0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.031 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.507 0.505 0.519
First-stage F-statistic - - 19.75 20.12 23.56
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the
log of repatriates. All outcomes refer to changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP,
Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and
Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native working age population.
The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over the native labor force.
All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the following
parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age population,
inactive and population below 15 as share of total population, those with higher
education as share of those above 15 and the native population above 15 in 1981.
IV1 is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument
based on network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik
instrument. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B6: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - 27 regions
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP 0.271 0.481 0.074 0.077 0.086
(0.465) (0.458) (0.278) (0.286) (0.284)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.182 -0.031 0.160 0.160 0.160
(0.175) (0.176) (0.123) (0.122) (0.121)
∆ Employment share 0.450 0.471 -0.100 -0.098 -0.089
(0.497) (0.533) (0.309) (0.318) (0.316)
∆ Share Employee -0.231 -1.995 -3.384∗∗∗ -3.353∗∗∗ -3.289∗∗∗
(1.108) (1.059) (0.790) (0.806) (0.790)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.257 1.846∗ 2.748∗∗∗ 2.715∗∗∗ 2.661∗∗∗
(0.702) (0.788) (0.692) (0.695) (0.681)
∆ Share Employer -0.699∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.142) (0.150) (0.150) (0.147)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.957 2.481∗∗ 3.383∗∗∗ 3.356∗∗∗ 3.308∗∗∗
(0.666) (0.822) (0.769) (0.771) (0.757)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.569 0.553 0.401
First-stage F-statistic - - 87.06 81.55 96.26
Observations 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample of
repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to changes between
1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship, Share
Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native working age
population. The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over the native
labor force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the
following parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age
population, inactive and population below 15 as share of total population, those with
higher education as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational
network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according to the colony
lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. The regressions exclude Grande Lisboa,
the Peninsula of Setúbal and Algarve from the NUTS 3 regions. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
João Pereira dos Santos 185
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Table B7: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - 27 regions
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.510 -1.129 -1.676∗ -1.644∗ -1.654∗
(0.745) (0.854) (0.654) (0.659) (0.655)
∆ Unemployment rate -1.618 -0.646 0.021 0.023 0.039
(0.895) (0.902) (0.527) (0.520) (0.516)
∆ Employment share 0.228 -0.715 -1.439∗ -1.415∗ -1.425∗
(0.768) (0.870) (0.642) (0.642) (0.636)
∆ Share Employee -1.203 -1.049 -1.939∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗ -1.904∗∗∗
(0.600) (0.725) (0.542) (0.551) (0.543)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 1.301∗ 0.074 0.315 0.319 0.293
(0.552) (0.453) (0.452) (0.453) (0.446)
∆ Share Employer -0.054 -0.052 -0.064 -0.063 -0.063
(0.026) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
∆ Share Self-employed 1.355∗ 0.126 0.378 0.381 0.356
(0.549) (0.449) (0.438) (0.439) (0.433)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.569 0.553 0.401
First-stage F-statistic - - 87.06 81.55 96.26
Observations 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample of
repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to changes between
1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship,
Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native
working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over
the native labor force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls
contain the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of
working age population, inactive and population below 15 as share of total population,
those with higher education as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on
educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according
to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. The regressions exclude
Grande Lisboa, the Peninsula of Setúbal and Algarve from the NUTS 3 regions.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B8: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - 25 regions
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.225 0.476 -0.171 -0.170 -0.137
(0.361) (0.496) (0.270) (0.283) (0.269)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.044 0.077 0.268∗ 0.270∗ 0.263∗
(0.129) (0.176) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116)
∆ Employment share -0.191 0.372 -0.439 -0.440 -0.402
(0.332) (0.567) (0.287) (0.301) (0.285)
∆ Share Employee -2.205∗∗ -2.255 -4.186∗∗∗ -4.168∗∗∗ -4.059∗∗∗
(0.787) (1.185) (0.924) (0.937) (0.893)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 1.179 2.028∗ 3.260∗∗∗ 3.236∗∗∗ 3.159∗∗∗
(0.609) (0.871) (0.812) (0.813) (0.784)
∆ Share Employer -0.329 -0.633∗∗ -0.687∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.181) (0.167) (0.169) (0.166)
∆ Share Self-employed 1.508∗ 2.661∗∗ 3.946∗∗∗ 3.931∗∗∗ 3.856∗∗∗
(0.623) (0.949) (0.922) (0.924) (0.894)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.501 0.484 0.355
First-stage F-statistic - - 55.28 50.92 65.83
Observations 25 25 25 25 25
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample of
repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to changes between
1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship,
Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native working
age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over the
native labor force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain
the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age
population, inactive and population below 15 as share of total population, those with
higher education as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational
network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according to the colony
lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. The regressions exclude the NUTS
2 regions Alentejo (corresponding NUTS 3 regions: Alentejo Central, Alentejo Literal,
Baixo Alentejo, Leźıra do Tejo, Alto Alentejo) from the regions. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B9: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - 25 regions
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.572 -1.405 -2.038∗∗∗ -2.003∗∗∗ -2.002∗∗∗
(0.693) (0.914) (0.594) (0.600) (0.593)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.002 0.179 0.352 0.364 0.370
(0.368) (0.622) (0.468) (0.461) (0.458)
∆ Employment share -0.470 -1.192 -1.807∗∗ -1.785∗∗ -1.782∗∗
(0.622) (0.893) (0.591) (0.593) (0.585)
∆ Share Employee -1.223 -1.570∗ -2.145∗∗∗ -2.120∗∗∗ -2.121∗∗∗
(0.639) (0.613) (0.431) (0.440) (0.428)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.405 0.163 0.161 0.155 0.158
(0.575) (0.542) (0.465) (0.464) (0.460)
∆ Share Employer -0.001 -0.056 -0.076∗ -0.075∗ -0.075∗
(0.036) (0.044) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.406 0.219 0.237 0.231 0.234
(0.590) (0.519) (0.450) (0.449) (0.445)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.501 0.484 0.355
First-stage F-statistic - - 55.28 50.92 65.83
Observations 25 25 25 25 25
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample of
repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to changes between
1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share Entrepreneurship,
Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares over the native
working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share of unemployed over
the native labor force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS 2 regions. Controls
contain the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of
working age population, inactive and population below 15 as share of total population,
those with higher education as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on
educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according to
the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. The regressions exclude the
NUTS 2 regions Alentejo (corresponding NUTS 3 regions: Alentejo Central, Alentejo
Literal, Baixo Alentejo, Leźıra do Tejo, Alto Alentejo) from the regions. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B10: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - different
region fixed effects
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP 0.228 0.455 -0.248 -0.247 -0.213
(0.366) (0.353) (0.317) (0.329) (0.316)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.186 -0.180 0.281 0.281 0.272
(0.137) (0.224) (0.161) (0.160) (0.158)
∆ Employment share 0.397 0.588 -0.522 -0.522 -0.479
(0.399) (0.492) (0.356) (0.369) (0.356)
∆ Share Employee -0.490 -0.912 -3.965∗∗∗ -3.941∗∗∗ -3.766∗∗∗
(0.936) (1.166) (0.891) (0.901) (0.855)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.318 0.926 2.939∗∗∗ 2.911∗∗∗ 2.779∗∗∗
(0.573) (0.849) (0.773) (0.769) (0.731)
∆ Share Employer -0.396 -0.427∗ -0.538∗∗ -0.541∗∗ -0.526∗∗
(0.204) (0.201) (0.188) (0.189) (0.181)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.714 1.353 3.476∗∗∗ 3.452∗∗∗ 3.304∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.962) (0.840) (0.836) (0.793)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.517 0.501 0.370
First-stage F-statistic - - 75.84 73.86 83.79
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to
changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share
Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares
over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share
of unemployed over the native labor force. Controls contain the following parameters
in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive
and population below 15 as share of total population, those with higher education as
share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational network effects,
IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according to the colony lived in and
IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. All regressions contain three regional dummies:
a dummy containing the NUTS 3 regions Centre and North, a dummy comprising
Alentejo, Algarve, and Lisbon, and a dummy for the islands Azores and Madeira. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B11: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - different
region fixed effects
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.512 -0.655 -2.319∗ -2.276∗ -2.203∗
(0.581) (0.979) (1.027) (1.028) (1.030)
∆ Unemployment rate -1.426 -1.231 0.114 0.112 0.089
(0.733) (0.924) (0.536) (0.527) (0.530)
∆ Employment share 0.087 -0.113 -2.020∗ -1.982∗ -1.910∗
(0.596) (1.043) (0.970) (0.968) (0.972)
∆ Share Employee -0.771 -0.399 -2.010∗∗∗ -1.986∗∗ -1.910∗∗
(0.558) (0.738) (0.600) (0.606) (0.604)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.604 0.034 -0.193 -0.182 -0.186
(0.500) (0.444) (0.589) (0.589) (0.575)
∆ Share Employer -0.014 -0.032 -0.072 -0.071 -0.069
(0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.618 0.066 -0.121 -0.111 -0.117
(0.514) (0.426) (0.568) (0.568) (0.553)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.517 0.501 0.370
First-stage F-statistic - - 75.84 73.86 83.79
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to
changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share
Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares
over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share
of unemployed over the native labor force. Controls contain the following parameters
in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive
and population below 15 as share of total population, those with higher education as
share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational network effects,
IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according to the colony lived in and
IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. All regressions contain three regional dummies:
a dummy containing the NUTS 3 regions Centre and North, a dummy comprising
Alentejo, Algarve, and Lisbon, and a dummy for the islands Azores and Madeira. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B12: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - without
NUTS 2 FE
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP 0.228 0.266 -0.590 -0.583 -0.534
(0.366) (0.335) (0.394) (0.405) (0.380)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.186 -0.176 0.309 0.311 0.299
(0.137) (0.217) (0.161) (0.160) (0.157)
∆ Employment share 0.397 0.401 -0.874∗ -0.870 -0.811
(0.399) (0.465) (0.437) (0.448) (0.422)
∆ Share Employee -0.490 -0.891 -3.484∗∗∗ -3.474∗∗∗ -3.348∗∗∗
(0.936) (1.046) (0.967) (0.977) (0.927)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.318 0.712 1.969∗ 1.961∗ 1.903∗
(0.573) (0.755) (0.871) (0.871) (0.842)
∆ Share Employer -0.396 -0.561∗ -0.859∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗ -0.825∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.222) (0.260) (0.259) (0.243)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.714 1.273 2.829∗∗ 2.818∗∗ 2.728∗∗
(0.566) (0.846) (0.905) (0.906) (0.867)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.371 0.355 0.274
First-stage F-statistic - - 13.00 12.29 16.19
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to
changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share
Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares
over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share
of unemployed over the native labor force. Controls contain the following parameters
in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive
and population below 15 as share of total population, those with higher education as
share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational network effects,
IV2 is the instrument based on network effects according to the colony lived in and
IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B13: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - without
NUTS 2 FE
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.512 -0.535 -1.421 -1.393 -1.386
(0.581) (0.946) (1.475) (1.471) (1.445)
∆ Unemployment rate -1.426 -1.322 0.462 0.473 0.419
(0.733) (1.008) (0.594) (0.582) (0.585)
∆ Employment share 0.0868 0.00810 -1.432 -1.411 -1.381
(0.596) (0.994) (1.275) (1.268) (1.250)
∆ Share Employee -0.771 -0.372 -1.848∗ -1.836∗ -1.776∗
(0.558) (0.705) (0.779) (0.780) (0.758)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.604 0.140 0.218 0.222 0.194
(0.500) (0.403) (0.681) (0.681) (0.662)
∆ Share Employer -0.014 -0.034 -0.091∗ -0.091∗ -0.087∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.618 0.173 0.309 0.313 0.281
(0.514) (0.387) (0.667) (0.668) (0.647)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.371 0.355 0.274
First-stage F-statistic - - 13.00 12.29 16.19
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer
to changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee,
Share Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated
as shares over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers
to the share of unemployed over the native labor force. Controls contain the
following parameters in 1960: unemployed and entrepreneurs as share of working
age population, inactive and population below 15 as share of total population,
those with higher education as share of those above 15. IV1 is the instrument
based on educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on network
effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument. ∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B14: Labor market effects of repatriates on male natives - sample
robustness
IV 1 - based on educational network effect
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆LFP -0.109 -0.097 -0.133 -0.201 -0.113
(0.298) (0.265) (0.364) (0.551) (0.309)
∆ Unemployment rate 0.217 0.194 0.229 0.401 0.226
(0.121) (0.107) (0.146) (0.226) (0.123)
∆ Employment share -0.333 -0.296 -0.135 -0.615 -0.346
(0.323) (0.289) (0.417) (0.604) (0.333)
∆ Share Employee -3.974∗∗∗ -3.541∗∗∗ -4.509∗∗∗ -7.345∗∗∗ -4.135∗∗∗
(0.912) (0.824) (1.049) (1.791) (0.902)
∆Share Entrepreneur 3.128∗∗∗ 2.787∗∗∗ 3.736∗∗∗ 5.781∗∗∗ 3.255∗∗∗
(0.773) (0.696) (0.899) (1.506) (0.767)
∆ Share Employer -0.687∗∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗ -0.854∗∗∗ -1.270∗∗∗ -0.715∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.142) (0.189) (0.304) (0.167)
∆ Share Self-employed 3.815∗∗∗ 3.400∗∗∗ 4.590∗∗∗ 7.051∗∗∗ 3.970∗∗∗
(0.858) (0.773) (0.979) (1.680) (0.854)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
N of repatriates in sample 310,199 351,427 258,148 219,117 245,619
First-stage coefficient 0.520 0.583 0.385 0.281 0.499
First-stage F-statistic 56.73 51.69 76.61 40.29 60.48
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to
changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share
Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares
over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share
of unemployed over the native labor force. All regression contain dummies for NUTS
2 regions. Controls contain the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and
entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive and population below
15 as share of total population, those with higher education as share of those above
15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument
based on network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik
instrument. (1) excludes students from the sample of repatriates, (2) uses an age
range of 15-64 years, (3) uses as age range 25-59 years (4) excludes all inactive
repatriates, (5) includes only Portuguese-born repatriates. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B15: Labor market effects of repatriates on female natives - sample
robustness
IV 1 - based on educational network effect
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -1.900∗∗ -1.693∗∗ -2.326∗∗ -3.512∗∗ -1.977∗∗
(0.702) (0.625) (0.853) (1.350) (0.722)
∆ Unemployment rate 0.070 0.062 0.158 0.129 0.073
(0.527) (0.470) (0.624) (0.975) (0.548)
∆ Employment share -1.612∗ -1.437∗ -1.949∗ -2.980∗ -1.678∗
(0.671) (0.598) (0.807) (1.287) (0.690)
∆ Share Employee -1.950∗∗∗ -1.737∗∗∗ -2.303∗∗ 3.603∗∗ -2.029∗∗∗
(0.584) (0.519) (0.710) (1.127) (0.594)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.141 0.126 0.115 0.261 0.147
(0.466) (0.415) (0.552) (0.859) (0.485)
∆ Share Employer -0.073∗ -0.065∗ -0.0832 -0.135∗ -0.076∗
(0.035) (0.031) (0.0425) (0.064) (0.036)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.214 0.191 0.198 0.396 0.223
(0.455) (0.405) (0.539) (0.839) (0.473)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
N of repatriates in sample 310,199 351,427 258,148 219,117 245,619
First-stage coefficient 0.520 0.583 0.385 0.281 0.499
First-stage F-statistic 56.73 51.69 76.61 40.29 60.48
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to
changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share
Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares
over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share
of unemployed over the native labor force. All regression contain dummies for
NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the following parameters in 1960: unemployed
and entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive and population
below 15 as share of total population, those with higher education as share of those
above 15. IV1 is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2 is the
instrument based on network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the
basic Bartik instrument. (1) excludes students from the sample of repatriates, (2)
uses an age range of 15-64 years, (3) uses as age range 25-59 years (4) excludes all
inactive repatriates, (5) includes only Portuguese-born repatriates. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B16: Labour market effects of repatriates on male natives - pre-shock
denominator
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP 0.297 0.839 0.169 0.163 0.197
(0.248) (0.449) (0.577) (0.587) (0.562)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.150 -0.215 0.350 0.354 0.334
(0.0766) (0.152) (0.242) (0.241) (0.232)
∆ Employment share 0.424 0.994 -0.206 -0.216 -0.163
(0.283) (0.510) (0.652) (0.667) (0.635)
∆ Share Employee 0.144 -0.0663 -6.875∗∗ -6.835∗∗ -6.459∗∗
(0.605) (1.149) (2.501) (2.555) (2.329)
∆ Share Entrepreneur -0.148 0.427 5.697∗∗ 5.643∗∗ 5.341∗∗
(0.332) (0.877) (2.085) (2.103) (1.924)
∆ Share Employer -0.0709 -0.542∗ -1.302∗∗∗ -1.313∗∗∗ -1.280∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.214) (0.367) (0.371) (0.341)
∆ Share Self-employed -0.0770 0.969 6.999∗∗ 6.956∗∗ 6.622∗∗
(0.281) (1.002) (2.353) (2.376) (2.170)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.528 0.510 0.375
First-stage F-statistic - - 55.05 50.94 63.64
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of repatriates over the native population above 15. All outcomes refer to
changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee, Share
Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as shares
over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the share
of unemployed over the native labour force. All regression contain dummies for
NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and
entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive and population below 15 as
share of total population, those with higher education as share of those above 15. IV1
is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on
network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B17: Labour market effects of repatriates on female natives -
pre-shock denominator
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.131 -0.354 -3.427∗ -3.373∗ -3.270∗
(0.301) (0.751) (1.661) (1.673) (1.597)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.904 -0.772 0.240 0.248 0.256
(0.585) (0.721) (0.959) (0.942) (0.911)
∆ Employment share 0.145 -0.0607 -2.972 -2.932 -2.844
(0.371) (0.727) (1.524) (1.526) (1.455)
∆ Share Employee -0.0270 -0.637 -3.511∗ -3.468∗ -3.353∗
(0.293) (0.674) (1.474) (1.497) (1.412)
∆ Share Entrepreneur -0.055 0.329 0.176 0.168 0.153
(0.345) (0.505) (0.842) (0.840) (0.806)
∆ Share Employer 0.017 -0.026 -0.127 -0.126 -0.121
(0.019) (0.038) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068)
∆ Share Self-employed -0.071 0.354 0.303 0.294 0.274
(0.358) (0.498) (0.824) (0.824) (0.789)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.528 0.510 0.375
First-stage F-statistic - - 55.05 50.94 63.64
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: See notes in table B16. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B18: Labor market effects of male repatriates on male natives - baseline
OLS IV
Outcomes for male natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP 0.248 0.472 -0.218 -0.223 -0.183
(0.337) (0.429) (0.291) (0.306) (0.287)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.181 -0.057 0.230 0.233 0.224
(0.122) (0.160) (0.120) (0.120) (0.118)
∆ Employment share 0.416 0.490 -0.449 -0.457 -0.410
(0.369) (0.494) (0.323) (0.341) (0.318)
∆ Share Employee -0.228 -1.552 -3.915∗∗∗ -3.914∗∗∗ -3.805∗∗∗
(0.857) (1.016) (1.009) (1.039) (0.979)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.158 1.458 3.009∗∗∗ 2.995∗∗∗ 2.932∗∗∗
(0.522) (0.761) (0.847) (0.859) (0.822)
∆ Share Employer -0.361∗ -0.535∗∗ -0.629∗∗∗ -0.637∗∗∗ -0.642∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.153) (0.179) (0.182) (0.175)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.519 1.993∗ 3.638∗∗∗ 3.633∗∗∗ 3.574∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.817) (0.967) (0.981) (0.940)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 0.745 0.716 0.300
First-stage F-statistic - - 9.99 9.54 12.34
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the
sample of male repatriates over the native male population above 15. All outcomes
refer to changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee,
Share Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as
shares over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the
share of unemployed over the native labor force. All regression contain dummies for
NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and
entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive and population below 15 as
share of total population, those with higher education as share of those above 15. IV1
is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on
network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B19: Labor market effects of female repatriates on female natives -
baseline
OLS IV
Outcomes for female natives (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ LFP -0.618 -1.309 -1.972∗∗ -1.944∗∗ -1.916∗∗
(0.637) (0.944) (0.711) (0.720) (0.723)
∆ Unemployment rate -1.420 -0.650 0.106 0.104 0.126
(0.789) (1.032) (0.551) (0.546) (0.532)
∆ Employment share -0.006 -0.863 -1.680∗ -1.657∗ -1.642∗
(0.648) (0.974) (0.676) (0.680) (0.676)
∆ Share Employee -0.848 -1.220 -1.912∗∗ -1.896∗∗ -1.880∗∗
(0.616) (0.766) (0.583) (0.596) (0.595)
∆ Share Entrepreneur 0.549 0.0809 0.0140 0.0169 0.0174
(0.547) (0.530) (0.444) (0.446) (0.443)
∆ Share Employer -0.0122 -0.0593 -0.0746∗ -0.0745∗ -0.0733∗
(0.0352) (0.0410) (0.0352) (0.0354) (0.0356)
∆ Share Self-employed 0.561 0.140 0.0886 0.0914 0.0906
(0.564) (0.522) (0.434) (0.437) (0.433)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Instrument - - IV1 IV2 IV3
First-stage coefficient - - 1.01 0.720 0.253
First-stage F-statistic - - 92.34 17.94 23.56
Observations 30 30 30 30 30
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variable is the sample
of female repatriates over the native female population above 15. All outcomes
refer to changes between 1960 and 1981. LFP, Employment share, Share Employee,
Share Entrepreneurship, Share Employer and Share Self-employed are calculated as
shares over the native working age population. The unemployment rate refers to the
share of unemployed over the native labor force. All regression contain dummies for
NUTS 2 regions. Controls contain the following parameters in 1960: unemployed and
entrepreneurs as share of working age population, inactive and population below 15 as
share of total population, those with higher education as share of those above 15. IV1
is the instrument based on educational network effects, IV2 is the instrument based on
network effects according to the colony lived in and IV3 is the basic Bartik instrument.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Figure C1: Products in Sample: All Product Groups
João Pereira dos Santos 200
Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Figure C2: Trends in Prices and Quantities: High Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: Average price (in euros) and ln(quantity of liters sold).
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Figure C3: Trends in Prices and Quantities: Medium Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: Average price (in euros) and ln(quantity of liters sold).
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Figure C4: Trends in Prices and Quantities: Low Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: Average price (in euros) and ln(quantity of liters sold).
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Figure C5: Trends in Prices and Quantities: Zero Sugar
A. Unbalanced Panel
B. Balanced Panel
Notes: Average price (in euros) and ln(quantity of liters sold).
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Table C1: Difference-in-differences Results: Prices in ln
ln(Price)
HS MS LS ZS
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion× PG -0.034*** -0.035* -0.019 -0.052***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011)
UnderApproval × PG 0.008 0.009 -0.018 0.014
(0.019) (0.032) (0.014) (0.015)
Implementation× PG 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.190*** 0.082*
(0.053) (0.032) (0.024) (0.044)
N 647966 567784 1107415 499099
adj. R2 0.985 0.973 0.966 0.987
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion× PG -0.032** -0.062*** -0.033* -0.050***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.007)
UnderApproval × PG 0.015 -0.015 -0.021 0.017
(0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018)
Implementation× PG 0.213*** 0.149*** 0.226*** 0.133*
(0.072) (0.033) (0.025) (0.073)
N 301075 317611 510061 224960
adj. R2 0.988 0.981 0.965 0.986
Quarter FE X X X X
Product-store FE X X X X
Month-region FE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1%(***). UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017;
Implementation: February 2017-January 2018. PG stands for the following product groups: HS(HighSugar),
MS(MediumSugar), LS(LowSugar), and ZS(ZeroSugar).
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Figure C6: Event Study Results for Ln(Quantity of Liters Sold): Aggregation
to the Brand Level
High Sugar Medium Sugar
Low Sugar Zero Sugar
Note: Standard errors are clustered by brand.
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Table C2: Difference-in-differences Placebo Results
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
HS MS LS ZS HS MS LS ZS
A. Unbalanced Panel
Fev −Apr2016 × PG -0.026 -0.026 0.025 -0.005 -0.004 0.135 -0.067 0.044
(0.023) (0.018) (0.041) (0.014) (0.071) (0.088) (0.111) (0.065)
N 253013 222241 452699 198364 253013 222241 452699 198364
adj. R2 0.982 0.958 0.956 0.986 0.907 0.861 0.878 0.913
B. Balanced Panel
Fev −Apr2016 × PG -0.030 -0.019 -0.004 -0.006 0.019 0.065 -0.020 0.007
(0.027) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.053) (0.080) (0.080) (0.047)
N 177911 160980 282091 137346 177911 160980 282091 137346
adj. R2 0.984 0.962 0.946 0.987 0.942 0.913 0.908 0.952
Quarter FE X X X X X X X X
Product-store FE X X X X X X X X
Month-region FE X X X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1%(***). UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017;
Implementation: February 2017-January 2018. PG stands for the following product groups: HS(HighSugar),
MS(MediumSugar), LS(LowSugar), and ZS(ZeroSugar).
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Table C3: Difference-in-differences Different Comparison Group
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
Baseline With Sparkling Water Baseline With Sparkling Water
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.040** -0.027 -0.084 -0.094*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.051) (0.051)
UnderApproval×HS -0.016 -0.019 -0.005 -0.036
(0.048) (0.048) (0.093) (0.084)
Implementation×HS 0.160*** 0.148*** -0.065 -0.060
(0.034) (0.035) (0.080) (0.068)
N 647966 770332 647966 770332
adj. R2 0.980 0.977 0.904 0.898
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.031** -0.019 -0.026 -0.035
(0.014) (0.016) (0.107) (0.106)
UnderApproval×MS 0.003 0.000 0.041 0.010
(0.025) (0.026) (0.184) (0.179)
Implementation×MS 0.152*** 0.141*** 0.003 0.008
(0.021) (0.022) (0.113) (0.104)
N 567786 690152 567786 690152
adj. R2 0.963 0.952 0.855 0.859
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.016** -0.004 -0.150** -0.158**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.066) (0.066)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 -0.015 0.085 0.054
(0.011) (0.014) (0.089) (0.080)
Implementation× LS 0.154*** 0.142*** -0.185** -0.179***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.077) (0.066)
N 1107429 1229795 1107429 1229795
adj. R2 0.957 0.952 0.879 0.876
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.042*** -0.029** -0.041 -0.051
(0.010) (0.012) (0.048) (0.048)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.022 -0.025 -0.040 -0.071
(0.055) (0.056) (0.127) (0.121)
Implementation× ZS 0.093*** 0.082*** 0.027 0.031
(0.020) (0.021) (0.091) (0.082)
N 499099 621465 499099 621465
adj. R2 0.984 0.977 0.906 0.899
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.027* -0.018 -0.034 -0.047
(0.015) (0.017) (0.059) (0.059)
UnderApproval×HS -0.029 -0.040 0.189*** 0.154***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.054) (0.052)
Implementation×HS 0.173*** 0.158*** -0.056 -0.076
(0.052) (0.052) (0.090) (0.084)
N 301075 376191 301075 376191
adj. R2 0.983 0.980 0.940 0.931
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.050*** -0.041** 0.049 0.036
(0.015) (0.017) (0.098) (0.097)
UnderApproval×MS -0.017 -0.029 0.239*** 0.203**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.079) (0.077)
Implementation×MS 0.143*** 0.129*** 0.038 0.017
(0.018) (0.019) (0.086) (0.079)
N 317611 392727 317611 392727
adj. R2 0.971 0.959 0.913 0.908
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.019** -0.010 -0.052 -0.066
(0.007) (0.011) (0.058) (0.058)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 -0.023 0.237* 0.202*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.119) (0.118)
Implementation× LS 0.162*** 0.147*** -0.134* -0.155**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.065) (0.057)
N 510064 585180 510064 585180
adj. R2 0.932 0.936 0.908 0.904
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.041*** -0.032** 0.009 -0.004
(0.010) (0.013) (0.097) (0.097)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.013 -0.024 0.171** 0.135**
(0.046) (0.047) (0.066) (0.064)
Implementation× ZS 0.102** 0.088* 0.119 0.098
(0.042) (0.043) (0.155) (0.151)
N 224960 300076 224960 300076
adj. R2 0.985 0.974 0.939 0.930
Quarter FE X X X X
Product-store FE X X X X
Month-region FE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***).
UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017; Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
PG stands for the following product groups: HS(HighSugar), MS(MediumSugar), LS(LowSugar), and ZS(ZeroSugar).
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Table C4: Difference-in-differences Robustness Results
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
Baseline No Own Brand No Border Baseline No Own Brand No Border
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.040** -0.046** -0.040** -0.085 -0.080 -0.083
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.051) (0.059) (0.051)
UnderApproval×HS -0.016 -0.025 -0.016 -0.005 -0.035 -0.005
(0.048) (0.059) (0.048) (0.093) (0.114) (0.093)
Implementation×HS 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.160*** -0.065 -0.060 -0.063
(0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (0.080) (0.084) (0.080)
N 647412 532198 633089 647412 532198 633089
adj. R2 0.980 0.978 0.980 0.904 0.879 0.904
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.031** -0.033* -0.032** -0.026 -0.051 -0.024
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.107) (0.118) (0.107)
UnderApproval×MS 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.041 0.034 0.042
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.184) (0.212) (0.184)
Implementation×MS 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.003 -0.043 0.004
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.113) (0.129) (0.113)
N 567289 480691 554839 567289 480691 554839
adj. R2 0.963 0.958 0.963 0.854 0.801 0.855
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.016** -0.012 -0.016** -0.150** -0.128 -0.149**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.066) (0.077) (0.065)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.085 0.116 0.084
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.089) (0.108) (0.089)
Implementation× LS 0.154*** 0.162*** 0.154*** -0.185** -0.198** -0.185**
(0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.078) (0.097) (0.077)
N 1106727 838023 1082533 1106727 838023 1082533
adj. R2 0.957 0.953 0.957 0.879 0.830 0.879
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.041 -0.030 -0.040
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.022 -0.034 -0.022 -0.041 -0.058 -0.039
(0.055) (0.071) (0.056) (0.127) (0.158) (0.127)
Implementation× ZS 0.093*** 0.078*** 0.093*** 0.027 0.029 0.029
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.091) (0.101) (0.091)
N 498730 412539 487810 498730 412539 487810
adj. R2 0.984 0.983 0.984 0.906 0.882 0.906
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.027* -0.033 -0.027* -0.033 0.016 -0.032
(0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
UnderApproval×HS -0.029 -0.054 -0.029 0.190*** 0.229*** 0.189***
(0.057) (0.086) (0.057) (0.054) (0.072) (0.054)
Implementation×HS 0.173*** 0.146* 0.172*** -0.056 0.004 -0.055
(0.052) (0.078) (0.052) (0.090) (0.075) (0.090)
N 300967 210932 294813 300967 210932 294813
adj. R2 0.983 0.981 0.983 0.940 0.915 0.940
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.051*** 0.049 0.029 0.051
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.098) (0.116) (0.098)
UnderApproval×MS -0.017 -0.024 -0.017 0.238*** 0.280*** 0.239***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.079) (0.075) (0.078)
Implementation×MS 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.038 -0.010 0.039
(0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.086) (0.099) (0.086)
N 317467 253532 310808 317467 253532 310808
adj. R2 0.971 0.964 0.971 0.913 0.866 0.914
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.019** -0.011 -0.019** -0.052 -0.011 -0.052
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.058) (0.067) (0.057)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 0.237* 0.398*** 0.235*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.119) (0.076) (0.119)
Implementation× LS 0.162*** 0.184*** 0.162*** -0.134* -0.157* -0.135**
(0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.065) (0.0 85) (0.065)
N 509992 335847 498978 509992 335847 498978
adj. R2 0.932 0.902 0.932 0.908 0.851 0.908
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.042*** 0.009 0.077 0.009
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.097) (0.123) (0.098)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.013 -0.035 -0.013 0.171** 0.253*** 0.171**
(0.046) (0.073) (0.046) (0.066) (0.052) (0.066)
Implementation× ZS 0.102** 0.064 0.102** 0.119 0.228 0.120
(0.042) (0.053) (0.042) (0.155) (0.150) (0.155)
N 224888 164518 220281 224888 164518 220281
adj. R2 0.985 0.984 0.985 0.939 0.915 0.940
Quarter FE X X X X X X
Product-store FE X X X X X X
Month-region FE X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***).
UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017; Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
PG stands for the following product groups: HS(HighSugar), MS(MediumSugar), LS(LowSugar), and ZS(ZeroSugar).
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Table C5: Difference-in-differences Location Results
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
Baseline Lis/ Op No Lis/ Op Baseline Lis/ Op No Lis/ Op
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.040** -0.038*** -0.042** -0.085 -0.076 -0.091
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.051) (0.048) (0.055)
UnderApproval×HS -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.005 0.004 -0.011
(0.048) (0.051) (0.046) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093)
Implementation×HS 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.161*** -0.065 -0.057 -0.071
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.080) (0.083) (0.079)
N 647412 268608 378804 647412 268608 378804
adj. R2 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.904 0.900 0.906
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.031** -0.030** -0.032** -0.026 -0.040 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108)
UnderAprroval×HS 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.041 0.056 0.030
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.184) (0.173) (0.192)
Implementation×MS 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.003 0.008 -0.001
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.113) (0.106) (0.119)
N 567289 236691 330598 567289 236691 330598
adj. R2 0.963 0.965 0.962 0.854 0.852 0.856
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.016** -0.017** -0.016** -0.150** -0.139** -0.157**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.066) (0.062) (0.069)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 0.085 0.083 0.086
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.089) (0.087) (0.092)
Implementation× LS 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.155*** -0.185** -0.179** -0.189**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.078) (0.076) (0.079)
N 1106727 458807 647920 1106727 458807 647920
adj. R2 0.957 0.955 0.958 0.879 0.878 0.880
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041 -0.065 -0.024
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.048) (0.045) (0.050)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.022 -0.024 -0.021 -0.041 -0.027 -0.049
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.127) (0.139) (0.119)
Implementation× ZS 0.093*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.027 0.007 0.042
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.091) (0.093) (0.091)
N 498730 205082 293648 498730 205082 293648
adj. R2 0.984 0.985 0.984 0.906 0.903 0.908
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.027* -0.027 -0.028* -0.033 -0.019 -0.043
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.059) (0.054) (0.066)
UnderApproval×HS -0.029 -0.039 -0.021 0.190*** 0.231*** 0.158***
(0.057) (0.065) (0.052) (0.054) (0.063) (0.053)
Implementation×HS 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.175*** -0.056 -0.032 -0.074
(0.052) (0.053) (0.051) (0.090) (0.096) (0.087)
N 300967 128501 172466 300967 128501 172466
adj. R2 0.983 0.984 0.983 0.940 0.943 0.938
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.053*** 0.049 0.023 0.069
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.098) (0.094) (0.102)
UnderApproval×MS -0.017 -0.016 -0.018 0.238*** 0.244*** 0.234**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.079) (0.072) (0.085)
Implementation×MS 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.038 0.054 0.025
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.086) (0.077) (0.093)
N 317467 135373 182094 317467 135373 182094
adj. R2 0.971 0.974 0.969 0.913 0.918 0.911
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.019** -0.017** -0.021*** -0.052 -0.042 -0.060
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 -0.009 -0.013 0.237* 0.235* 0.239*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.119) (0.116) (0.122)
Implementation× LS 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.160*** -0.134* -0.118* -0.147**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.065) (0.060) (0.070)
N 509992 215434 294558 509992 215434 294558
adj. R2 0.932 0.926 0.935 0.908 0.911 0.907
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.044*** 0.009 -0.003 0.018
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.013 -0.015 -0.012 0.171** 0. 214** 0.139**
(0.046) (0.051) (0.043) (0.066) (0.081) (0.060)
Implementation× ZS 0.102** 0.104** 0.101** 0.119 0.118 0.119
(0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.155) (0.165) (0.150)
N 224888 95061 129827 224888 95061 129827
adj. R2 0.985 0.986 0.984 0.939 0.942 0.938
Quarter FE X X X X X X
Product-store FE X X X X X X
Month-region FE X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***).
UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017; Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
PG stands for the following product groups: HS(HighSugar), MS(MediumSugar), LS(LowSugar), and ZS(ZeroSugar).
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Table C6: Difference-in-differences Different Sizes
Price (in euros) ln(Quantity of liters sold)
Baseline Less 1L 1L or More Baseline Less 1L 1L or More
A. Unbalanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.040** -0.048** -0.034** -0.084 -0.012 -0.136**
(0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.051) (0.055) (0.051)
UnderApproval×HS -0.016 -0.039 0.003 -0.005 0.030 -0.040
(0.048) (0.085) (0.016) (0.093) (0.107) (0.117)
Implementation×HS 0.160*** 0.153** 0.167*** -0.065 0.003 -0.130
(0.034) (0.059) (0.021) (0.080) (0.073) (0.102)
N 647966 455341 487984 647966 455341 487984
adj. R2 0.980 0.981 0.965 0.904 0.919 0.878
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.031** -0.048*** -0.025 -0.026 0.072 -0.071
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.107) (0.052) (0.136)
UnderApproval×MS 0.003 -0.021 0.015 0.041 0.093 0.015
(0.025) (0.018) (0.030) (0.184) (0.113) (0.222)
Implementation×MS 0.152*** 0.179*** 0.140*** 0.003 0.084 -0.035
(0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.113) (0.072) (0.145)
N 567786 381824 481321 567786 381824 481321
adj. R2 0.963 0.983 0.921 0.855 0.898 0.838
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.016** -0.049*** -0.005 -0.150** -0.079 -0.174**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.066) (0.052) (0.084)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 0.085 -0.138** 0.167
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.089) (0.066) (0.102)
Implementation× LS 0.154*** 0.145*** 0.158*** -0.185** -0.122 -0.211**
(0.025) (0.038) (0.021) (0.077) (0.087) (0.083)
N 1107429 516459 886329 1107429 516459 886329
adj. R2 0.957 0.972 0.893 0.879 0.920 0.864
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.042*** -0.028** -0.056*** -0.041 -0.030 -0.051
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.048) (0.036) (0.076)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.022 -0.053 0.036*** -0.040 0.086 -0.236
(0.055) (0.086) (0.012) (0.127) (0.104) (0.190)
Implementation× ZS 0.093*** 0.106*** 0.076** 0.027 0.079 -0.039
(0.020) (0.022) (0.031) (0.091) (0.076) (0.170)
N 499099 406759 387699 499099 406759 387699
adj. R2 0.984 0.986 0.959 0.906 0.918 0.871
B. Balanced Panel
UnderDiscussion×HS -0.027* -0.039* -0.015 -0.034 0.028 -0.098*
(0.015) (0.019) (0.010) (0.059) (0.056) (0.048)
UnderApproval×HS -0.029 -0.078 0.023 0.189*** 0.158* 0.221***
(0.057) (0.095) (0.015) (0.054) (0.082) (0.067)
Implementation×HS 0.173*** 0.154 0.192*** -0.056 -0.005 -0.110
(0.052) (0.092) (0.009) (0.090) (0.072) (0.105)
N 301075 234273 230683 301075 234273 230683
adj. R2 0.983 0.983 0.960 0.940 0.945 0.934
UnderDiscussion×MS -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.048** 0.049 0.134** -0.001
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.098) (0.051) (0.125)
UnderApproval×MS -0.017 -0.020 -0.015 0.239*** 0.190*** 0.268**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.079) (0.037) (0.110)
Implementation×MS 0.143*** 0.186*** 0.118*** 0.038 0.122 -0.013
(0.018) (0.028) (0.022) (0.086) (0.072) (0.108)
N 317611 221261 260231 317611 221261 260231
adj. R2 0.971 0.984 0.934 0.913 0.944 0.899
UnderDiscussion× LS -0.019** -0.045*** -0.013* -0.052 -0.078** -0.045
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.058) (0.027) (0.066)
UnderApproval× LS -0.011 0.009 -0.017 0.237* -0.069** 0.319***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.119) (0.029) (0.099)
Implementation× LS 0.162*** 0.128*** 0.171*** -0.134* -0.138** -0.133*
(0.025) (0.008) (0.027) (0.065) (0.054) (0.072)
N 510064 237063 436882 510064 237063 436882
adj. R2 0.932 0.984 0.904 0.908 0.946 0.904
UnderDiscussion× ZS -0.041*** -0.044** -0.038*** 0.009 0.02 0.018
(0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.097) (0.067) (0.177)
UnderApproval× ZS -0.013 -0.042 0.023** 0.171** 0.296*** 0.017
(0.046) (0.084) (0.010) (0.066) (0.076) (0.170)
Implementation× ZS 0.102** 0.111** 0.092 0.119 0.158* 0.070
(0.042) (0.043) (0.058) (0.155) (0.074) (0.346)
N 224960 197567 191274 224960 197567 191274
adj. R2 0.985 0.986 0.965 0.939 0.945 0.932
Quarter FE X X X X X X
Product-store FE X X X X X X
Month-region FE X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by brand. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***).
UnderDiscussion: May-October 2016; UnderApproval: November 2016-January 2017; Implementation: February 2017-January 2018.
PG stands for the following product groups: HS(HighSugar), MS(MediumSugar), LS(LowSugar), and ZS(ZeroSugar).
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Measuring causal impacts with natural and field experiments
Figure D1: Number of ATM machines in Portugal
Source: INE and SIBS
Figure D2: Amount of withdrawals in ATMs Portugal (in constant euros)
Source: INE and SIBS
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Figure D3: Turnout Rates (in %)
2017 Local Elections - Mainland Portugal
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Figure D4: Campaign (treatment message)
Notes: “Votar é um dever” means “To vote is a duty”. “Este domingo/ amanhã/ hoje vote” means “This Sunday/
tomorrow/ today vote”.
Figure D5: Estimated Treatment Effects as in Figure 4.3
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Table D1: Balance Tests
Variable Treatment Control Difference (Std. Error)
Stratification Controls
Voters Density 509.111 515.436 -6.324 (64.032)
Number of ATM Devices 7.029 6.991 0.038 (0.726)
Number of Commercial Banks 1.141 1.223 -0.082 (0.158)
Turnout 2013 (%) 0.595 0.595 0.000 (0.005)
Term Limit Dummy 2017 0.082 0.088 -0.006 (0.014)
Other Controls
-Socio-demographic and Economic
Population Below 15 Share 2011 (%) 24.637 24.672 -0.035 (0.247)
Population Above 70 Share 2011 (%) 16.635 16.463 0.172 (0.365)
New Citizens Share 2011 (%) 2.139 2.146 -0.007 (0.063)
Until Primary Education Share 2011 (%) 39.559 39.293 0.266 (0.395)
Tertiary Education Share 2011 (%) 7.644 7.842 -0.198 (0.256)
Mean Value September 2016 40380.310 40017.870 362.436 (4177.158)
Unemployment Rate 2011 (%) 12.328 12.439 -0.112 (0.194)
Service Workers Share 2011 (%) 61.589 61.988 0.399 (0.699)
-Fiscal and Political
Transfer to Civil Parish per capita 0.032 0.031 0.001 (0.001)
Winning Margin 2013 (%) 22.081 21.463 0.619 (0.916)
Number of Candidates 2017 3.563 3.599 -0.036 (0.064)
Independent Mayor Dummy 0.101 0.096 0.005 (0.015)
Leftist Share 2013 (%) 48.773 49.026 -0.253 (1.124)
Central Government Alignment Dummy 0.449 0.447 0.002 (0.025)
ATM Usage (Entire Campaign)
Number of Cards (/100) 22.686 22.498 0.188 (2.507)
Number of Operations (/100) 38.674 38.421 0.253 (4.281)
Number of Withdrawals (/100) 19.398 19.244 0.154 (2.110)
Past Elections
Turnout Rate EU 2014 (%) 33.999 33.723 0.277 (0.359)
Turnout Rate Leg 2015 (%) 56.277 56.099 0.178 (0.371)
Turnout Rate Pres 2016 (%) 49.090 48.869 0.221 (0.393)
Notes: Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and
1% (***).
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Table D2: Descriptive Statistics of the post-treatment recall survey
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable
Recall GOTV Campaign 0.188 0.391 0 1
Recall Any Campaign 0.506 0.501 0 1
Experimental Variable
Treatment 0.596 0.492 0 1
Control Variables
Gender 0.500 0.501 0 1
Age 51.949 15.977 19 91
Primary Education 0.152 0.360 0 1
Secundary Education 0.264 0.442 0 1
Tertiary Education 0.539 0.500 0 1
Low Interest in Politics 0.514 0.501 0 1
Medium Interest in Politics 0.232 0.423 0 1
Notes: N= 175, corresponding to our preferred specification in Table 4.2. The omitted categories in the control
variables are No Primary Education and High Interest in Politics.
Table D3: Baseline Results per Tercile
Turnout Rate 2017
1st Tercile 2nd Tercile 3rd Tercile
Treatment -0.113 -0.232 0.244
(0.414) (0.397) (0.265)
Municipal dummies Yes Yes Yes
Stratification Controls Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 568 567 568
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.574 0.87
Notes: The dependent variable, Turnout Rate 2017, is measured in percentage terms. Terciles according to ATM Usage
are measured using the number of unique cards. Treatment is a binary indicator that takes value one if all ATMs in
the civil parish displayed the voting campaign. There are 308 municipal dummies. The vector of Stratification Controls
includes registered voters’ density, the number of ATM devices, the number of commercial banks in 2016, and turnout
in 2013 municipal elections. The vector of Other Controls includes the share population below 15 years old in 2011, the
share of population above 70 years old in 2011, the share of new citizens in 2011 (since 2007), the share of citizens with
primary education and below in 2011, the share of citizens with tertiary education in 2011, the mean value withdrawn
in ATMs in September 2016, the unemployment rate in 2011, transfers to civil parishes per capita, the winning margin
share in 2013 Local Elections, the number of candidates in the 2017 local election, an independent mayor dummy for
2017, the share leftist votes in the 2013 local election, a central government alignment dummy. Robust standard errors
are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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Table D4: Difference-in-Differences Results





Number of observations 3 406
Adjusted R2 0.590
Notes: The dependent variable, Turnout Rate Local Election (2017 and 2013), is measured in percentage terms.
Treatment is a binary indicator that takes value one if all ATMs in the civil parish displayed the voting campaign.
There are 308 municipal dummies. Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
Table D5: Intensity Effects: Weekend
Turnout Rate 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.213 -0.034 -0.199 -0.030 -0.239 -0.041
(0.351) (0.197) (0.351) (0.196) (0.355) (0.197)
Treatment * Number of Cards (*100) 0.027** 0.010**
(0.013) (0.005)
Number of Cards (*100) -0.109*** -0.038***
(0.010) (0.014)
Treatment * Number of Operations (*100) 0.017** 0.006*
(0.009) (0.003)
Number of Operations (*100) -0.070*** -0.023**
(0.007) (0.009)
Treatment * Number of Withdrawals (*100) 0.036** 0.012**
(0.017) (0.006)
Number of Withdrawals (*100) -0.138*** -0.052***
(0.013) (0.019)
Municipal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratification Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703
Adjusted R2 0.620 0.876 0.619 0.876 0.621 0.876
Notes: The dependent variable, Turnout Rate 20117, is measured in percentage terms. Treatment is a binary indicator
that takes value one if all ATMs in the civil parish displayed the voting campaign. There are 308 municipal dummies.
The vector of Stratification Controls includes registered voters’ density, the number of ATM devices, the number of
commercial banks in 2016, and turnout in 2013 municipal elections. The vector of Other Controls includes the share
population below 15 years old in 2011, the share of population above 70 years old in 2011, the share of new citizens in
2011 (since 2007), the share of citizens with primary education and below in 2011, the share of citizens with tertiary
education in 2011, the mean value withdrawn in ATMs in September 2016, the unemployment rate in 2011, transfers to
civil parishes per capita, the winning margin share in 2013 Local Elections, the number of candidates in the 2017 local
election, an independent mayor dummy for 2017, the share leftist votes in the 2013 local election, a central government
alignment dummy. Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
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Table D6: Intensity Effects: Robustness Check without Lisbon and Oporto
Turnout Rate 2017
Excluding: Lisbon and Oporto Municipalities Lisbon and Oporto Districts
Treatment -0.025 -0.022 -0.023 -0.190 -0.193 -0.181
(0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.225) (0.224) (0.225)
Treatment * Number of Cards (*100) 0.006* 0.014***
(0.003) (0.005)
Number of Cards (*100) -0.011 -0.024
(0.010) (0.016)
Treatment * Number of Operations (*100) 0.003* 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003)
Number of Operations (*100) -0.007 -0.016*
(0.006) (0.010)
Treatment * Number of Withdrawals (*100) 0.007* 0.015***
(0.004) (0.005)
Number of Withdrawals (*100) -0.011 -0.013
(0.016) (0.021)
Municipality Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1 673 1 673 1 673 1 390 1 390 1 390
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.863 0.863 0.863
Notes: The dependent variable, Turnout Rate 20117, is measured in percentage terms. Treatment is a binary indicator
that takes value one if all ATMs in the civil parish displayed the voting campaign. There are 308 municipal dummies.
The vector of Stratification Controls includes registered voters’ density, the number of ATM devices, the number of
commercial banks in 2016, and turnout in 2013 municipal elections. The vector of Other Controls includes the share
population below 15 years old in 2011, the share of population above 70 years old in 2011, the share of new citizens in
2011 (since 2007), the share of citizens with primary education and below in 2011, the share of citizens with tertiary
education in 2011, the mean value withdrawn in ATMs in September 2016, the unemployment rate in 2011, transfers to
civil parishes per capita, the winning margin share in 2013 Local Elections, the number of candidates in the 2017 local
election, an independent mayor dummy for 2017, the share leftist votes in the 2013 local election, a central government
alignment dummy. Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
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Table D7: Intensity Effects: Robustness Check without Autonomous Regions
Turnout Rate 2017
Excluding: Azores and Madeira Autonomous Regions
Treatment -0.071 -0.071 -0.078 -0.080 -0.080 -0.086
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.209) (0.208) (0.208)
Treatment * Number of Cards (*100) 0.006** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Number of Cards (*100) -0.010 -0.010
(0.010) (0.010)
Treatment * Number of Operations (*100) 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Number of Operations (*100) -0.008 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
Treatment * Number of Withdrawals (*100) 0.007** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003)
Number of Withdrawals (*100) -0.019 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013)
Municipality Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social Support Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546
Adjusted R2 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873
Notes: The dependent variable, Turnout Rate 20117, is measured in percentage terms. Treatment is a binary indicator
that takes value one if all ATMs in the civil parish displayed the voting campaign. There are 308 municipal dummies.
The vector of Stratification Controls includes registered voters’ density, the number of ATM devices, the number of
commercial banks in 2016, and turnout in 2013 municipal elections. The vector of Other Controls includes the share
population below 15 years old in 2011, the share of population above 70 years old in 2011, the share of new citizens in
2011 (since 2007), the share of citizens with primary education and below in 2011, the share of citizens with tertiary
education in 2011, the mean value withdrawn in ATMs in September 2016, the unemployment rate in 2011, transfers to
civil parishes per capita, the winning margin share in 2013 Local Elections, the number of candidates in the 2017 local
election, an independent mayor dummy for 2017, the share leftist votes in the 2013 local election, a central government
alignment dummy. Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
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Table D8: Intensity Effects: Robustness Check Horse Race with (selected)
Control Variables
Turnout Rate 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment -0.022 -0.018 -1.000 0.133 0.496
(0.198) (0.197) (1.223) (0.346) (0.872)
Treatment * Number of Cards (*100) 0.007** 0.07** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.03) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Number of Cards (*100) -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Treatment * Voters’ Density -0.000
(0.000)
Treatment * Number of Commercial Banks -0.035
(0.061)
Treatment * Until Primary Education Share 2011 0.023
(0.031)
Treatment * Tertiary Education Share 2011 -0.027
(0.040)
Treatment * Service Workers Share 2011 -0.009
(0.014)
Municipal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703 1 703
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876
Notes: The dependent variable, Turnout Rate 20117, is measured in percentage terms. Treatment is a binary indicator
that takes value one if all ATMs in the civil parish displayed the voting campaign. There are 308 municipal dummies.
The vector of Stratification Controls includes registered voters’ density, the number of ATM devices, the number of
commercial banks in 2016, and turnout in 2013 municipal elections. The vector of Other Controls includes the share
population below 15 years old in 2011, the share of population above 70 years old in 2011, the share of new citizens in
2011 (since 2007), the share of citizens with primary education and below in 2011, the share of citizens with tertiary
education in 2011, the mean value withdrawn in ATMs in September 2016, the unemployment rate in 2011, transfers to
civil parishes per capita, the winning margin share in 2013 Local Elections, the number of candidates in the 2017 local
election, an independent mayor dummy for 2017, the share leftist votes in the 2013 local election, a central government
alignment dummy. Robust standard errors are depicted in parenthesis. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
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